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Preface
This book had
it is

its

inception in a common teaching experience. Although
years since we were first involved in the preparation

now almost two

of materials on the Middle East for a course in the problems of American
democracy, world events continue to remind us of the critical importance
of the Mediterranean area. Our students were aware of an increasing

variety of proposals for the role the United States should play in easing
the tensions in the Middle East, but they were relatively unfamiliar with
the general history and geography of the area. Thus they were unable to

evaluate these various proposals critically.

As a

result of this experience

it

was

felt

that there

was a general need

for a selection of materials designed to guide the citizen in formulating
his own view of United States policy in this troubled zone.
then

We

undertook a dual task: (1) the preparation of a descriptive essay which
would meet the need of student and lay reader alike as a guide to the
basic historical and geographical data of the Middle East; and (2) the
provision of a source book of historical and recent documents which would
constitute a framework for developing and testing foreign policy proposals.
We were assisted in our undertaking by many interested colleagues.
We wish to express our appreciation to all of them with a particular note
of gratitude to Professor Stuart Gerry Brown and Dean Harlan Cleveland of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs,
Syracuse University.

We

would

also like to

acknowledge our thanks to the following

for

permission to quote privileged or copyrighted material:
To The American Political Science Review for the selection from "The

Mainspring of American Foreign Policy," by Hans Morgenthau;
To Henry Holt and Company for the selection from Caravan, the
Story of the Middle East, by Carleton S, Coon;
To The New York Times for the selection from Harry S. Truman's
series, which appeared January 13, 1957;
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To the University of Chicago Press for the selection from American
Diplomacy, 1900-1951, by George F. Kennan.
CAROL FISHER and FRED KRINSKY
Maxwell School, Syracuse University
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Introduction

The

big failures are the most interesting part of history. This book brings
together some of the crucial documents necessary to understand the recent

failure of the West to read aright the signs of change in the Middle East,
and to cope with changes when they occurred. Because the drama of
American involvement in that turbulent area is only beginning, every
American can usefully acquaint himself with the facts.
The twenty-one months, from the Suez crisis to the Lebanon landings,
are truly a watershed in the history of the modern world. These stirring
the rise of Nasser in Egypt, the Arab unity movement, the deevents

velopment and will-to-survive of

Israel, the decline of

European influence

Levant, the competitive intervention of the Soviet Union and the
United States have their origins deep in a past but dimly remembered.
in the

The state of
Hebrew prayer

Israel can be seen as a political fulfillment of the ancient
to

God

to lead his

chosen people back to Jerusalem.

The

Arabs grope toward unity spurred by the memory of an antique time,
already a millenium past, when a Moslem empire spanned the world from
central Asia to Spain. The British-French landings at Suez can be seen in
in the
perspective as a pathetic reversion to methods that used to work
nineteenth century In that same century, we learned in school, Tsarist
Russia was forever pushing at the edges of the Middle East in search of a

warm-water port. And as for the Marines in Lebanon, are they not the
heirs and assigns of a tradition which includes a landing on the shores of
Tripoli in search of pirates?

What's past is prologue, to be sure; but the roots of the contemporary
crisis do not all lie deep in the kind of history that is measured in centuries. A closer look at the Middle East in 1956-58 shows us a past that
is full

of "proximate causes."

ingathering of the Jews in Palestine would hardly have achieved a
so disturbing to the Arabs had Hitler not consigned six million of their brethren to confinement and death. When the Industrial

The

momentum

ix

THE MIDDLE EAST IN

x

CRISIS

Revolution made petroleum a form of wealth, and petroleum was evennations of the Arab World,
tually found in unequal measure beneath the
the "have-not" nations
a move toward Arab unity was fore-ordained
"

u
Once Lenin took power
taking the initiative to federate with the haves
in nearby Russia, and established the policy of undermining capitalist

West off from its colonial ties, it was only a matter
of time before the Soviets would get around to penetrating the Middle
East in earnest. The wonder is that it didn't happen sooner before,
rather than after, the much larger and more difficult operations in China
strength

by cutting

the

and Southeast Asia.

Add to all of this the sudden emergence of the United States as the
most powerful nation in the world if also the one most astonished by its
ro l e
anc American involvement in the Middle East can be seen as almost
inevitable. The wonder is that we were able to stay on the sidelines as
]

long as

we

did.

book might well be subtitled, "The Sudden Education of the
United States." For two brief, crowded years, in the microcosm of the
Levant, Americans have been exposed to three homely truths. We have
This

little

learned that the mighty cannot avoid involvement in a crisis anywhere in
in Soviet arms trafso shrunken a world. A policy of studied disinterest
fic with Egypt, in Israel's desperate appeals for arms, in the precarious

Hashemite kings in Iraq and Jordan, in the growing power
Arab unity movement simply did not work. The same old problems remained and were rapidly joined by others. When President Eisenhower decided to "sit out" the Suez crisis, some kind of dramatic over-

position of the
of the

involvement at a later date was predestined. Destiny was in a hurry:
than two years later, the Marines were sloshing ashore at Beirut.

We

learned, too,

how unhelpful

to

less

our real interests are those cliches

by which we have lived for more than a generation

in

our relations with

the several regions of the world. Attractive ideas like "nationalism" and
"self-determination" and "federal union" somehow look different when

them up and use them to justify the assassination of Iraqi
and Egypt's "federation-by-swallowing" with Syria.
few
a
years ago, you had asked most Americans what they really
If,
the
Middle East, the unhesitating answer would have been:
in
wanted

others take

political leaders

We

have learned now that the attempt to assure stability by
bottling up political forces both ineluctable and readily exploited from
Moscow is a dubious way to seek peace and order in a revolutionary
"stability."

world. If

we have

learned this lesson well,

recorded in these pages

will

all

the diplomatic heartburn

have been eminently worth while.

Introduction

Taken

xi

documents in this volume constitute a judgment of
some of the methods powerful nations have long used

together, the

irrelevance against

affect the actions of

to

Egypt

in

others.

When

the British

that abortive and miserably executed

and French attacked

little

war

1956, the

of

outrage of the rest of the world soon gave way to amazement that any
prime minister of Britain or France could have started so quaintly oldfashioned an enterprise. Similarly, while the real drama was being played
in the "internal" affairs of several Middle Eastern countries, men

out

with international reputations for diplomatic sagacity were engaged in
setting

up military

announcing "doctrines" against the least
and gravely pretending that the established

alliances,

likely forms of aggression,

order of tiny, unviable "nations" was not already beyond repair.

some United

How

far

knowing the score was revealed
Iraq's king and prime minister, an

States officials were from

when, a few days before the murder of
American intelligence agent reported in Baghdad that the stability of Iraq
was assured. "These Iraqi Arabs are different," he averred. "They are congenitally incapable of assassinating their leaders."
In diplomacy as in genetics, only the fittest survive for long.

The

skills

are therefore unrequired to deal effectively across national boundaries
mutation these days. It is no longer adequate for American

dergoing rapid

of each foreign society,
diplomats to negotiate with the thin upper crust
and high governmental officials. Americans abroad are engaged nowadays in operations on a very large scale

to deal only with other diplomats

technical

aid,

industrial

clandestine liaison with

economic, and cultural

investment,

military

training,

and overt or

elements of each nation's political,
more deeply we become involved in other

all significant

life.

The

we are of the need to get
people's "internal affairs," the more conscious
with their possible sucbut
the
with
not
authorities,
existing
only
along,
Middle East, we temporarily laid aside this first principle
of twentieth-century diplomacy. We opted for stability in a region where
there will be no stability until there has been plenty of change.
cessors. In the

Because the Middle East's m^r-national

affairs

cannot be understood

without seeing the dynamic change in their wtfra-national affairs, Miss
Carol Fisher and Professor Fred Krinsky have not only put together a collection of timely historical documents but have produced a guide-book as
underan
well
essay which provides the background for

introductory
of contemporary
standing the place of each document in the tangled story
Eastern
Middle
history.
work is not just a "survey" of Middle Eastern affairs; it
The
is,

resulting
of United States interests
rather, a basis for discussion

and United
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States policy in the area. More than that, it is a discussion guide tested
in terms of past success. The documents it contains were first

and proved

assembled as a basis for a study-and-discussion project in a sophomore
course in Citizenship, conducted by the Maxwell School as part of Syracuse University's liberal arts program.

Both authors teach in the Citizenship Program, a general-education
curriculum designed to introduce freshmen and sophomores to the comand to methods of making and executing public
Miss Fisher, a graduate of Colorado College, has combined anthro-

plexities of public affairs

policy.

work with her

duties as Instructor at Syracuse University
her
requirements for the interdisciplinary Doctor of
completing
Social Science degree in the Maxwell Graduate School. Dr. Krinsky, As-

pological field

and

is

sociate Professor in the Citizenship Program, earned his
cal Science at the University of

Pennsylvania

in

Ph D.

in Politi-

1951 and taught at the

University of California before joining the Syracuse faculty in 1948. He
is co-author of several textbooks used in the Citizenship Program and

chairman of the editorial board which produced the sixth revised edition of
Problems in Democratic Citizenship, published by the Maxwell School.

HARLAN CLEVELAND
Dean, Maxwell Graduate School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs,
Syracuse University

HISTORICAL REVIEW

CHAPTER

The Land and
Many

Americans

first

Its

1

Peoples

recognized the importance of the Middle East to

when Israel was established as an independent nation,
The political attacks by Arab states on the new nation, the

the United States

May

14, 1948.

short but bloody Arab-Israeli war, the plight of Arab refugees, the continuing efforts of the United Nations to maintain a truce along the border
of Israel, the nationalization of the Suez Canal

the frightening

moment

of

war between

by Egypt in July, 1956,
and England on

Israel, France,

one side and Egypt on the other at the very moment of the Presidential
election of 1956, the increasing Russian influence in Syria and Egypt, and
the revolutions which have overthrown the monarchy in Iraq and threaten
other Middle Eastern nations

all these events have brought the Middle
East to the forefront of popular attention and concern. Yet perhaps the
first thing an alert citizen needs to know about the Middle East is that
behind these dramatic developments lies a complex history.

Many American citizens have viewed the happenings of October, 1956,
and the troubled times that have followed as due somehow to an unfortunately volatile mixture of the Suez Canal and Israel. Some have
assumed that there is necessarily a "right side" and a "wrong side" both
legally and morally in these events, and have been disappointed in the
search for a quick but just solution.

The purpose of this selection of readings is twofold. It is hoped that
the geographical, historical, and cultural materials in the introductory
essay together with the selection of important documents will provide
the reader with a clearer understanding of the problems and tensions in
the Middle East and of the importance of this area to world peace. It
is

further hoped that following developments in the Middle East from
tensions to the actual threat of world conflagration will serve as

local

useful staging for illustrating the development of America's foreign policy.
The Middle East contains the most appalling contrast between wealth
and poverty to be found anywhere in the world. It gave birth to and

3
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Hebrew, Christian, and
Moslem. Here are found peoples enjoying the advanced technologies of
industrial civilization surrounded by nomads living in mud huts and
animal-skin tents, caring for small wandering herds of camels and goats as
contains treasured relics of three great religions

thousand years before them. The challenge
formidable in this land of deserts, swamps, barren

their ancestors did literally ten

of the environment

is

rocky wastes and isolated areas of
environment is matched by variety
;

isolated for generations

From

fertile coastal plain.

in

This variety

in

the cultures of peoples relatively

by almost impassable

desert.

has been the meeting ground of East and
West. Overland transport depended upon long and tedious caravans for
safe passage through desert and barren hills. Even ocean vessels relied
earliest times this area

upon Middle Eastern ports

for provisions

and welcome

rest

on the journey

across oceans and around the tip of Africa. These deserts
"

became the

Middle East"

midpoint between Europe and the exotic spices and wares
or the "Near East" with reference to Europe.
of India and China

The

building of the Suez Canal brought the Middle East into even

sharper focus as a strategic geographical midpoint, and the discovery of
incredible amounts of oil beneath the desert sands and coastal plains won
for

the

Middle East the favors and attention

of all

the industrialized

nations of the world. Unfortunately, but logically, the area became a pawn
in the power struggles of the richer and more advanced nations. Its
peoples
know too well the yoke of foreign domination. To them imperialism is a

word

of hateful

meaning. But before we begin a more detailed consideraMiddle East we might first

tion of the several categories of tensions in the

turn to a brief contemporary political and geographical orientation.
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Middle East, with the

exception of Persia,
it

came under the

control of the

remained until the termination of World

War

I.

Ottoman Empire, where
Thus the contemporary

political history of the Middle East begins at the war's close in 1918
with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the partitioning of
the Middle East into spheres of influence and League of Nations protectorates awarded to Great Britain and to France.

The Middle East

is an area about the size of the United
States, mainly
and wasteland, supporting approximately 80,000,000 people.* A
majority of the people are illiterate and live in great poverty; a few are

desert

*

for

Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Lebanon and
of Statistic*, Vol XII, No. 10 (Oct. 1958),
Statistical Office of the United Nations, United Nations, New York.
Population
figures for Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Aden, and the Sheikdoms are curient New
Population

statistics

Turkey are taken from Monthly Bulletin

York Times

estimates.
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among the richest men in the world. In some areas technological development is creating a growing middle class, not yet successfully integrated
into the economic or political structure.

beside

those

many

centuries

The most modern

buildings stand

Transportation may be by a camel
caravan over desert trails, a "cadillac caravan" on a modern highway, or
a public conveyance, often a late model station wagon.
old.

Although some of the desert lands yield to cultivation if irrigated,
water is universally scarce. Since water is differentially available, in many
areas the full utilization of potential water resources will necessitate international

cooperation.

Mineral

reactions

the

in

soil,

for

example,

"salting up," further complicate irrigation problems.

An

estimated two-thirds of the world's

known

oil

resources

lie

beneath

but in general the people are not technically advanced enough
to develop or use them. Most of the oil is produced by more advanced
industrial nations on a fifty-fifty agreement basis.
this land

Another of the Middle East's major advantages involves its strategic
geographic location linking the three continents of Europe, Asia, and
Africa.

Problems of commercial and agricultural development, intense nationalism,

in

conflict

religious

beliefs,

resentment against former colonial

powers, internal intrigues and rivalries between ruling families, as well as
boundary disputes with frontiers periodically in motion, all encourage
weak, unstable governments and increasing internal and external tensions.

EGYPT
On February

Egyptians and Syrians voted nearly unanimously
United Arab Republic, a union of Egypt and Syria with
Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser as its first president (see Doc.
44). On March 8, Yemen joined with the UAR in a federation to be
21, 1958,

to establish the

known as the United Arab States. This agreement permitted Iman Ahmed
of Yemen to remain as absolute monarch of Yemen, but provided for
unified

armed

forces

and foreign

policies.

A

Federal Council of the

UAR

and Yemen representatives was granted veto power.
Let us look

first

of all at these three countries

who have

linked their

political futures for better or for worse.

At the outbreak of World

War

I,

Egypt, once a powerful civilization

became a British protectorate. In the tide of rising nationalism before
World War II Egypt was the first Middle Eastern country to achieve
political

independence, though British troops maintained a strong base
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the Suez area. After a period of continual tension, the last British
in June, 1956.
troops finally left Egyptian soil
has no coal or iron and only a little oil, not enough for her own

in

Egypt

needs.

A population

of 24,000,000 lives in an area about half again as large
miles. Ninety-six per cent of the country is

as Texas, 386,198 square
desert, however,

and most

of the people are concentrated in a

narrow

the Nile Valley. Although general living
strip of cultivated land along
conditions are very poor and mortality rates high, the population is inare

unemployment is rising, sales of cotton the major export
is dwindling. Thus it is underfalling off, and the flow of imported goods
standable that now, more than ever before, the Egyptians have come to
creasing,

look upon the Suez Canal as their greatest potential asset.
The government, prior to union with Syria, was a dictatorship under
rose to power in 1952 through an army coup
The government seeks to improve the econFarouk.
King
increase industry, and generally strengthen
of
standards
raise
living,
omy,

Gamal Abdul Nasser who
that dethroned

the power and position of Egypt.

SYRIA
little over 4,000,000 people
Iraq, is underpopulated \vith a
about the size of New
a
of
area
an
country
miles,
square
66,039
inhabiting

Syria,

like

additional
England. Some authorities estimate that up to 3,000,000
tlers

are necessary to provide the

manpower

set-

to develop Syria's resources.

Very little land is now under irrigation, although water is available
some quantity and the use of irrigation is increasing. Most Syrians are
farmers and herders, and enough wheat and meat are produced to meet
the country's needs. Other than building stone, raw materials are at a
in

bare minimum. Syria is paid considerable rent, however, for oil pipelines
running through its land from Iraq.
was granted independence by the French in 1941, but French and
Syria
British troops did not leave until 1946,

and then only under strong United
Nations pressure led by the United States. The government, prior to union
with Egypt, was run by an unstable army clique closely allied with Nasser
in

Egypt and increasingly pro-Soviet.

YEMEN
This country,

least

known and most backward

as big as Nebraska, 75,000 square miles,

in the

Middle East,

is

about

and supports a population

of

The Land and

Its

7
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about 4,500,000. Yemen is not the typical Middle Eastern
country recently released from colonial rule. Although controlled by Turks during
the sixteenth century, Yemen, a completely independent
oligarchy, has for
centuries been closed to outside influences.

This country has no roads, no transportation facilities, and no industry
is rich in water and
minerals, however, and has fertile

of importance. It

plateaus where grain and coffee are grown, though at least 90 per cent of
the population is both illiterate and poor.

JORDAN
On March

19,

tion of a union

1958, Iraq and Jordan formally proclaimed the constitubetween these two countries to be known as the Arab

Federation (see Doc. 45). Although Jordan and Iraq under this union
to retain sovereignty over their own territories, the constitution of

were

the Federation provided for equal representation in legislative, executive,
and judicial bodies empowered to act for the Federation as a whole.

On July 28, 1958, the government of Iraq was overthrown and a republic sympathetic to the United Arab Republic established in its place.
King Hussein of Jordan proclaimed himself head of the Arab Federation
under the constitutional clause that delegated authority to him in the
event of King Faisal's "absence," but without armed force he was powerless to support his claim and Iraq again operated as an independent government. Let us look for a

moment

at these

Federation for such a brief period.
For a few years immediately after World

two countries united as a

War

I,

the area

now known

was part of the Arab kingdom of Syria. With the collapse of
the Syrian authority in 1920 it came directly under British supervision.

as Jordan

Thus it was that Winston Churchill, acting as Colonial Secretary in 1922,
was able to set up Jordan as an independent national unit under Abdullah,
the second son of the

Arab

divert this ambitious prince

king, Hussein. His purpose in so doing

from leading a Bedouin army

to

was

to

war against

French-held Syria. At this time the area, then known as Transjordan,
was primarily a desert home for bands of wandering tribesmen, though
some important towns remained from the centuries when the major caravan routes crossed these lands. The population there in 1922 was approximately 300,000. Today it nears 1,500,000. Since Jordan annexed some of
the Palestine lands set aside by the United Nations for an Arab state,
it

now

little

extends across some 37,500 square miles, making
larger than the state of Indiana.

it

a territory a

MIDDLE EAST IN
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Severe desert conditions and scant material resources, except for an

abundance

The

of

economic handicap.
phosphate rock, constitute Jordan's grave

political

future

fluences Jordan

is

nationalist inequally uncertain. Under Arab

had ousted British

officers

from

its

territory in

March,

such a serious
July, 1958, revolution in Iraq, however, posed
threat to the monarchy in Jordan that Great Britain at once returned
is based on a combintroops to its support. Jordan's political uncertainty
ation of unstable government and threats of revolution together with
1956.

The

border struggles, high feelings of revenge against Israel and the problem

posed by the return of British forces.

IRAQ
an ancient civilization flourished on the rich
alluvial plain between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. This territory
which we now know as Iraq was even then made fertile by an ingenious
At one
system of canals on which the life of the countryside depended.
time or another over the centuries invading Persians, desert tribesmen,

Long before

biblical times,

Romans, and Turks destroyed the irrigation systems and
The desert knew a hundred years of
to fall back into
fertility in the eighth and ninth centuries only

Asians, Greeks,

so destroyed a succession of empires.

return to

wasteland again under the Ottoman Empire.
In World War I, British forces drove the Turks out of this land which
was then known as Mesopotamia, Iraq was created under British protec-

monarchy and in 1932 was recognized as an in1956 under pressures of Arab nationalism the last
Iraq and in July, 1958, a revolution overthrew the

torate as a constitutional

dependent nation. In
British forces left

monarchy

in

favor of a republic sympathetic to the cause of an extreme

nationalist group.

Approximately 6,500,000 people

live in this

country which

is

about half

the size of Texas.
Oil was discovered in great quantities in Iraq and the present government has been directing oil profits into programs designed to raise the

standard of living of the Iraqi who were, until just recently, as poor as

Middle East. Long-term programs for roads,
industrial development are in progress.
and
irrigation, dams, schools,
oil
moves
to
Europe through pipelines across Syria. These pipeIraq's

any of the peoples

lines

of the

were damaged by Syria when Egypt was attacked in October, 1956.
fell to a minimum and tension developed with Syria over

Oil income

repair of the pipelines.

The Land and
Apart from
the soil

is
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oil

the only major export

unusually
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fertile

is

dates.

When

properly irrigated

and the country could support and would need

more people

to develop its resources.

SUDAN
Though located on the southern Egyptian border and primarily a central
African country, the Sudan has been included in this discussion of the
Middle East because of its strategic and economic importance to Egypt.
Long-range control of the Nile waters hinges on cooperation between
Egypt and Sudan.
This area, about one-third the size of the United States, supports a
population of about 10,200,000 people who live in tropical forests, wide
a variplains, and fertile lands along the Nile. The population represents
ety of religious and racial groupings including Arabs, Negroes, Nubians,

and Mulattoes.
Britain and

government

is

Egypt ruled the Sudan from 1899
a parliamentary republic.

to

On January

1953.
1,

The

present
1956, under an

agreement among these countries, Sudan proclaimed her independence. Serious disputes over the border between Egypt and Sudan remain unsettled.

The standard of living in the Sudan generally is still quite low, roads
are few, and transportation minimal. There is an abundance of farm land
with cotton as the major crop. Another natural resource is gum arabic
and most

of the world's supply

comes from this area.
Arab League and in

receipt of arms from
discussed
has
not
Sudan
military pacts with any
yet formally
Egypt,

Though

a

member

of the

country.

ISRAEL
In 1948 when Israel

officially

came

as a parliamentary democracy,
result
in

its

into being through the United Nations

Jewish population was 650,000. As a

of intensive immigration, inhabitants

an area about the

size of

New

Although much of the land

total

nearly 2,000,000

8,048 square miles.

sandy waste and stony

hill

country, in-

continually opening new land for culticitrus fruit is now being exported in even

tensive irrigation development
vation, with the result that

is

Jersey

now

is

Middle
greater quantity than before. Here, as throughout most of the
East, the struggle for water

is

intense.
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seaports of Tel Aviv, Jaffa, Haifa, and Elath are increasingly im-

portant in the Israeli economy, as are both fresh and salt water fishing.
Some mineral resources have been found in Israel, and recently several
high grade

have improved and advanced an already ambitious

oil strikes

industrial development program.

This industrial program together with transportation, health, and educational developments combine to bring Israel closer to

"modern"

states

than any other nation in the Middle East today.

SAUDI ARABIA
Though Saudi Arabia

includes

and one half times the

size of

some 870,000 square miles, a country three
Texas, most of it is a desert wasteland. Its

6,000,000 Arabs are forced to live mainly on the watered fringe of the
Arabian peninsula and in its scattered desert oases.
Today the land and peoples of Saudi Arabia literally belong to one

man

Saud Ibn Abdul-Aziz al-Saud. He inherited the property from

father

who

March

23, 1958,

and

orginally united

financial

it

by conquest

of local tribal chieftains.

his

On

Saud conferred unlimited power over "internal, external
on his prime minister and half-brother, Crown

policies"

Prince Faisal. But Saud nonetheless remains king.
Oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia in 1928. A group of United States

companies holds the concession to develop and market King Saud's
As a result the United States holds also a major air base in Saudi
Arabia and trains and arms the Saudi army. Other than oil, Saudi Arabia

oil

oil.

exports only dates, camels and a few horses.

Since King Saud owns the land,

personal wealth. Although
class,

there

is

all

income from

oil

and export

is

his

indication of an expanding middle

the general population maintains a very low standard of living in

a desert subsistence economy.

LEBANON
In this ancient land 1,500,000 people live in an area about half the size
New Jersey. At one time or another Persians, Egyptians, Romans,

of

Crusaders, Turks, and numerous other groups have ruled the territory.
close of World War I, Lebanon became a French
protectorate

At the

under a League of Nations mandate, and in 1926 was organized as a republic. Although the French mandate remained in juridical effect until
1946,

when

the last French troops quit Lebanese

soil,

the French

Com-
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mittee of National Liberation and Great Britain
recognized Lebanon as
an independent republic as early as 1941. Even
today the people of

Lebanon

are so diverse culturally that the seats in
parliament are divided
religious affiliations. A slim majority are Christians.

on the basis of

Although Lebanon
considered by

many

economy and natural
able,

the smallest country in the

most advanced.

resources to aid in

its

though as yet only part of the land

tivation.

rent for
Iraq.

is

as the

Lebanon exports
oil

Arab League, it is
has an infant industrial

development. Water is availunder irrigation or even cul-

tobacco, and olive

fruits,

pipelines running through

Most Lebanese

is

It

its

territory

oil.

It also collects

from Saudi Arabia and

are farmers, while city folk are devoted

and

skilled

traders.

Since most of the Christians in Lebanon are
Arabs, there is still no
peace commitment with Israel. Pro-Western sympathizers combined

real

with increasing numbers of Moslem citizens and Arab refugees produce
in Lebanon an increasingly difficult dilemma. National
policy has often
reflected this

uneasy truce between Western and Arab

when armed

rebellion in

Lebanon and the

affiliations.

In 1958,

successful revolution in Iraq

threatened the government in Lebanon, United States armed troops were
sent to Lebanon at the request of President Chamoun. It is unlikely that
there will be

much

lessening of tension in

Lebanon

for

some time

to come.

IRAN
The Persis of antiquity and the Persia of modern times, Iran is a kingdom
of 628,060 square miles, an area about two and one-half times the size
of Texas, containing 19,700,000 people.
Not an Arab

nation, Iran's history has been in some real measure
from the development of other Middle Eastern nations since it
successfully resisted attack from the Ottoman Empire and remained indistinct

dependent of Turkish control.
In 1907 a revolution, intended

to

overthrow the absolute Shah in favor

of a constitutional monarchy, led in effect to a

Britain

moved

in

and divided Persia

power vacuum. Russia and

into "spheres of influence" with

Russia looking after the northern and central area and Britain overseeing
During the 1920's and 1930's the Riza Shah consolidated

in the south.

the nation, strengthened the constitutional government, brought an end to
the Anglo-Russian agreements and thus established Iran's independence
as a sovereign nation.

During World

Britain again sent troops into Iran.

however, the USSR and Great
was not technically an ocThough

War

II,

this
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cupation, the presence of foreign troops renewed old fears among the people
that Russia and Great Britain intended to occupy permanently. At the

conclusion of the war British troops withdrew from the south and the
Iranian government sent its own troops to the north to reclaim the last
areas of Soviet control.

Up

to this point the oil that

had been discovered

in the

southern section

was developed under agreement by a British company. The nationalist
movement at the end of World War II, internal struggles, and government
agreement in 1951. The
were nationalized under the leadership of the extreme nationalMohammed Mossadegh, but nationalization proved no solution. Inter-

instability resulted, however, in abrogation of this
oil fields
ist,

nal

power

new

struggles, often violent, continued.

The

signing in

1954 of a

agreement, discussed on pages 29 and 30 moderated the situation

oil

only slightly.
Iran formulated a policy of increasing economic and political cooperation outside the Soviet bloc, including membership in the Baghdad Pact
and, at the same time, encouraged the development of cordial relations
with the USSR. In April, 1957, Manouchehr Eghbal, with army support,
took over as Shah, ended the martial law which had been in force for sixteen years, and entered upon the development of a freer two-party system
in

Iran.
Oil revenue

is

the greatest source of income to the country,

and

oil

profits are going into a development plan that should slowly improve the

general standard of living.

Iran has considerable mineral resources but, since these are as yet undeveloped, the people are still chiefly farmers and migrant tribesmen.

THE SHEIKDOMS
Around

the rim of Arabia

lie

an assortment of Arab sheikdoms which have

been under British protection since the last century. In the

Yemen

area

alone Britain protects eight sultanates, two emirates, and seven confederations of small sheikdoms and tribes.

Much

of this land

is

fertile

and abounds

in

fresh-water springs.

The

people are tribesmen, herders, and farmers.
The discovery of oil in Kuwait has transformed the ruler of the 200,000
tribesmen in this area into one of the world's wealthiest men. In smaller
in Bahrain and in Qatar, both under British
thought to lie under the Oman, Muscat, and Hadhramaut lands. Traces have been found in several of the smaller desert

quantities

protection.

oil

is

More

produced
oil is
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sheikdoms near Yemen. This

oil wealth, both realized and
potential,
provides real incentive for controversy over control of these lands. Inter-

nal rebellions and increasing pressures from
neighboring nations continually
threaten British hegemony.

ADEN
Aden

is a British
colony won from Yemen in 1839. Aden proper is only
about 80 square miles in size with a population of 140,000: The
city of
Aden is among the busiest seaports in the British Commonwealth. This
port is on the direct line of commerce between Africa and India and ser-

vices a vast shipping trade. Aden proper has a
large British
a petroleum refinery of considerable size.

Aden

Protectorate,

an area

of

Arab chiefdoms

also

air

base and

under British

This territory covers 112,000 square miles and contains 650,000 people. Oil was discovered in 1955 in the eastern Aden
control,

is

far larger.

Protectorate.

TURKEY
Although Turkey
groupings,

is

its role

not included in some Middle Eastern geopolitical
Middle East during the centuries of the

as ruler of the

Ottoman Empire, together with

the fact that 98 per cent of its people
are Moslems, suggests a place for it in our survey.
Even though the later years of Ottoman rule placed France, Great Bri-

tain,

and Russia

with regard to the Middle East

in influential positions

(see page 4), the Ottoman Empire remained in control until Turkey's
defeat in World War I. The abrupt swing at the close of the war relegated
Turkey to a position of relative mediocrity as the newly mandated areas,

freed from

Ottoman

control,

attempted

to

win back from Turkey "stolen"

trade and cultural centers. In the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Turkey
was established as fully independent. Under the leadership of Mustafa
Kemal, or Ataturk, in reality a benevolent dictator, a parliamentary

republican system was developed.
With the termination of World

War

II

and the onset

of the

Cold War,

Turkey's pro-Western sentiment brought it back into a position of some importance. As a relatively stable republic, a founding member of the United

NATO

alliance and the Baghdad
Nations, and a strategic member of the
Pact, Turkey has become a committed Western ally.

Turkey's population numbers around

25,500,000

in

296,185

square
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The growing economy

larger than Texas.

includes

sizable exports of tobacco, cotton, hazelnuts, chrome, and copper
exports
sent mainly to the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany.
The government is planning programs for a stabilized economy, including industrial development and extension of facilities for transportation,

education, health, and housing.

DIVERSITY

AND UNITY

The Middle East is
The natural

water.

tillable land,

even

a land of sand

and mountains, sparse in wood and
metal ore, workable stone,

resources that do exist

flint

are often widely scattered, separated

deserts or malarial swamps. Such a land

lenge to peoples devoid of

by burning
would seem a formidable chal-

power but that of human muscle. Yet such
environment produced in ancient biblical times

all

people living in this difficult

upon which modern civilization depends.
Middle East we have received most of
the plants and animals we use daily. We owe to them likewise the inventions of metallurgy and glass making, the principles of the rotating shaft,

many
From

of those crucial inventions

these early dwellers in the

the alphabet, and a religious

way

of life deeply affecting our

contemporary

culture.

In a land where resources are so widely scattered and transportation so

minimal we might

development of specializaan area where necessary materials are immediately
available. In the Middle East, however, the specializations have been deconfined

tions

logically expect to find the

to

veloped to a point where an entire village or area concentrates on one
vocation, be it metalwork, pottery, silken textiles, woolen rugs, or the breed-

From fathers to sons for generations have passed
or wool. In geographic isolation communiwith
metal
working

ing of camels and horses.
secrets of
ties

have practiced their
to exist in a

skill to its perfection.

Such specialization

poor environment, but

is

an

the de-

depends upon
way
velopment of an adequate means of transportation. A village devoted
efficient

it

metalworking relies for its very life upon transport of
out
to
trade
centers and a flow of necessities in from other
goods

to silk spinning or
its

centers.

traders

A complex of transportation
and merchants.

Many
zation,

isms,

specialists

must develop along with

areas, because of this relative isolation

developed unique customs among

modes

of dress, colloquial speech,

and

basic faith of Islam. If their journeys took

and economic

their people
later

special

speciali-

manner-

even variations upon the

them from home these

special
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customs identified them, for example, as well-diggers of the north or
rug-weavers of the south.

The

relationship established between

been successful

man and

land has traditionally

in

supporting a stable population. Introduction of modern
means of power, sudden population increases, a transportation system
adequate for transporting finished goods and also for transporting raw ma-

from one area to another have demanded the establishment of new

terials

man-land relationships

in parts of the Middle East. In some areas the
ancient village specializations have broken down and a more diversified
way of life has developed. In other areas, and even in the large modern
cities,

the ethnic division of labor has simply been adapted to supply

for the

new

men

jobs created

most of the clerks

in

by industrialization. Until recently, for example,
Egypt were from an ethnic division known as the

Copts.

Although the introduction of modern power has required readjustments
and the few main highways even today brings us back relatively swiftly to the old pattern where

in the original pattern of living, leaving the cities

we

A

find peoples living as they did in the times of

Abraham and

Isaiah.

development over the past ten years that has disrupted more
the
stable organization of life in the Middle East, involves
seriously
crucial

phenomenon of mass migrations numbering into the hundreds of thouThousands of Jews, economically specialized in this Middle-Eastern
mode of living, moved into Israel from areas that had been their homes for
generations. Arabs moved out of Israel, away from their ancestral homes. In
Yemen, for example, the Jews had almost a monopoly on the exportthe

sands.

import trade, ironworking, stone masonry, money exchange, and marketing
of textiles. Who can be found to adopt these vocations for centuries exclusively Jewish?

Such

losses in

human

ability

have disrupted and strained

the system throughout the Middle East.

Even

as ethnic specialization has formed the pattern of living in the

Middle East,

religion has

human

together in

been the bonding agent holding these diverse
an
beings
exchange of mutual confidence.
About A.D. 570, Mohammed, Prophet of Islam, was born in Mecca.
Before Mohammed's time the peoples of the Middle East worshiped in
forms, ranging from local tribal superstitions to universal religions
Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity. Mohammed and his followers

many
like

succeeded where

all

others had failed and united the

common god and a single
Mohammed's code was
Christianity.

Moslems

Arab world under a

code of ethics.
built

upon the

religious outlines of

see these three faiths as identical

Judaism and

in

their early
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Mohammed

words were the fulfillment of

and complete prophet whose
God's communications to mankind. Chris-

tianity corrupted the true faith

prior prophet) into a god.

as the last

by turning Jesus

Thus

(to the

Moslems only a

the Middle East, holy land for the three

and places enshrined and reverenced alike by Jews,
and Moslems. The kinship was in part responsible for the

faiths, contains objects

Christians,

relatively peaceful cooperation

among

the faiths characteristic of the early

development of Islam. This same kinship, complicated by political differences between Christian nations and the Arab world, and with the emphashifted

sis

to difference, bred hostility

from likeness

and suspicion

in later

years.

The

faith of

Islam cultivates the virtues of devotion, humility, and ac-

ceptance virtues achieved through obedience to the Law. The Law itself
is a carefully detailed code of behavior derived from the Koran (the will

God spoken through

of

the

mouth

of

Mohammed) and from

the Tradi-

of the prophet.
tions, noninspirational sayings and records of the action
Deviations from the original code are common throughout the Arab

Some

world.

sects,

perhaps more seriously influenced by Christianity,
Mohammed. Other variations

attribute varying measures of divinity to

stem from differing opinions on the meaning of some passages in the
Koran. More limited deviations result from the natural addition of local
superstitions to the

body

of basic Islamic beliefs.

In spite of these deviations, however, the incredible success achieved by
Mohammed and his followers deserves special notice. Carleton Coon in

Caravan, his definitive book on Middle Eastern culture (see Bibliography),
has this to say of the religious unity of Islamic peoples:

built to fit a cultural situation, Islam was it Its
from Christianity (and here I expose myself to criticism
from both sides) are' that it was suited to a particular environment and
culture, while Christianity is applicable to all time and space, and that by so
limiting itself Islam became correspondingly more practical in the immediate
situation, and surer of success within its smaller field Conceptually a less
ambitious and more certain venture, it produced its golden age earlier

If ever a religion

were

principal differences

than

that

of

Christianity,

greater resources, and a

The

which,

though older, required a wider canvas,

more elaborate technology

for

its fruition.

peoples of the Middle East are united, then, in diversity

a diversity

born of specialization and a unity born of necessity and bonded by
religion.
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a strange phenomenon to place against this mosaic of
whose loyalty has rested for generations within an isolated community, peoples who have looked upon all others outside of their
is

diversity. Peoples

local specialization as strangers, do not easily learn to shift their
loyalty
from the real and immediate to the larger and, to them, entirely unreal and

The two seem to be incompatible. The fact
again due in no small part to the uniting of human beings
emotion this time an emotion of hatred.

arbitrary ^national" identity.
of their union
in

a

common

is

CHAPTER

2

Nationalism and the Arab League

Until the termination of

World War

the

I

Ottoman Empire

of

Turkey

ruled the Middle East from Persia to the Sudan, uniting it again under
foreign rule. This time, however, as had not been true under the Romans,

conqueror and conquered shared a

many common

common

religious faith and, to a large

Under the despotic rule of the
Ottoman Empire, cultural and commercial centers of the Middle East declined as trade and commerce shifted to the Bosphorus and Constantinople.
Little distinction was made in terms of any national boundaries within
extent,

aspects of cultural

life.

the Empire. The distinctions that remained were in terms of local tribal
chiefdoms and heads of leading families who through inherited religious
office

the

maintained control of important religious centers, as for example,

Grand Mufti

of Jerusalem or the Sherif of

Mecca.

The

exception to this situation was found in Egypt which managed to
retain identity as a national entity. The French occupation under Napoleon at the end of the eighteenth century brought with
interest in the past glories of

Egyptian

civilization

it

a

new

scholarly

which was not without

long-range effect in reawakening Egyptian self-consciousness. Furthermore, British military and economic control in the nineteenth century,
together with Egypt's location in relation to the Suez Canal, served to enits

hance Egypt's position as a strategic area and bring
awareness.

its

people to national

Egyptians were also Moslems, however, and the Moslem religion can be
called to account in part for the degree of unity as well as fatalism with

which Ottoman rule was accepted. It must be remembered that the Middle
East is a harsh environment. Peoples isolated for centuries continued in
isolation throughout the

Ottoman

period.

The Ottoman

rulers interfered

rarely with internal tribal affairs. Commercial centers with their classes
of tradesmen and merchants felt the foreign rule most strongly, but the
fatalism inherent in the Moslem faith and the fact that the rulers shared
this faith

18

made

the situation

more palatable

if

not thoroughly acceptable.

Nationalism and the Arab League
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Toward the end of the nineteenth century Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic
nationalism began to appear, first as an organized movement in greater
Syria, spreading thence throughout the southern Middle East. This movement envisioned release from Ottoman rule and the establishment of some
sort of autonomous Arabian polity. Opposed by several leading Arab
families and without strong leadership of its own, the movement constituTurkey until World War I. Under stimulus from
French and American mission schools throughout the Middle East, deeply
disappointed in a rebellion in Turkey itself which resulted only in inted no great threat to

creased "Turkiftcation," and heartened by vague British references to an
Arab State, the Middle East Arabs rallied to the allied cause in World

War

I,

helping in the defeat of Turkey and the collapse of the

Ottoman

Empire.
The Arabs had not reckoned with European politics, however, and the
close of World War I found Britain involved in commitments to France

and the

made

Zionists.

to

France was granted control of Syria. Concessions were

Zionism (see page 41

visions of a great

ff)

through the Balfour Declaration. Arab

Arab nation became swamped in the embroilments of
and the Middle East was divided into a series of British

European politics,
and French protectorates under mandates from the League of Nations.
Nationalism to this point had been twofold: British-inspired Pan-Islamic
in the south and French-inspired libertarian in the north. At the close of
the war, Faisal of the Hashemite family ruling the Holy City of Mecca,
cooperative and sympathetic to the establishment of a

who had been
Jewish home in

Palestine, entered Damascus and declared himself king of
Greater Syria. Britain, fearing loss of her Middle Eastern power, could not
support such a move. By 1920 Faisal was forced to surrender his power

France and the partitioning of the Middle East began in earnest. Faisal
pacified by the British and given the kingship of Iraq. His brother
Abdullah was made regent of Transjordan in order to put down a Bedouin

to

was

revolt against French-held Syria.

In 1925 the King of Hejaz and Sherif of Mecca, father of Faisal and
Abdullah, was overthrown by Ibn Saud, a former chieftain of a small and

who, with British help, was establishing himself as supreme
the Arabian peninsula. A bitterness which has been the
basis of much insecurity in the Middle East developed between Saud's

humble

tribe

leader over

all

Hashemfamily and the Hashemite family. It was not surprising that the
to
of
a
land
control
in
was
Saud
felt
that
belonging
ites
rightfully
illegal
some day
them, while Saud for his part feared that the Hashemites might
him.
dethrone
to
command enough power
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and Abdullah advanced Greater Syria

of years Faisal

in cooperation with and sometimes opposed to plans for
a Jewish national home
but always with a view to restoring the Hashemites to what they considered their rightful throne in the Arabian peninsula.

The

success of

even control of

any Greater Syria plan would undermine Saud's security;
southern Palestine by Jordan would threaten both Saud's

power and the security

when

of

Egypt.

army took control of the Syrian government,
Jordan were severed, the borders were closed and the announcement was made that not only did Syria reject categorically all plans
for an Abdullah-led Greater Syria but threatened to annex Jordan and
In 1949,

the Syrian

relations with

warned Iraq against interference.
In 1951, Abdullah was assassinated, reportedly by agents
of Jerusalem,

The ex-Mufti,

perately bitter over his

Abdullah as king

in

of the

alternately pro-Nazi or pro-Soviet,

loss

of

influence

when

the

British

ex-Mufti

was

des-

established

Jordan. Abdullah, a commanding personality with a

strong following, occupied a highly strategic position as king of Jordan.

Toward

the close of the Second

lishment of a Jewish national

movements
from

of this

Syria, Egypt,

World War events surrounding the estaboften waited upon the political

home had

man. His violent death precipitated fears of invasion
and Saudi Arabia, thereby upsetting the delicate bal-

ance of power in the Middle East. Britain stepped in to fill the power gap,
if attacked. Abdullah's son Talal took the throne

promising aid to Jordan

and made overtures

end the long feud with Saud, leaving Britain fearwith Jordan. In 1952, Jordan's parliament
deposed Talal, an ineffective man, harrassed by ill-health, and set up in
to

ful of the loss of her alliance

his stead his young, English-educated son Hussein. Anti-British elements,

and pressures from Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt
contributed to a complex, politically unstable situation for Jordan's

pro-British elements,
all

young king. The spring of 1951 brought another threat of invasion by Syria
and Saudi Arabia to the little kingdom and again British intervention
protected Hussein's throne.

The establishment of
Arab

factor influencing

representative of

the

League

of

relationships.

Pan-Arab unity,

in

success in redirecting internal rivalries

Arab

States introduced one

The Arab League,
reality

based

its

more

while seemingly
strength

on

its

and bitterness outward against any

foreign intrusion or intervention in Arabian affairs.

In 1942, the prime minister of Iraq, fully supported by Great Britain,
proposed an Arab federal union of Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, and Syria.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, afraid

of such united strength, violently

opposed

Nationalism and the Arab League
the plan. Nahas Pasha, prime
won support for the formation
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minister of Egypt, suggested instead and
of an association of sovereign

which was then formally established

Arab

states

Cairo in 1945 (see Doc. 9), Alplans envisioned the League as a prior step toward an even-

though first
tual Pan-Arab polity, the

final

form

in

specifically called for "respect for the

(member) states." The League in its initial organization became Pan-Arab not Pan-Islamic. It allowed for limited

independence of these

association with Palestine, provided for association with nonindependent

Arab

countries, pledged every nation against any undertakings thought to
be to the detriment of the whole, and specifically warned against any out-

any member nation. Contrived
by Egypt with the blessing of Great Britain, the leadership of the League
fell to Egypt and a campaign designed to secure its position of leadership

side intervention in the internal affairs of

was inaugurated at once

a campaign committed to the promotion of

intense nationalism, heightening the fervor against

u

Western imperialism"

and "foreign domination."

The League might well have collapsed for lack of strength in its earliest
months had not Britain and the United States intervened in its support
in the League's first trial. In 1941, Syria and Lebanon had been pronounced independent by France but France continued to exert pressures to
By 1945, Syria and Lebanon severed relations

control their internal affairs.

French armed advances. The Arab League accordarmed protest to France. Since the League was in no
position to supply either arms or men in support of Syria and Lebanon,
France ignored the warnings and undertook military occupation. Britain,
with France

in spite of

ingly issued warnings of

with the support of the United States, then sent troops to Syria to enforce
a cessation of hostilities and support the Arab League demand for the
removal of French forces. Largely due to this intervention the League

emerged from her first trial with added strength and support.
There were points of both strength and weakness in the League's
secular, individual sovereign approach. It was probable that cooperation
among these widely divergent governments, hostile and suspicious toward
one another, could not have been achieved on any ground other than
individual member sovereignty. But such a concession meant a continuance of rivalries between nations and

hostilities

in the

Certainly the failure of the League
to a compounding of these tensions.

within the League

itself.

1948 war with Israel was largely

due

On May

14,

1948, with Israel's declaration of independence, the

Arab

World presented a strongly united front in its apparently unanimous decision to "drive Israel into the sea." This was, in reality, an enforced
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made necessary because of the hatred existing between the Arab
nations themselves. Each nation, deeply suspicious of all its neighbors,
unity,

any one other nation invade Israel alone on the
risk that it might win Palestine and thereby increase its own power
nations. The only self-defense in this
sufficiently to dominate other Arab
Israel. Even Lebsituation
paradoxically, a united war against
could not afford to

let

became,
from trade with
anon, predominantly Christian and benefiting enormously
into the war.
force
the Palestine area, found it necessary to send a token
(See page 49.)
In 1950, in an attempt to strengthen the League and, incidentally,
a joint
Egypt's position of leadership in the Arab World, Egypt proposed
defense and economic treaty (see Doc. 12) and by 1952 won total ratification of the treaty. In addition to pledging the military assistance of
the whole League to the aid of

any attacked member nation, the treaty pro-

vided means for enhancing economic and cultural cooperation. The hope
that such a treaty would open the arms embargo and allow free shipments of

arms from Western democracies without restrictive commitments was frustrated in 1950 with the announcement of the tripartite agreements between France, Great Britain, and the United States (see Doc. 13). Accordto Israel and
ing to the terms of these agreements, arms would be shipped

Arab nations provided assurances were given that such arms were to be
used nonaggressively.
Frustrated in the arms agreement, embittered by the power struggles
of

Western democracies over control of Arab lands, and finding it imposwith the pro-Israel sentiment of these same Western democra-

sible to live
cies,

some individual member nations began more and more to flirt with
and military aid (see Doc. 17).
must be remembered that among Middle East nations all but Egypt

Soviet Russia for economic
It

owe

their national existence less to efforts of their

litical

maneuverings of the great

powers

of

own than

to the po-

Western Europe. Their leaders

weak peoples, too long exploited
of
ambitions
the
stronger nations, but they had come to realize
by
political
too that their continued existence depended, in part at least, upon the
had come

to recognize the insecurity of

support of stronger powers. National independence had been achieved in
large part in an atmosphere of violent hatred for former colonial powers

and "Western imperialism."

Israel

became

in

Arab minds another attempt

Middle East. Once having produced this
became increasingly difficult for Middle Eastern lead-

at Western imperialism in the
state of hysteria,

it

with Western powers or seek their support without cries of
"traitor" arising from other Arab nations, or from their own people. In the
ers to deal

Nationalism and the Arab League

23

view of the leaders, Soviet Russia became the logical and "safe" power
from which to seek aid.

The Arab League achieved

a real measure of economic and cultural co-

operation by uniting these insecure, suspicious nations, each individually
aspiring to influence and control within the Arab world, each alert to pre-

vent any neighbor from accomplishing any similar ambition. In turning
the great part of the internal fear and resentment outward into resentment
of foreign intervention, in defining Israel as another

Western scheme

for

further imperialism, the League

managed to produce a substantial measure
of political unity. It has become a focal point for intense Middle Eastern
nationalism and as such constitutes an ethical and attitudinal position not
to be overlooked or treated lightly,

even though this "unity"

is

precari-

ously balanced and easily disrupted. The importance of the Arab League
was manifested in its resolution, adopted by the United Nations General

Assembly

in

August, 1958, breaking the deadlock on the Middle Eastern
Assembly (see Doc. 48).

issue then before the

The

unity of the Arab League was seriously disrupted by the Middle

East Treaty Organization, or the Baghdad Pact (see Doc. 16), an alliance
of Great Britain, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq
the so-called "northern tier." This alliance, initiated by Great Britain with the approval of the
United States, attempted to halt the erosion of British and Western power
in

the Middle East, form a stronghold against Russian intrusion, and

provide a nucleus for a general Middle East defense system.
Hopes that the Baghdad Pact would be a rallying point for other
Middle East nations were soon dashed by the creation of a "southern tier"
military alliance

among Egypt, Saudi

of Soviet Russia

and

Arabia, and Syria with the support

in direct opposition to the

Baghdad

Pact.

True

to

Egyptian aims, President Nasser aspired to Egyptian supremacy
in the Arab world (see page 57 ff). The northern coalition presented serious

earlier

and demonstrations against the
of
Western
accusations
imperialism and of pro-Israel senBaghdad Pact,
timent in the Baghdad Pact countries breached the tenuous unity of the

obstacles to such an ambition. Bitter riots

Arab League. Even British-created Jordan was torn by violence and
government seriously shaken by rumors that

its

considered joining the Pact.
The change in government in Iraq as a result of the July, 1958, revolution
in effect leaves the Pact without a single Arab member nation and its
usefulness in the future

is

it

in serious question.

The United Arab Republic was formed

February, 1958 (see page 5)
at the height of the Middle East Treaty Organization Council meeting
held in Ankara. Both President Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad Pact
in
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in this union of Syria
In
his
installation
and Egypt under his personal leadership.
speech PresiArab
United
to
the
dent Nasser invited all Arab states
Republic in
join

and

his aspiration to

Arab leadership were manifest

a Pan-Arab polity. The immediate response of Jordan and Iraq, in obvious
mistrust of the Syrian-Egyptian alliance, was to join together in the Arab
Federation.

The Arab

Federation, like the United Arab Republic, also

urged other Arab nations to join with Jordan and Iraq in Arab unity.

Again the old

and suspicions among Arab leaders resulted in
opposing factions in the Middle East. The Hashemite

rivalries

the development of
dreams of a great Arab kingdom with its center
Egyptian drive toward a Pan-Arab polity centered

in

Damascus and

in

Cairo met squarely

the

in troubled Syria.

At the time of

its

union with Egypt, Syria was rocked with internal

leadership, was threatening
the moderate nationalist government of President Shukri el-Quwatli. Observers in Syria expressed the opinion that Quwatli accepted Nasser's

violence.

The army, under strong pro-Soviet

means of dealing with the unruly Communists in Syria, since
Nasser, while carefully courting Soviet economic and military aid, had
severely suppressed the Communist Party within Egypt. Shortly after the
control as a

formation of the United Arab Republic, Nasser flew to Moscow for extenin a joint pledge of friendship

ded talks with the Soviets which resulted

and cooperation, and an extension
to the newly formed union.

With

their

of Soviet

hopes of a Greater Syria

economic and military aid

now thwarted and under

pressure

from Syrian and Egyptian agitation, Jordan and Iraq found the resolution
to their dilemma in the union of these Hashemite kingdoms. The treaty of
federation stipulated

that neither partner

other's prior alliances nor

would be committed by the

would the union abrogate

alliances of either

partner.

This did not prove to be a solution to the growing nationalistic, proUnited Arab Republic fervor in Jordan and Iraq, for on July 28, 1958, the
government of Iraq was overthrown, King Faisal and Premier Nun were

and a republican government was installed under the leadership of
Brigadier Abdel Kerim el Kassem. Revolutionists, encouraged by the turn
of events in Iraq, posed a serious threat to the governments of Jordan and
killed,

Lebanon. In response to requests for aid the United States sent troops to
Lebanon and Great Britain sent troops to Jordan (see Docs. 46 and 47).
Again the Middle East became the source of a major world crisis. AntiWestern elements charged the West with imperialism and intervention in
violation of the United Nations Charter.

The Western powers responded

Nationalism and the Arab League
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"

that Iraq had fallen prey to indirect aggression" from the United Arab
Republic and that Jordan and Lebanon were likewise severely threatened.

The Western

nations contended that they had acted in compliance with

the United Nations Charter since they had entered these countries at the

request of their

official

governments. Russia threatened not to remain inand the matter was

different to these "acts of aggression" near her borders

referred to an emergency session of the Security Council. A Western
proposal to remove the troops as soon as a United Nations police force
could be empowered to protect the sovereignty of Middle East nations was
vetoed by the Soviet Union and the issue was referred to the General

Assembly.
drafted

main
1.

On August

by

21, 1958, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
Arab League plus Tunisia and Morocco which in its two

the

clauses:
called

on members of the Arab League

to

observe the pledge of

noninterference in one another's internal affairs contained in the League
Pact,

requested the United Nations Secretary General to uphold "the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter in relation to Lebanon
2.

and Jordan
troops from

.

.

.

and thereby

facilitate the early

the two countries."

withdrawal of the foreign

(See Doc. 48.)

Despite the advantage of geographic contiguity and strong family ties
between two leaders, the Arab Federation has dwindled to an ineffectual
status. On the other hand, the United Arab Republic has apparently

surmounted the severe disadvantage of geographic separation, deriving
strength from increasing military and economic aid from the USSR,

its

oil pipelines that run through
and
of
economic
Problems
political adjustment, however, still face
Syria.
the United Arab Republic. Yemen's membership, for example, raises seri-

control of the Suez Canal, and control of the

ous questions of political relations with this independent oligarchy.
The many difficulties facing Lebanon and Israel have been increased
that they have become obstacles in the path of geographic union between Syria and Egypt. In Lebanon, the disruption of the delicate balance
of power through intense agitation and violence inspired by pro-UAR

now

elements led to an armed rebellion in

May

of 1958.

The
by extreme nationalists who were opposed to the
of
United States military aid and were angered
government's acceptance
would seek a constitutional amendChamoun
by reports that President
revolution

ment

was

led

that would allow

him

to

run for a second term. The introduction of

United States troops in late July did not prevent the revolutionists from
continuing their activities against the government. In September of 1958,
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Chamoun surrendered the presidency to the newly elected president,
General Fouad Chebab, a man who is more popular with the nationalists
than Chamoun. Nevertheless it is unlikely that the tensions resulting from
the presence of foreign troops and continued revolutionary agitation will be
resolved without further turbulence.

King Saud

of Saudi Arabia, tentatively pro-Western, but at times given

outspoken support of President Nasser's ambitions, has encouraged
both the United Arab Republic and the Arab Federation while remaining
apart from commitment to either. By acting thus he hoped perhaps to
strengthen his own role in Middle Eastern affairs. The transfer, however,
to

of the principal reins of

power to his half-brother, Faisal, suggested a
measure of support for Nasser.
Although these two unions involved a recurrence of old rivalries, it

significant

must be remembered that both are steps toward strengthening the political
unity of the Middle East. President Nasser's ambitions do not stop with
the Middle East. His vision of an Arab union includes the troubled Arab
nations across the whole of North Africa.

Our newspapers
Eastern

states.

will continue to carry news of turmoil in the Middle
Often these tensions do not involve Israel, or, for that

matter, the Suez Canal, but instead reflect both the political maneuverings of the Cold War and the interfamilial suspicions and hatreds between

Middle East leaders themselves.

The

nationalistic fervor

"meddling"

would seem

in the affairs of the

to

suggest that

we should

cease

Middle East, but the Western World

will

continue to pursue its interests in the face of this adversity. Abandoning
the Middle East might well mean abandoning it to Soviet Russia. Our

moral commitment to democracy as well as the strategic location of the
Middle East forbids us this option. And to this already volatile brew

we must add the ingredient that most uncomfortably gives flavor
Middle Eastern charge of foreign imperialism oil.

to the

CHAPTER

The Problem

of

3

Middle Eastern Oil

Even a very cursory examination
affairs since World War I shows

of the

Middle East and

its role in

world

conclusively that water and oil are not
the only incompatible elements in the area. Most recent studies of this
trouble spot indicate that Middle Eastern oil is one of the fundamental

problems that prevail there. Thus, an eminent MidEast analyst, Benjamin Shwadran, in a recently published work (see
Bibliography) put the matter in strikingly clear-cut alternatives: the

issues at the root of the
dle

Middle East "must be held by the West as a vital strategic base and as
an invaluable source of petroleum with which to oil a possible future war;
conversely,

Let

it

must not be allowed

hands of the enemy."
and then proceed to an

to fall into the

us, therefore, first present the oil statistics

evaluation of the political problems arising therefrom.
Two-thirds of the world's proved oil reserves are in the Middle East.

As a comparison,
billion barrels of

it

may

proved

be noted that whereas America has some 31.3
oil reserves,

the Middle East has no less than

144.8 billion barrels. In 1955, Britain and the Western powers used 75 per
cent of the area's total output. In 1956, up to the time of the sabotaging
of the Iraqi pipelines and the closing of the Suez Canal, Europe and North

Africa were receiving over three million barrels of

oil

a day from the

Middle East. This marked a

sixfold expansion since 1945. Barring further
there
is a bright promise for a continued high rate
political complications,
of expansion.
in

The

sources of this flow are

American, British,

ment

in all aspects of

excess of $2.5 billion.
fifty-fifty division

oil

concessions almost entirely

French, and Dutch hands. The total gross investthe oil industry in the Middle East is probably in

The

usual arrangements call for something like a
oil companies and the governments in-

between the

volved. Suggestive of the great financial returns in this area is the fact
that net profits of the American oil companies alone in the Persian Gulf

were approximately $900 million for the year 1955. It is expected that in
1958 the oil companies and the producing states will split a profit of more
27
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This marks a trebling of the 1951 figure which in itself
constituted an increase from about $115 million in 1947. The following
list shows the expected oil returns in 1958 for these countries:

than $2.5

billion.

$375 million
300 million

Kuwait (approx.)
Saudi Arabia

260 million

I ra q

275 million

Iran

50 million

Qatar

Further indirect revenues, which when added up amount to very substantial

sums (estimated

as high as half of the direct payments), result

from wages paid to native labor and from other expenditures by foreign
companies and their employees. A country-by-country breakdown presents the following picture of concession arrangements:

Kuwait
This tiny sheikdom, a British protectorate, is now the largest single oil
producer in the Middle East, supplying one and one-half million barrels
a
The concession, owned jointly by the British Oil Company and
day.

the Gulf Oil Corporation,

is

contracted for until the year 2026.

Saudi Arabia

Here the concession, which runs to the years 1999-2005, is held by the
famous combine known as Aramco, the Arabian American Oil Company,
which consists of the Standard Oil Company of California, Standard Oil
Company of New Jersey, Socony Vacuum Oil Company, and the Texas
one
production prior to the Suez crisis ran around
million barrels a day. This has now increased by approximately 50,000

Company. Crude

oil

barrels per day.

Saudi Arabia

is

the country

most often cited by the

critics

of

a

oil

diplomacy" as a dramatic manifestation of all that the term implies.
They point to Aramco, for example, as being responsible for securing for
Ibn Saud some $100' million in direct and indirect lend-lease aid in the
years 1940-1947 despite the fact that his kingdom was not directly
volved in the Second World War.

in-

Iraq

The
their

concessions in Iraq,
entirety,

by

running

a combined

till

owned almost in
French, Dutch, and American

the year 2000, are

British,

group. Approximately 750,000 barrels are produced daily.

The Problem

of Middle Eastern Oil

Of particular significance
premier and revolutionary

to the

leader,
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West was the announcement by the new
Abdel Kerim el-Kassem, that he will

continue to honor the nation's lucrative

oil

contracts with the West.

Iran

The

original concession

Company, now known

was granted

in

1909 to the Anglo-Persian Oil

as the British Petroleum

Company. Controlling
company was purchased by the British government at the
World War I. These were the assets which were so dramatically

stock in the
start of

nationalized by the Iranian government in
seizure

marked the

Arab nationalism

first

successful attempt

1951

(see

Doc.

by any segment

14).

This

of the

new

former imperial power

to nationalize vast holdings of a

in that area. It thus has served as a continual

impetus for further simithroughout the Middle East. Three years later, after lengthy
negotiations, the Iranian government came to terms with a "consortium"
lar action

of companies representing private British, American, French, and

and provision was made

interests

tion

by

this

group of

Dutch

for short-term

oil installations

(25-40 years) operaformerly held by the Anglo-Iranian

Oil

Company. Iran's current oil production is reportedly 850,000 barrels
a day.
In addition to these major concessions, there is a combined production
of approximately 200,000 barrels daily in the sheikdom of Qatar, the
island of Bahrain

and the

so-called neutral zone

between Saudi Arabia

and Kuwait.
Turning now

to some of the political considerations, we can start by
the
unavoidable
dilemma which plagues Western policy makers.
presenting

The West

it must have Arab good will and knows that it must
but
neither can be purchased in the future by the same
oil,
means as used in the past. The wave of nationalistic outbursts which have

feels that

have Arabian

so

characterized this area in the last decade has

made

it

abundantly

clear that, despite the fantastic revenues accruing to the oil concessions,

Arab social and political demands and Western ability
demands continues to grow. To put it in the simplest terms,
the profit demand of Western oil companies and the political demands of
the Arab nationalists do not and cannot in the foreseeable future coincide.
the gap between
to fulfill these

Furthermore, the situation

is

one

in

which the Western bargaining posi-

must become progressively worse. The continued dependence of Western European nations in general and Great Britain in particular on the

tion

uninterrupted flow of Middle East oil has made of them nervous hostages
Arab good will. This dependence has become symbolic of the West's

of
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to the Middle
apparent helplessness and diplomatic weakness in regard
East. It also helps account for the French-British gamble upon a mili-

of cirtary coup de force in 1956. Contrariwise, the same juxtaposition
of
Arab
the
cumstances has led to everincreasing aggressiveness on
part

diplomacy, thus further crystallizing the dilemma.
To complicate the matter further, we should consider the effect of the

USSR'S new role as a major participant in Middle East affairs. For some
time prior to the Western debacle at Suez, the Soviet leadership had shown
evidence of great interest in the oil situation. As elsewhere, in their apinitial position of altruistic

proach to the Middle East they adopted an

and disinterested onlookers. They, their argument ran, had no need for
Middle East oil; they were only concerned about Western exploitation of
the Arabs. Thus, in a portion of his speech at the momentous Twentieth
Party Congress, Anastas Mikoyan, a leading figure in the new Soviet
hierarchy, had the following to say: "In the Middle East in 1955, the
United States and British monopolies took out 150 million tons of oil at

The net profit they made
one year's return covered the entire
that area .... If all the income earned from oil were

a cost of $240 million. This

on

this oil

amounted

capital investment in

remain with

to

its

is

fabulously cheap.

to $1.9 billion

Arab and other peoples

legitimate owners, the

of the

Middle East, how speedily might not these peoples abolish poverty and go
forward with their economic and cultural development, which has been
retarded for years by the ruthless exploitation of the foreign capitalists."

The point here is not the inaccuracy
we have already noted above that there
them.

What

is

of
is

Mr. Mikoyan's
at least

of greater immediate consequence

of imperialist exploitation

was constant

bardment of the Middle East
Suez. Excerpts from only one

in

for at least six

is

figures, though
an element of truth in

the fact that this theme

the Soviet propaganda

bom-

months preceding the war

in

many Egyptian radio broadcasts echoing
the theme give ample evidence of the degree of skillful influence exercised
by the men in the Kremlin. The Cairo radio on March 6, 1956, announced:
of

companies a host of rights
expense of the people struggling against them. The
Arabs allow the crude oil to go to the countries of their enemies and coloni-

The Arab

rulers granted the exploiting imperialist

and concessions

at the

We

do not want United States dollars, British pounds, French francs, or
Oh Arabs, our oil is plundered by aliens, it is seized by
your enemies Remember oil it is our last wealth Oil is for the Arabs
zers.

Dutch

guilders

.

.

!

!

An

ever present element of the Soviet "line"

times

made

explicit) that should the

is

the implied promise (some-

West make

difficulties,

the

USSR

is

The Problem of Middle Eastern
ready to move

in

from the sidelines and provide

including the purchase of Arab
It is this
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all

the aid necessary

oil.

combination of factors which leads so

many

"realistic"

com-

mentators to dismiss as childish naivete the criticism of those who refer
to

in

any diplomacy

the

Middle East

as "simply" oil diplomacy.

Such

observers particularly abhor the attachment of the value-judgment "evil,"
for their contention is, obviously, that all things considered the West,
particularly Western Europe, has no alternative but to deal for

on whatever terms

One more

it

factor

Arab

oil

can.

must be considered. Since

the Iranian nationalization,

has become an inescapable conclusion that Arab nationalism, whatever
its particular form, has marked off the heretofore privileged position of the

it

companies as a primary target for elimination. The limited
success of the Iranians, and later the Egyptians (albeit with the aid of

Western

oil

foreigners), in handling the intricacies of a technical operation long considered beyond their ability has further encouraged the extremists in all

As a result of this heightened impatience, the emergent
Soviet-Arab alliance becomes even more significant.

of these countries.
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The machinations

of Soviet

Middle East

diplomacy in the Middle East make it abunhave serious intent in terms of permanent

dantly clear that the Russians

policy-making in that area. However, to get a truer picture of Soviet ambitions one must place USSR involvement within the context of a much
broader Soviet and Russian foreign policy.

The

entire history of Czarist Russia is marked by consistent efforts to
warm-water port, particularly on the Mediterranean. The penetration of the Middle East also has stood high on the list of Soviet
priorities.
Only since the Geneva Conference of 1955 and, more particularly, since the
Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal have these ambitions been realized.

find a

As long ago

as 1940 the Russians entered into secret protocol agreements
with the Axis powers which stated that "The Soviet Union declares that
its territorial aspirations center south of the national
territory of the Soviet

Union

in

the direction of the Indian Ocean." This in itself

is

but the

continuation of a yet older Soviet theme in the Middle East. As far back
as the First Congress of Peoples of the East some thirty-seven
years ago,
the Russians had already enunciated their strident theme of anticolonialism. Whereas the implementation of a policy in keeping with this
approach
remained relatively dormant, its eventual emergence in the form of a new
Soviet imperialism has always been imminent.

The
which

degree to which the Russians have successfully entered into an area
seemed closed to them can be traced to major psycho-

in the past

and economic reasons. To the peoples of the
Russians have appeared as comand unselfish benefactors. In their manifold re-

logical as well as political

Middle East, as

in Asia generally, the

paratively disinterested

new sovereign states of Asia the Russians have gone to
great pains to indicate their desire simply to help these new peoples establationships with the

freedom and economic viability. Time and again Russian
was
made
headway
by offering Asian nations what they desired; no direct
gifts were proffered but so-called business deals almost amounted to
lish political

phi-
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lanthropies. Because in tendering aid

and trade they have been oblivious
economics but fully aware of the rules of politics, each deal
has created much good will at relatively low cost. Perhaps the most vital
consideration in Soviet success has been the very absence of Russian power
to the rules of

Middle East for so long a period of time. As a result, the Russians
entered the arena untainted by the epithet "colonial imperialists." While

in the

the Western powers have a long history of intervention in the affairs of

Arab

and Asian nations and have thus

feel-

ing, the Soviets

built

up a tremendous

by comparison often appear

reservoir of

ill

to native nationalists as inno-

cent and as disinterested as they claim to be. There has been also, unfortuAmerican record of offers of aid with political or military

nately, an

which tended to confirm pre-existing nationalist suspicions of the United States as nothing better than a replacement for the

strings attached,

recently ousted Western European "imperialists."

The combination

of

these factors with those described above pertaining to the rise of Arab
nationalism led to the emergence of a common goal for the Soviets and

Arab nationalists in the Middle East. A simple definition of this goal
would be the elimination of Western power in the Middle East and Africa.
Soviet aims can perhaps be better understood
series of steps

employed

to realize them.

The

first

by briefly analyzing the
aim may be seen in the

formulation of a policy which the Soviets hope will lead to the breakup of
Western concessions in the oil fields (see pages 29-30).
The second can be stated in negative terms as the prevention of the
establishment of a combined Middle Eastern-Western collaborative defense organization.
tical

purposes, as

By

the end of 1955 this goal

we have

was achieved

seen. Until the recent revolt

for all prac-

which deposed the

pro-Western government, only Iraq, among the Arab countries, retained
any major ties with the Western powers.
The third goal can be described as the eventual dismantling of Western
military bases in the Middle East. This aim likewise seems well on the

way toward realization.
The Arab attitude in

regard to the fulfillment of these aims was perhaps

by Moscow's strongest ally in the Arab World, President
Nasser of Egypt. At the conclusion of his work, The Philosophy of the
Revolution, which is in effect a prospectus for the future, he has this
best stated

to say:
travels to the eighty million Moslems in Indonesia, the
million in China and the several other million in Malaya, Siam, and
Burma and the hundred million in Pakistan, the hundred million or more in

When my mind

fifty

the Middle East and the forty million in Russia, as well as the other millions
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I visualize these millions
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united in one

have a great consciousness of the tremendous potentialities that cofaith,
operation amongst them all can achieve a cooperation that does not deprive
them of their loyalty to their countries but which guarantees for them and
I

1

their brethren a limitless
I
is

now

the role, such are

We

power.

revert to the wandering role that seeks an actor to

features and such

its

perform

it.

Such

stage

and only we are impelled by our environment and are capable of

performing

this role

[Italics ours.]

doubtful that the Soviet Union

It is

is its

is

much concerned with

either the

national or international aspirations voiced in the above declaration. What
is much more probable is that the Russians are very much interested in

maintaining a constant "crisis" situation

in the

Middle East which would

embarrass and eventually dislodge Western influence. To the

serve to

degree that Egypt, Syria, or others serve this purpose for Soviet foreign
policy, the present Russian leadership can be expected to remain comparatively

unconcerned with either the manifestoes of would-be Arabic Cae-

sars, or for that

seem

to

matter with any of their local intrigues.

The Egyptians

be aware of the Soviet attitude and quite willing to play the Soviet

game so
we have

own ambitions

long as their

are realized at the

Colonel Nasser explaining to

New

same time. Thus

York Times correspondent

Osgood Caruthers (April 1, 1956): "The Russians are very clever. They
know what I want to say and they please me by saying what I want to
say." Both the Russians and the Egyptians have also apparently learned
an era when any "minor war" might erupt into an atomic holocaust, prudential bluffing becomes a workable foreign policy. What the
Russians hope to achieve is perhaps best stated by U.S. News and World
that, in

Report (March

16,

1956):
an Arab-Israel war, a big area of strategic
thrown into chaos. Western defense systems are

If Russia succeeds in provoking

importance to the West
broken or imperiled

is

Even if war is averted, Russia still stands to gain
Arab countries as the only big power that gave them military
aid .... Armies equipped with Soviet weapons become dependent on Soviet
repairs, spare parts and ammunition. Russia thus sees a chance to infiltrate
some of the very armies on which the West is relying for military support in
event of war with Russia.
.

.

.

the regard of

A

specific

example

of

how Russian and Arab nationalist demands often
demand for the nationalization of Middle

coincide can be seen in the

Eastern

oil fields,

Egypt and

Syria, neither one a

major

oil

producer, were,

The
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most pro-Soviet of the Arab nations. Thus, even
such acts as closing the Suez and cutting Syrian oil pipelines need not
necessarily prove to be disastrous for the Western powers, since more than

prior to their union, the

.

80 per cent of Middle Eastern
of

Cape
demands
its

oil

could be carried in tankers around the

Good Hope. The Russians,

therefore,

source. Needless

have openly supported Arab

which would cut

for nationalization of the oil fields

to say the Soviet political support

off the oil at

both in the United

Nations and elsewhere of Egypt, Syria, and others in their attempts to
eliminate Western might from the Middle East is another manifestation
of this alliance (see Docs. 24, 41).

which
Against this background let us now examine the specific means by
the Soviets have entered the Middle Eastern scene. Their approach has
been made on separate

political, cultural,

and economic

of these levels a relationship of friendly reciprocity

On

levels.

each

has been established

between the USSR, or its satellite nations, and members of the Arab bloc.
For example, in terms of economic aid the following have either taken
place or been promised
installation

2.

construction of a

Egypt by the

:

of Egypt's

1.

new

first

nuclear laboratory by

railroad in Saudi Arabia

and

the

Russians;

steel plants in

Poles;

purchase of Egyptian cotton by Russia, China, and Czechoslovakia
of surplus Egyptian
(it was, in fact, the bulk purchase by Czechoslovakia
cotton which made possible the famous arms deal of 1955, see Doc. 17);
3.

oil refineries in

4.

construction of

5.

building of bridges across the Nile

6.

construction

work

by the Czechs;
by the Hungarians;

Syria

in Alexandria's harbor

by the Bulgarians;

water in the Sudan by East Germans.
have either established or renewed
the
On
political level the Russians
and
with
relations
Libya. In addition, there has been a
Sudan,
7.

drilling for

Yemen,

the engeneral strengthening of the Russian diplomatic corps throughout
the
Soviets
of
moves
being supplemented by
tire Middle East, with the

growing number of Soviet diptechnicians on military and
and
lomats is the veritable army of advisers
also been many a rumor
has
There
economic, as well as political matters.
in Egypt
concerning the presence of Soviet military missions, particularly
the action of their satellites.

and

Syria.

Added

to the

More than one commentator has

attributed the Anglo-French-

attack upon Egypt in part at least to the fear of what the Soviet
with the Arab armies. A further exmilitary technicians might achieve

Israeli

Soviet leaders now regard
ample of the great significance with which

this
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is

the public apology

made by V M. Molotov

Congress for not having paid propei

to the
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Twentieth Party

attention in the past to the

Middle

East.

Recognizing the great susceptibility of the Arab leaders and people to
public flattery, the Russians have given particular attention to the technique often referred to as "cultural exchange." Thus, at any time since
the middle of 1955, the natives of Cairo and Damascus, in particular, but

have had the opportunity of viewing ballets,
soccer teams, movies, and cyclists on tour from Russia and the satellite
nations. As a special treat one might even have attended the performances
of other

Arab lands as

of the Peiping

well,

Opera Group. In addition, exhibitions and fairs were conArab public. There began, too, to appear an

stantly being opened to the

inordinately large

number

the Soviet-Arab bloc.
the Tass

of

News

new

periodicals representing the ideology of

News Agency became

regular features in

the Soviets overlooked nothing in theii

support can be seen

in their

Moslem

Moscow radio and
Egypt and Syria. That
attempt to win over mass Arab

reports emanating from

wide use

in all of their delegations of repre-

should be added, too, that in all of these
undertakings the Soviets have readily availed themselves of the machinery
of the Arab League. This in itself served to endear them to a vital element
sentatives of

of the

origin

It

Arab leadership.

Much
There
There

made here and in the public press of the Soviet inroads
pages 57-58 we will discuss further the 1955 arms deal.

has been

On

into Egypt.
are,
is

however, some mitigating factors which should be considered.
evidence of the existence within Egypt of groups

now some

which are fearful of the additional strain on Egypt's economy involved in
military adventurism. There is also the possibility of restraint being ex-

by those who have become an established bureaucracy in the new
and
see in Nasser's ambitions a threat to their own security.
Egypt

ercised

Above

all,

there

is

the historical record that

mined adversary (as,
uing war reparations

when faced with a

deter-

example, Adenauer's inflexible policy of continto Israel, or Sudan's stubborn stand against merger
with Egypt), Nasser has shown himself both reasonable and flexible.
The other great area of Soviet concentration had been Syria. The defor

velopment there of the largest Communist Party in the Middle East can
be attributed to its background of political immaturity combined with
social

and

institutional instability.

When

one adds to

this the additional

combination of a restless and impoverished peasantry, a similarly discontented urban proletariat plus support of the majority of the Army's high

command,

it

is little

wonder that the extravagant appeal

of the

Commu-

The
nists

upon
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found ready receptivity. One

of the

remaining paradoxes attendant
Arab Republic has been the

the recent emergence of the United

relative eclipse of the Syrian

Communist Party

ing of ties between President Nasser

As one might

and the

despite the general cement-

USSR

expect, Soviet friendship with the

(see page 24).

Arab bloc has

led to

a corresponding attack on Israel. In the Soviet press and radio Israel is
constantly attacked as an ''aggressor," a tool of the "Western Imperialist

Powers." The Arabs on the other hand are constantly portrayed as "peaceloving people" whose sole desire is to rid themselves of the domination of
their former colonial masters. Only one familiar with communist jargon

aware of the extent of the Soviet attack, which in the Twentieth Party
Congress singled out Israel alone among the nations of the world as being

is

guilty of "fascization."

Against this background of political intrigue and raging nationalism,
us now proceed to a closer survey of the role in the Middle East played
by the old-new nation of Israel.
let

CHAPTER

From Palestine to
It is

5

Israel

almost impossible to set forth a specific set of events or a given era

of historical time as the exact point of origin of a reborn Jewish national-

ism. But perhaps the most striking conclusion to be reached from any
survey of Jewish history is the prevalence of strong nationalistic feeling
among the Jewish masses ever since their dispersion from Palestine in A.D.
70. It

was

in recognition of this

unbroken attachment

to

an ancestral land

that the British government referred to Jewish nationalism as "the oldest
nationalist

The
life in

movement

in history." *

idea of a return to Palestine

was ever a dominant theme of Jewish

the diaspora, which term applied to

any Jewish community living
from Palestine. The whole history of the Jew lies in a demand for
political restoration. This helps explain why most Jewish leadership as
well as the Jewish masses have persistently rejected schemes such as the
in exile

British

Jews
in

Uganda Plan

in a

in

1903 which aimed at resettlement of persecuted
The idea found expression in the past

land other than Palestine.

both successful and abortive attempts to colonize Palestine. It constantly

emerged in the form of prayer and poetry and general religious practice.
The method whereby the Jews succeeded in maintaining their identity
as a unit throughout the long centuries of their dispersion
of the usual procedure of

Jews transformed

all

Thus, by surrounding
succeeded in warding

making

was a

reversal

religion a part of national life, for the

the elements of nationalism into religious practice.
their nationalism
off all

them physically.

attempts

on

with a halo of sacredness, they

to assimilate

them

culturally or ob-

unwavering concentration
that the nonlegal Jewish claim was based and not alone on the mere ex-

literate

It is

this tenacious,

istence of a Jewish state in antiquity. It should be added, however, that

as early as 1891 a host of experts in international law contended that since
* Peace

38

Handbook No. 162 on Zionism, London,

1920.
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Jews never gave up

their title to Palestine the

"law of dereliction" did

not hold in their case.*

Toward

the end of the nineteenth century groups of Jews were attemptJewish nationalism from the confines of its religious bonds

ing to extricate

and

set

it

up as an end

in itself.

who were themselves the product
men differed from their medieval

Among
of a

the groups were a few Hebraists

Hebrew

cultural renaissance.

These

that they undertook the

predecessors in
task of establishing a Jewish national movement independent of religion.
They secularized and expanded the Hebrew language. They undertook
glorified Palestine in song, drama,
geography and history rather than
religion. In essence, these men were attempting to reverse the medieval
trend of Jewish nationalism, which had emphasized the protective bond of

vast research into Jewish history.

and novel and spoke

religion,

and

nationalism.

of

it

They

in terms of

to re-establish a completely independent

The one

and secular Jewish

thing both these forms of nationalism had in

common

was Palestine as the symbol of their vision.
Another major cause of the rebirth of a vital Jewish nationalism was
the outbreak of violent anti-Semitism. The wave of anti-Semitic outbursts
Russia in the 1880's, accompanied by further government restrictions
upon the Jews, served as a great catalytic agent in popularizing nationalistic ideas. The pogroms crushed all hopes of free Jewish survival even
in an enlightened Russia, and spurred the efforts toward the colonization
in

of Palestine. Furthermore, the growing discrimination against the Jews of
Eastern Europe for economic reasons, coming as it did on top of a seemhostile
ingly endless struggle with the Christian church and a generally
Gentile community, convinced many others of the inevitability of choossocial justice, and
ing Zionism as the only remaining path to freedom,

security.

Colonization of Palestine as the only solution of the Jewish question was
advocated quite often in the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth

Jew and Gentile. It culminated
known as Hovevei Zion
resettle(Lovers of Zion), whose avowed purpose was to promote Jewish
ment in Palestine upon a more extensive scale than the isolated new

centuries
in the

by many statesmen and

writers,

foundation in 1884 in Russia of a society

settlements that had already been founded in the two preceding decades.
should be noted here that at no time did the Jewish returnees ever

It

their land. The Jewish aim was the restoration
rule
homeland, and not the establishment of an alien

forcefully oust

Arabs from

of a people in

its

*
See, particularly, Dr. William E. Blackstone,
for the Jews?" Our Day, October, 1891.

"May

the United States Intercede
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over the population and resources of the country. Thus all the land cultivated in both the early and later days of the Zionist movement was
or by
purchased from the Arabs either by leading Jewish philanthropists
Fund.
a fund set up for that purpose, the Jewish National
Yet only with the advent in 1896 of Theodore Herzl, an Austrian play-

wright and

man

of letters,

was the Jewish national sentiment propounded

an idea whose expression should not limit itself to the creation of scattered colonies in the Holy Land, but should expand into an organized
endeavor of the Jewish people to work for its national regeneration.
Herzl published his first ideas on the reorganization of the Jews in a
as

the creapamphlet, Judenstat (the Jewish State), in which he advocated
tion of an autonomous Jewish settlement as the solution to the Jewish
Herzl succeeded in
question. Despite relentless and powerful opposition,
of considering
bringing together the First Zionist Congress for the purpose
convened at Basel, Switzerland on August 27, 1897, and

his project. It

all parts of the world. After much discussion the Congress adopted as the aim of Zionism: "The creation for
Jewish people of a publicly and legally assured home in Palestine." To

was attended by delegates from

Congress proposed the following measures:
means the settlement of Palestine by
effective
through
promote
workers
industrial
and
Jewish agricultural
2. to organize the whole Jewish people by means of local and interrealize this aim, the Zionist
1.

to

;

national institutions suitable for the purpose and conforming with the

laws of the countries in which Jews
3.

4.

live;

Jewish national sentiment and consciousness;
to take proper steps toward securing the concurrence of the Powers,
to strengthen

insofar as their assent might be necessary,

for

the achievement of the

Zionist goal.

Thus Zionism, for the first time in modern history, strode onto the
arena of world politics and international diplomacy. Virtually everything
that was to unfold in the Zionist movement of later years was already
discernible in this first Congress in Basel.

Herzl died in 1904, heartbroken and penniless, without having achieved
But others took up the cause and the task of colonizing Pal-

his purpose.

estine

went on

in

almost uninterrupted fashion, so that, at the termination

World War

there numbered some 80,000 in
I, the Jewish community
a total population of about 850,000. Over fifty agricultural colonies, with
a total of over 100,000 acres, were firmly established as were the beginnings
of

of the Israeli metropolis of the future, Tel Aviv.

The outbreak

of

World War

I

brought colonization to a comparative
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standstill,

but the course of the war led to the issuance, on November 2,
from Lord Balfour to Lord

1917, of the Balfour Declaration, a letter

Rothschild supporting the establishment of a Jewish national home in PalThe Declaration was hailed by the Zionists of the day as a Magna

estine.

Carta of future Jewish rights in Palestine (see Doc. 4).
In retrospect, it seems that the promulgation of the Declaration was
at least four

prompted by

major considerations.

was a long

Firstly, there

history of British concern over the fate of European Jewry. For a period
of 50 to 75 years prior to World War I there had arisen in England a

Christian-sponsored

Land

movement

favoring the return of the Jews to the

as the only solution to their chronic

Holy

woes on the Continent. Sec-

ondly, there was the serious military problem posed by the Turkish threat
to Suez. A protective bastion had to be erected on the Palestinian coast
to help

keep open the

Thirdly, the Declaration would

lifeline to India.

draw the enthusiastic support

of the masses of

Jews

in Eastern

Europe

a sector facing total capitulation to the German war machine. It would
also gain the very important backing of leading

American

Zionists.

In fact, in his appearance before the Palestine Royal Commission of
1936, Lloyd George testified that the launching of the Declaration at that
specific

moment was due

to "propagandist reasons."

He remarked

further

that "the Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that if the Allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national
for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish
sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They
kept their word."

home

It must be remembered that at the time of the Balfour Declaration there
were over 600,000 Jews in the ready-to-collapse Russian army. These men
were fighting for a government they hated and whose success in the
war they did not anticipate with relish. That the Germans were aware of
this is evident in the daily proclamations they dropped over the Russian

lines

The
promising that a German victory would bring them true liberty.

following serves as an example

:

TO THE JEWS OF POLAND:
Germany and
Our
Poland
entered
have
rights and
you
bring
flags
Austria-Hungary,
freedom; equal citizenship rights, freedom of belief, freedom to work undisturbed in ail branches of economic and cultural life in your own spirit ....
Remember Kishinev, Homel, Bialistok and many hundreds of other pogroms!
The

heroic armies of the great mid-European governments,
.

.

.

You

.

.

.

must

rise as

one

man

.

.

to aid in the holy cause

.

.

APPLY

WITH THE GREATEST CONFIDENCE TO THE COMMANDANTS
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OF OUR MILITARY IN THE PLACES THAT ARE NEAREST TO
YOU. HELP BRING THE VICTORY OF FREEDOM AND JUSTICE.*
German and Turkish
was more in line
But by then the

After the Balfour Declaration was finally issued the

governments issued a similar promise which, if anything,
with Zionist aspirations than was the British declaration.

propaganda victory had been snatched from their hands.
A fourth motivating factor behind the release of the Declaration at
this time was the British fear of postwar French domination of the entire
Mediterranean littoral. The French, through M. Georges Picot, had althe whole of Syria
ready insisted that any postwar settlement should place
to the Egyptian frontier under their control. The British looked

down

upon a Jewish home in Palestine, under their mandate, of course, as an
almost heaven-sent means of thwarting the French pretensions. What

made

the entire scheme even

fortress

on the imperial

more appealing was the fact that this new
would be self-supporting in the sense that

lifeline

undertaking supported by Jewish financing.
with Jewish leaders headed by Dr. Chaim
undertaken
were
Negotiations
it

would be

built as a Jewish

Weizmann, the emerging leader
come the first president of the

of the Zionist forces
state of Israel.

From

and destined

to be-

the middle of 1916

earnestness and with obvious
on, these discussions were carried on in great
President Woodrow Wilthat
record
the
for
be
added
should
It
progress.

acknowledged champion of the Zionist movement, was constantly
consulted and the drafts of the proposed Declaration were submitted to
him for approval. That the Arabs, too, were duly informed of the Balfour
son, an

Declaration

is

made

clear

the Peace Treaties. In

it

by Lloyd George
he states:

in his

book, The Truth about

Through Sir Mark Sykes and Colonel Lawrence we informed the Arab
leaders, King Hussein and his son, Faisal, of our proposals (regarding the
Balfour Declaration). We could not get in touch with the Palestine Arabs
as they were fighting against us
The Arab leaders did not offer
as the rights of the

any objections

to the non- Jewish population of Palestine

of

its

inhabitants, as well as to the

sations which

we had

to the Declaration so long

Pledges were given
constituted the great majority
These were the results of conver-

Arabs of Palestine were respected

with such

who

Jews
Arab leaders

as

we

could get in touch with.

There was a two-fold understanding given to them, that the establishment of
a Jewish National Home would not in any way, firstly, affect the civil or
religious rights of the general population of Palestine; secondly, would not
diminish

pledges

the

general prosperity
to the Arabs

of

that

population.

Those were the only

we gave

"William B.

Ziff,

The Rape

of Palestine,

New

York, 1938, pp. 530-531.
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of debates were to occur in later
years regarding the "true

meaning" of the Balfour Declaration, but at the time the Declaration was
unqualifiedly endorsed by the Allied powers. Statements of approval came
from as far away as China and even the French
formally committed themselves "to the renaissance of Jewish
Nationality." President Wilson echoed
the prevailing sentiment in America when he declared: "The Allied nations, with the fullest concurrence of our own government and people,
are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a
Jewish
Commonwealth." (See Doc. 5 for President Wilson's recommendations on

The original favorable attitude of the Arab leaders can best
be determined from a joint agreement signed by Dr. Weizmann and Emir
Faisal in Paris in 1919 (see Doc. 6).
Palestine.)

Later Arab claims that Palestine had been promised

to

them and not

the Jews were based largely on the exchange of letters and
negotiations

between King Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt (see Doc. 3). In answer to these
claims, Sir Henry himself

had

"I feel
it

it

this to

my

say in a

duty

London Times on July 23, 1947:
do so definitely and emphatically that
in giving this pledge to King Hussein to include
letter to the

to state,

me

was not intended by

and

I

Palestine in the area in which

Arab independence was promised. I had also
every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not
included in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein." It is no
wonder then that in February, 1919, the Zionist Organization submitted
a special request to the Allied Supreme Council that, in keeping with the
principle that the popular wish of the people involved be honored, the
mandate for Palestine be granted to Great Britain. Their wish was granted
at San Remo on April 25, 1920. It took another two years, however,
before the Mandate, in its final form, was submitted to the League of

Nations (see Doc. 7). The delay was occasioned by intervention on the
part of the American government which had evinced a great interest in
the entire undertaking.

The end

result of this interest

was a "Convention

between the United Kingdom and the United States of America" signed
on December 3, 1924, which forbade any modification in the terms of the

Mandate without American

consent. If this

was not enough

to assure the

Zionist leadership that the future held naught but promise, there was in
the preamble to the Mandate the specific commitment to translate the
7).

Thus, when on September

Mandate formally came

into force the vast major-

Balfour Declaration into practice (see Doc.
29, 1923, the Palestine
ity of those
its

who were

interested in the Zionist venture were convinced of

promise of fulfillment.

What

followed instead was a generation of frus-
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disappointment culminating in the British White Paper
8). This document completed a cycle for, in effect, it
the
British
put
government in the position of denying an independent
In these days of bitter Arab- Jewish warfare in
in
Palestine.
Jewish state
tration

and

bitter

of 1939 (see

Doc.

the Middle East one

Arabs had assumed

is

prone

by 1939 Britain and not the

to forget that

the role of "villainous

enemy"

as far as the Zionists

were concerned

Volumes have been written regarding the record of British
all that was implied in the earlier promises. What lies behind
There

in British attitude?

ideas

made

was, first of

this

change

the complete rejection of the

all,

Mandate by both

explicit in the

rejection of

the British military in Pales-

more important, by the British Colonial Office. The latter in parwas convinced that affairs in Palestine should be conducted in the
same tradition of imperial rule which characterized the British dominion
tine and,

ticular

over India and the rest of the Empire. Since the promise of an independent
in Palestine stood squarely in the path of such a policy they

Jewish state

all that was in their power to subvert the Zionist goal. In addition, it
must be added that even then the British Foreign Office already dreamed
of a network of semifeudal Arab states under British hegemony.* Only

did

a

independent

successfully

Jewish

state

loomed as a

threat

to

this

undertaking.

What must

be said

is

that despite every obstacle placed in

its

way,

despite the gradual truncation of Palestine from an area of 45,000 square

miles in 1920-1922 to an area of 10,000 square miles in 1922-1948, despite the British restrictions

on immigration and economic development,

White Papers, the Zionist experiment
grew ever more successful. Wave after wave of immigrants, legal and illegal, developed oases from desert lands. A new communal form, the
despite the barrage of anti-Zionist

Kibbutz, combined Anglo-American political democracy and socialist economics with great success. Self-governing bodies within the framework

Mandate

of the

received the vital experience necessary to the public ad-

ministration of a

and

literate as

modern

any

in the

society.

The

political parties

were as mature

Western World.

The most notable Zionist achievement in this period of trial and stress
was the psychological and political transformation of the Jews. The great
mass of Jews who migrated to Palestine by 1939 the figure had reached
500,000 seemed to thrive in the face of the many challenges placed in their
path.

Gone now was

*For
Paassen

detailed

the abject creature of the medieval era

documentation

in Bibliography.

see.

William

B

Ziff,

whose main hope

Paul L. Hanna, and Pierre Van
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for salvation lay in messianic redemption.
Gone, too,

was the

rootless mass,

universally cut off from the soil and normal economic productivity. In

its

place had emerged a thriving, spirited, and determined people bidding for
recognition as equals in the family of nations. It was this rejuvenated
Jewish community also which gave the Allies their most reliable locally-

derived Middle East fighting contingent during World

The

War

II.

immediately after the war, 1945-1947, were marked by
unprecedented violence in Palestine and continued diplomatic bickering
years

over the question of Palestine's future.

The Jewish position could be parabut one refuge for the Jews who survived the
Palestine. Therefore, the restrictions on immigration

phrased thus: 'There
terrors of Hitlerism

must be

lifted

is

and we must be allowed

to progress along the road to in-

dependence. If the British government returns to
date we shall not press for immediate statehood.

remain adamant

its
If,

however, the British

their refusal to allow our natural flowering

in

Man-

promises in the

we

shall

have to establish a Jewish state independent of their wishes."
The Arab reaction to the stated aims of the Zionists can best be gauged
from the remarks made by Azzam Pasha, Secretary of the League of Arab
States, early in 1946 before

an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry:

Our brother has gone to Europe and to the West and come back something
else. He has come back with a totally different conception of things, Western
and not Eastern. That doesn't mean that we are necessarily quarreling with
anyone who comes from the West. But the Jew, our old cousin, coming back
with imperialistic ideas, with materialistic ideas, with reactionary or revolutionary ideas and trying to implement them first by British pressure and then
by American pressure, and then by terrorism on his own part he is not the

we do not extend to him a very good welcome. The Zionist,
new Jew, wants to dominate and he pretends that he has got a particular

old cousin and

the

civilizing mission with which he returns to a backward, degenerate race in
order to put the elements of progress into an area which wants no progress.
Well, that has been the pretension of every power that wanted to colonize and

aimed at domination The excuse has always been that the people are backward and that he has got a human mission to put them forward The Arabs

NO We

are not reactionary and we are not backward.
are ignorant, the difference between ignorance and knowledge is
ten years in school
are a living, vitally strong nation, we are in our renais-

simply stand and say

Even

if

we

We

we

still

are producing as many children as any nation in the world
have our brains.
have a heritage of civilization and of spiritual

We

are not going to allow ourselves to be controlled either

sance,

We

by

We
life.

great nations

or small nations or dispersed nations

When
and

the Anglo-American Committee, appointed by President

British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin,

recommended

Truman

that 100,000
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Jews be admitted into Palestine as rapidly as possible and that restrictions
on sale of land to Jews in Palestine be lifted, the government of Prime
Minister

Clement Attlee disavowed the

report.

of

Hopes

conciliation

threatened to evaporate. Underground Jewish forces began an incessant
of
harassing of the British in Palestine which the latter proved incapable
from
of
the
taken
measure
imprisonment
British,
by
suppressing. Every

Palestine's foremost Jewish leaders to severe military countermeasures

and

the interception and sinking of boats, arriving constantly with "illegal"
Matters were
Jewish refugees, failed to stem the tide of the Jewish uprising.
Arab
the
not at all eased by the additional announcement by
Higher Com-

mittee in Palestine that as soon as the

Mandate should come

to

an end an

Arab army would drive the Jews out of Pahstine. In February of 1947, after
had failed, Mr. Bevin formally

several last-ditch attempts at conciliation

announced that

government had decided

his

to refer the

whole problem

to

the United Nations.

The urgency
long in

of the situation dictated

A

coming.
Nations was called

immediate action and

special session of the General

Assembly

it

was not

of the United

1947, to discuss the Palestine situation.

for April 28,

Arabs were represented within the United Nations by
the states of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. The Palestinian Arabs, through the Palestine Arab Higher Committee, and the Jews,

At

this session, the

through the Jewish Agency, pleaded their cases before the Political and
Security Committee of the General Assembly. The first bombshell in the
proceedings was thrown by the Soviet United Nations delegate, Andrei
Gromyko who astounded the Assembly by deserting the former Soviet
anti-Zionist position

and declaring

in favor of a binational state in Pal-

Failing that, he said that the Soviet government would accept
partition as a solution to the Palestine problem. On May 15, a Special
estine.

Committee on Palestine presented
ical partition of Palestine as

It

its

majority report favoring the polit-

the only feasible answer to the entire problem.

recommended an economic union between

the independent

Arab and

Jewish states, including a customs union, a joint currency system, joint
economic development schemes, joint operation of ports and airports as
well as interstate railway, highway,

further

special safeguarding of the
for free

the first

and postal

recommended a United Nations

Holy

services.

The committee

trusteeship over Jerusalem

Places. It dealt with the Jewish

and

demand

immigration by proposing the admission of 150,000 Jews during
two years of transition and an additional 60' 000 per year should

the transition period go

?

beyond two years.

A

minority report submitted by

From

Palestine to Israel

India, Iran,

47

and Yugoslavia recommended a

federal state in Palestine akin

with severely restricted Jewish immigration.
Speaking for the United States, Secretary of State George Marshall
approved the majority plan. The Russian government did likewise. The
to binationalism

British government rejected both plans. Jewish reaction to the
plan was
by Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, spokesman for the Jewish Agency:

stated

If heavy sacrifice is the inescapable condition of a final
solution, if it makes
possible the immediate reestablishment of the Jewish State, that ideal for

which a people has ceaselessly

striven, then the

Jewish Agency

is

prepared to

recommend

the acceptance of the partition solution. That sacrifice would be
the Jewish contribution to the solution of a painful problem and would bear
witness to the Jewish people's spirit of international cooperation and its desire
for peace.

The

following comments typify Arab reaction to the plan.
Mr. Mahmoud Fawzi, the Egyptian representative

Nations

We

at

the

United

:

do not choose to comply with the General Assembly's resolutions on PalThe Charter and the United Nations will not fall apart if one more of

estine.

the General Assembly's resolutions

Mr. Adil Arslan

My

is

not put into effect.

of Syria:

country will never recognize such a decision

Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Foreign Minister of Iraq:
Iraq does not recognize the validity of
of action towards its implementation.

The

Partition Plan

was introduced

this decision

and

will reserve

freedom

at the plenary session of the General

Assembly on November 26, 1947, and adopted three days later (see Doc.
the absence of provision
10). However, a major flaw in the resolution
led rapidly to an even greater defor implementing the Partition Plan
terioration of the situation. Shortly after the General

Assembly session,
would terminate the Mandate over Palestine on May 15, 1948. It also insisted that until that date it alone would
be responsible for maintaining order in Palestine and would not tolerate
United Nations interference in the administration of that land. The Arab
Great Britain announced that

it

League, too, made no secret of

its

opposition to the implementation of the
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Partition Plan.

and the British government both announarms would continue to be sent to the Middle East in

The Arab

ced that British

CRISIS

states

fulfillment of "contractual obligations."

Meanwhile, various elements in the American State Department began
favor a reversal of the American position in Palestine, arguing that
United States support of the Jewish state in Palestine would provide an
to

opening wedge for the Soviet Union
rulers

might cancel American

oil

in the

Middle East, and that Arab

concessions as a retributive measure.

The

in a series of speeches
growing strength of this viewpoint was reflected
made before the Security Council by the American United Nations dele-

gate,

Warren R.

Austin.

On March

19,

1948,

Ambassador Austin made

American position in the following proposals
explicit the reversal of the
submitted to the United Nations:
which
1. The plan proposed by the General Assembly is an integral plan
cannot succeed unless each of its parts can be carried out There seems to be
general agreement that the plan cannot now be implemented by peaceful

means

We

2.
believe that further steps must be taken immediately not only to
maintain the peace but also to afford a further opportunity to reach an
agreement between the interested parties regarding the future government of
Palestine To this end we believe that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine

should be established under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations
Such a United Nations trusteeship would be without prejudice to the rights,
of the eventual
claims, or position of the parties concerned or to the character

In
settlement, which we hope can be achieved without long delay
our opinion, the Security Council should recommend the establishment of such
a trusteeship to the General Assembly and to the mandatory pouer This
political

would require an immediate special session of the General Assembly, which
the Security Council should request the Secretary General to convoke under
Article 20 of the Charter.
3 Pending the meeting of the proposed special session of the General
Assembly, we believe that the Security Council should instruct the Palestine
Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the proposed partition plan.

In America, Mr. Austin's statement elicited an extraordinarily vocal negaopinion. In the United Nations Mr. Gromyko blamed the

tive public

United States for the breakdown

in the

attempts to solve the Palestine

support of the American stand.
In Palestine, organized anti-British military and terroristic measures were
renewed on a large scale. Conditions became such that Trygvie Lie, Uni-

problem. England readily announced

ted Nations

its

Secretary General, was obliged to call into being another

special General

Assembly session on Palestine. The Assembly convened
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on April

16,

The American

1948.
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delegation to the special session sub-

mitted a series of proposals recommending a temporary trusteeship over
Palestine, pending Arab- Jewish agreement on a future government; a
restriction upon Jewish immigration and land purchase (pending such

agreement) and election of a legislature (which would necessarily have
an Arab majority). The Soviet Union countered by demanding, as under
the United Nations Charter it had the right to do, a seat on any trusteeship
;

over Palestine.

So matters stood on the afternoon of Monday,

May

14, 1948.

At 5:00

P.M. that day the final plenary session of the special session was scheduled
to convene. At exactly 4:06 P.M. the state of Israel declared its inde-

pendence.

The Arab World

reacted swiftly.

On May

15,

the regular armies of

Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon invaded Israel. Their purpose as
stated by Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, was clear:

"There

will

be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which

be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades." One
week after the beginning of hostilities, the Security Council issued the first

will

of several cease-fire orders which were accepted

The weeks and months that
establishment and abandonment of several

the Arabs.

by

Israel

followed were

and rejected by
marked by the

truces. They were also marked
by a series of surprisingly conclusive Israeli military successes. After eight
months of heavy fighting the military phase of the war came to an end
with the crushing defeat of the Egyptian armies which had invaded southern
Israel.

During the months of February, March, April, and July, armistice agreements were reached between Israel and her Arab neighbors. (See Doc. 11.
for Egyptian-Israel armistice agreement.) To date, no further progress

made toward permanent treaties of peace. By October of the
same year it had become apparent that the Arab nations were already
arming for a "second round." Thus Mohammed Saleh El-din Bey, a leading
Egyptian statesman and former foreign minister, declared, "The Arabs

has been

intend to annihilate the state of Israel." This cry for revenge remained
consistent in the

April

14,

Arab

countries.

Akram Hourani,

1950,

the

Defense

Minister

of

Syria,

declared:

The Syrian army
Palestine.

We

call

battle of revenge.

ready to take revenge for the shame of the defeat in
on Arab countries to unite towards the national war, the

is
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June 17, 1951, Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League,
announced:
The United Nations
themselves can do
Palestine

April

,

.

the day

will

not solve the Palestine problem but only the Arabs
are now getting ready and preparing to take back

They
is

not far

Paris El Khouri,

1952,

24,

it

chief

Syrian delegate to the United

Nations, stated:

The only way open
is the way of force

January

Israel to the

May

8,

Israel

is

to

Arab World
uproot

it

is

like a

an

artificial state

And on October

14,

cancer to the

human body and

the only

just like a cancer.

1954, Colonel Nasser

is

problem

1953, King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia declared:

9,

remedy

to the Arabs to achieve a solution of the Palestine

had

this to say:

which must disappear.

1955, Colonel Nasser added:

is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There isn't even the
smallest place for negotiations between the Arabs and Israel

There

April 11, 1956, the Egyptian government-controlled newspaper Al

Gom-

houria remarked:

The only reasonable proposal which
literation of Israel

Mr

from the face of the

These expressions of Arab

Hammarskjold can make

is

the ob-

earth.

intent, coupled with their categorical refusal to

translate the uneasy armistice terms into a

permanent peace, were among

the major causes of unabated friction in the area.

Among

other factors

which exacerbated the situation were:
1.

The unending series of raids and counterraids along every ArabThe United Nations Security Council has chastised both

Israeli borderline.

Israel
tice

and the Arab

agreements.

states

on her border

for constantly violating the armis-

The United Nation and world public opinion were

partic-

From

Palestine to Israel

51

ularly disturbed over several major retaliatory raids conducted

against Egypt and Syria.
2. The dispute over boundaries.

The Arabs have demanded

by

Israel

that Israel

return to the boundary lines set by the Partition Plan of 1947. Israel has
refused to consider any major boundary revisions claiming that to do so

would dishonor those who died defending the present boundaries against
aggression.

The dispute over water rights. There has been particular bitterness
over harnessing the waters of the Jordan River.
4. Free passage in the Suez Canal. Nothing ever came of a Security
3.

Council order calling upon Egypt to end

its

blockade of Israel by opening

the canal to Israeli shipping.
5. The status of Jerusalem.

The Arab refugees.
With the possible exception of the border clashes, no single issue in
the Middle East prior to the Suez War aroused as much public interest
as the problem of the Arab refugees. It is generally agreed that this is
6.

one of the important obstacles to peaceful settlement of Arab-Israeli
differences. The problem has its origin in the mass Arab exodus from
Palestine which began shortly after the United Nations Partitions Resolution

was announced and which continued through the early phases of
War of 1948-1949. The number of Arabs who left Pales-

the Arab-Israeli
tine has

been estimated as anywhere between 550,000 and 750,000.

there are over 900,000 Arab refugees living in several Middle
Eastern lands under the most miserable conditions imaginable. The bulk

Today

some 500,000, are in Jordan; the remainder, with approximation
as to totals, are dispersed as follows: Lebanon, 120,000; Syria, 90,000;
Iraq, 5,000; Gaza 220,000; and a sprinkling in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

of them,

The Arabs have

insisted that Israel repatriate all those

who wish

to

return and compensate the others for their properties. The Arabs have
argued that Israel could settle many of these refugees in the territory it

acquired during the Palestine

War beyond

the original Palestine boun-

daries.

When Israel declared its independence, the new nation was established
within the boundaries set by the United Nations in its 1947 Partition
Plan. Under the terms of that proposal an area of 5,670 square miles of
the former territory of Palestine was to be set up as an independent
Jewish state. The present territory of Israel 8,048 square miles consists
of that original territory plus 2,378 square miles acquired in the war
waged against the Arab states in 1948-1949. As a result of the same war
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Jordan acquired 2,222 square miles and Egypt assumed control of the
135 square miles which comprise the Gaza Strip.
The Gaza Strip is a narrow rectangular piece of land some six miles
width extending north of the Egyptian frontier for approximately 26

in

miles along the Mediterranean coast and includes the town of Gaza. Its
military importance can be gauged

by the

fact that

it

within 35 miles

is

about 90,000. The additional
have
Arab
who
encamped within the narrow confines of
200,000
refugees
the strip are almost entirely dependent upon the United Nations Relief
of Tel Aviv.

The

resident population

is

and Works Administration and other international
Egyptian representatives

Gaza

Strip

a

as

annexed the Gaza

the

at

relief agencies.

11

Egyptian controlled
Strip. It

Though

United Nations often referred to the

Egypt never actually

territory,

was treated as occupied

territory provisionally
administered by the Egyptian military authorities. Thus, in September,

1955,

Gaza
ities

the
Strip

Cairo Court of Administrative Jurisdiction

was outside Egyptian
a

were exercising

territory

and that

stated

that the

the Egyptian author-

a kind of control over part of the territory of

Palestine."
Israel has argued that the mass resettlement of obviously hostile Arabs
would be tantamount to inviting a "fifth column" more than half the size

of its

lem"

own
is

population.

a two-sided

the masses of East

have been forced

to

The

Israelis also point out that the "refugee prob-

affair since Israel

has had to absorb, in addition to

European Jews, some 400,000 Jewish refugees who
emigrate in recent years from Egypt, Yemen, Syria,

Israel, as has already been noted, is adamant
make any but minor boundary adjustments and consis-

Iraq, and other Arab lands.
in its refusal to

tently points to the fact that Jordan, too, acquired

miles of additional land as a result of the

In

1948, Israel offered to accept

some 2,200 square

same Palestine War.

100,000 returning Arab refugees as

part of a general peace settlement but, in the absence of such a settle-

ment, has withdrawn the offer. The Israel government has, however,
absorbed some 30,000 illegal Arab immigrants who infiltrated across the
border, and has released

most

belonging to Arab refugees.

of the

The

councils of the United Nations

$12 million

bank accounts

in frozen

feeling nevertheless persists within the

and elsewhere

that, all its

arguments to

the contrary notwithstanding, Israel's attitude toward the

Arab refugee

has been far too

rigid.

The United Nations

position can be

summarized as a

shift

from the

view that a compromise was possible between repatriation and resettle-
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ment, to a view in which the emphasis has shifted to resettlement in the
Arab World.
Despite the numerous points of friction many people still believe that
an eventual peace settlement might have been possible were it not for the

dramatic suddenness with which Egypt emerged as a close collaborator
with if not ally of the Soviet Union. The turning point in this history

can be dated as September 27, 1955. At that time Egypt consummated
an arms deal with Czechoslovakia estimated at over $250 million, which
resulted in its assuming the role of a much more powerful leader of an

Arab military entente. It is to the
u
of this
new Egypt" that we now

details surrounding the

turn.

development

CHAPTER

6

Egypt and the Suez Canal
In July of 1956, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, many observcondemned this action without realizing that Egypt was doing what

ers

would be legally acceptable for it to do twelve years later. The original
agreement, by some interpretations, might even be construed to permit
the legality of such action as early as 1956. The final agreement for
the

management

of

the Suez Canal, however, provided that the

Canal

Egyptian control and ownership 99 years from
the date of its completion (see Doc. 1). Since the Suez Canal began operation in 1869, under the terms of the agreement it would have been

would be turned over

transferred to

Egypt

to

in

1968. Justifying

its

action in nationalizing the

Canal twelve years early, Egypt cited reasons of national security, economic necessity, and indemnity for economic deprivations caused by the
construction and operation of the Canal. It was a bold move on the part

Gamal Abdul Nasser, insecurely established leader of a bankand
nationalistic people. With one stroke he could hope to
highly
rupt
secure the economy of his country and at the same time play upon and
of Colonel

heighten nationalistic fervor.
To be a pawn in the international economic and political game was
not in any sense a new role for the Suez Canal. Its very inception logically

involved immense economic and political complexities. The conof the Canal was opposed by Great Britain, then maritime

struction

leader of the world, which considered its own economic and political control to be threatened by the scheme for a short cut to the Indian Ocean.

On

the other hand, the venture was fervently supported by France and
other Western European nations who saw in the Canal a resurgence of
the possibilities of power for Western Europe, since the smaller mer-

chant

fleets

could profit considerably from the shorter route to important

trade centers. Finally pressured into accepting an eventual accomplishment
of the Canal in spite of opposition, Great Britain did the next best thing
from the English point of view and undertook to gain control of the new
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Suez waterway. In effecting

this, use was made of an old agreement with
Ottoman Empire granting Great Britain informal control in the
southern Middle East, and another, in 1882, which permitted formal

the

occupation of Egypt.

Much

of

the history of the

Suez Canal and of

twentieth-century Egypt centers in Britain's political, economic, and military maneuvers designed to seize and maintain control of this vitally

important waterway.

When Egypt became
(see

Doc.

2)

Britain,

a British protectorate at the close of World War I
with informal international approval, assumed

guardianship of the Canal
increasing tension between

a responsibility continually complicated by

Egypt and Great Britain over Egyptian

inde-

pendence and by the increasing international importance of the Canal

modern world.
The culmination

in

the

came with Egypt's
amine Egypt's

power struggle between Great Britain and Egypt
nationalization of the Canal in 1956. In order to ex-

of the

The

we must look

justifications for such action

beginning of the Canal
inclusion of

and the organization

Egypt

in the affairs of

further into the

Canal Company.
the Suez Canal Company was
of the Suez

a recent development in the management of the Canal. Egypt had supplied almost half of the original cost capital and for ten years supplied

Although in addition
Sweet Water Canal which was necessary to the

four-fifths of the construction labor for the project.
it

also maintained the

function of the Suez, Egypt did not realize any return from its investment.
In debt as a result of these economic drains and domestic mismanage-

ment, Ismail, the Khedive, was forced to sell Egypt's shareholdings in the
Canal Company which amounted to 44 per cent. These shares were purchased in 1875 by the British government in a brilliant move by Disraeli.
Even the 15 per cent of the net profits allotted to Egypt under terms of
the original agreement were transferred to France in part satisfaction
of other debts.

While Egypt was removed from any control over Canal operations and
left to suffer substantial financial loss, the operation of the Canal itself
further threatened the Egyptian economy. Previous overland trade took to
the waterway for transit. Even the new Cairo-Suez Railway had to be

abandoned. The construction and operation of the Canal left Egypt in a
state of bankruptcy and dependence upon Britain, from which she is only

now

recovering.

In 1922, Egyptian pressure for independence resulted in the establishment of an independent monarchy in Egypt; but the price of independence

was

to

reserve to Britain almost the

same

rights

and influence

it

had
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exerted under the protectoratea defense of Egypt and the Canal and
the security of the British government and British military installations
of British control, and Egyptian
Egypt. Egypt's increasing resentment
of the Canal led to bitter disputes
pressure for a voice in the operation
which were temporarily eased by the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, dein

but continuing British protection of
creasing British control over Egypt
the Canal. Britain managed, indeed, to maintain substantial control of

Egyptian

affairs

the

until

disruptions caused

by World

and some pro-Axis sentiment

exigencies of the war

in

War

II.

The

Egypt again strained

relations.

Anglo-Egyptian
At the close of World

War II attempts by Great Britain to bring the
securely under its control were met by violent
again
Egypt
government
anti-British demonstrations. Egypt demanded removal of all British forces
of

and military installations (almost a billion dollars in military installations
and some 84,000 troops), union with the Sudan, and control of the Canal,
From 1944 until the last British troops left Egypt in 1956 relations between the two countries gradually deteriorated. Though they were close
to

agreement at times,

changes

political

in

Egypt

or Great Britain

would

this period,

however, Egypt
continued to win concessions. Some British troops were evacuated and
and in 1949 extensive conmilitary bases consolidated in the Suez area,

again result in further breaches.

cessions were
to

Throughout

Egypt by the Suez Canal Company, admitting more
management of the Canal and providing further sharing of

made

to

Egyptians
from the operation of the Canal.

profit

In spite of such concessions Egypt's nationalistic determination indefeat in Egypt.
creased, while Britain was unwilling to concede complete
before the Security Council without resoluwithout
even
success, to the United States to reappealed,
Egypt
in Egypt. Under pressure from complications such
Britain
Great
place
as the Arab-Israeli war, the Egyptian blockade of Israeli shipping, and the

The controversy was debated
tion.

in the Cold War, and with the encourageArab nations, Egypt repudiated all political ties with the

heightened significance of Suez

ment

of other

West. Further,

it

abrogated all Anglo-Egyptian treaties. Refusing to reGreat Britain, with the support of the United

cognize the abrogation,

in Egypt. Egypt interBritain
and
fered with British
replied with military
shipping,
British
between
took
clashes
troops and Egypplace
strength. Violent
and loss
destruction
considerable
was
tian demonstrators. There
property

States, took steps to defend its

remaining strength

canal

on both sides The 1952 coup by which the Egyptian army took
control of the government and ousted King Farouk quieted hostilities
of

life
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temporarily, but it soon became clear that the new government would
consolidate by utilizing and emphasizing nationalistic tensions. Further

demonstrations and bitterness finally resulted in an agreement on the
withdrawal of British troops (see Doc. 15). The last British troops left

Suez in June of 1956.

Egyptian claims of economic deprivation as a result of the Canal were
even though increased Egyptian authority in the Suez
Canal Company since the late 1940's had begun to produce financial return.

in large part true,

Egypt's claim to national security as further justification for the nais intimately bound up with its struggles against

tionalization of the Canal

Great Britain for self-realization as a nation. Foreign control of the Canal
brought continual foreign intervention in the national life of the country.
Egypt learned in its struggles with Great Britain that it was virtually
helpless as long as foreign military vessels could line the Suez against

it.

1948, confident of a quick and easy
victory, only to be pushed back until Israel was within striking distance
of the Canal. Great Britain came to the defense of Egypt by suggesting

Egypt went

war with

to

Israel in

that a threat to the Canal would bring military intervention on the part
of Great Britain.

With

the failure of

its

armies, Egypt utilized

its last

resource against

denied Israel's right to the use of the Canal and together with
Saudi Arabia closed off Israel's only other southern sea exit through the

Israel

it

Gulf of Aqaba. Although Article

I of

the Suez Canal Convention clearly

states that the Canal shall be open to all ships of all nations in peace or
war, Egypt defended her action on the basis of Article X, which provides

that the terms of the convention shall not hinder

necessary to her self-defense

(see Doc.

Egypt

in

measures

1).

to sympathize with peoples struggling
realization of political rights. We can
full
for
domination
against foreign
be sympathetic with Egyptian goals so long as Egypt does not, in the
It

is

in the

American tradition

other nations. It bepursuit of its national rights, violate the security of
comes a more involved question when, in view of Cold War politics, free
is necessary to defend Western democracy. Nor can we
count on the reliability of a government based upon dictatorship.
A great deal of Egypt's resources in recent years has gone into the
but Egypt's
purchase of arms from the West and from the Soviet Union,
was not
the
Canal
of
nationalization
to
the
situation
economic
prior
poor
a
had
mobilization.
intensive
to
simple
due
Egypt
military
altogether

transit of the Suez

agrarian

economy

one of primary

for centuries. Prior to British control, the

economy was

stable
subsistence, capable of supporting only a small,
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population. British control and British capital established for

CRISIS

Egypt a

one-crop economy. That one crop was cotton. Desirous of greatly increased
crop yields for purposes of export, Britain regulated the Nile waters

through dams and irrigation projects. Although the uncontrolled annual
Nile floods were not a reliable method for crop irrigation, each flood left
behind it a deposit of rich silt that continually replenished the soil exhausted from the year's planting. British dams and irrigation provided
instead a regular water supply that temporarily increased crop yields profitably. Because of these very dams, however, the land, no longer replenished by annual deposits of rich silt from Nile flood waters, grew
poor and unyielding. As might be expected, during the period of increased

crop yields, Egypt also developed one of the highest rates of population
increase in the world The fellaheen, the Egyptian peasant class, were
soon overcrowded, but were too poor to buy fertilizers for their now wornout soil. Egypt's resources, already diminished by the Suez Canal, were
inadequate to restore the disrupted economy, so that its fortunes came to
depend more and more upon the fluctuations of the world cotton market.
Egypt's economic position remained much the same throughout the
early years of the twentieth century. Limited industrialization and utilization of the few natural resources available improved the situation some-

what, but by 1955 the economic position was still a desperate one and
President Nasser determined upon a complete restoration of Egyptian economy. Reviving an Egyptian dream of previous centuries, he announced a
proposal for the building of a tremendous dam across the Nile at Aswan,
a vast irrigation and power project which would cost an estimated $1.3
billion dollars. Nasser appealed to the West for aid and in December of

1955 was offered by Washington and London $70 million in outright
grants and $200 million more in loans, with assurance of more to come.
In his desire to consolidate the Arab World under his leadership, Nasser,
playing upon anticolonial, anti-Western fervor, turned also to Russia for
aid with the dam. It was during this period that Egypt contracted with

Czechoslovakia to purchase considerable shipments of arms and planes.
Finally on July 19, 1956, Egypt announced to the West that it was now

ready to accept the West's offei of aid in the matter of the Aswan project.
Washington replied with a refusal, echoed by London, which registered

doubt of Egypt's financial ability to undertake the project "in present
circumstances." Two days later Russia announced that it too had no intention of offering aid to finance the

26, that

Nasser

in a violent

dam.

It

was

days after that, on July

five

anti-Western speech proclaimed the nationali-

zation of the Suez Canal (see Docs. 18 and 19).
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Some experts judge the Aswan dam project itself to be unsound and
are of the opinion that any solution to
power and irrigation problems
along the Nile would necessitate a series of developments extending back
Sudan in order to include the sources of the river. This would

into the

require certain agreements between

Egypt and the Sudan. Moreover,

nei-

ther the Sudanese, nor the Ethiopians, from whose territories
spring the
main tributaries of the Nile, had agreed to Egypt's proposal for a division
of the Nile waters.

The

refusal of

on these criticisms, however.
undermine Nasser's power.

It

London and Washington was not based
was a diplomatic stroke designed

to

The Suez Canal was the one asset remaining to an economically unsound Egypt, and Nasser promptly utilized this one remaining advantage.
Egypt assumed control of the Canal with promises of complete compensation to shareholders

dered

to

if

all

the Suez Canal

Company

assets

were surren-

was

to

itself.

As

the Egyptian government. France and Britain's answer

freeze the assets both of the Suez Canal

Company and

of

Egypt

the issue was brought before the United Nations, Nasser warned that any
intervention would bring about the closing of the Canal.

Thus

the matter stood until October 29, 1956,

when

Israel

broke the

deadlock by invading Egypt's Sinai Peninsula for the announced
purpose of clearing out Egyptian "commando" nests said to be responsible for increasing raids on the Israeli frontier. Within twenty-four hours,
political

Great Britain and France without United Nations sanction, and reportedly without the knowledge of the United States, issued an ultimatum
to the

British
British

contending parties which called for a cease-fire in twelve hours or

and French troops would intervene. Israel accepted. Egypt refused.
and French forces then entered the area along the Suez Canal and

bombed Egyptian

military installations. In reply to this action

Egypt sank

hulks to block the Canal and Syria blew up the oil pipelines which crossed
its territory from Iraq. Within a week British and French forces suc-

ceeded in occupying two-fifths of the Suez Canal area. Israel occupied
both the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. A further complication was
offered

by Russia and Red China who threatened

to

send "volunteer"

troops to

Egypt.
In the United Nations, Security Council action was deadlocked by British and French vetoes. The issue, then referred to the General Assembly,

was debated in an emergency session called to discuss both the crisis in
the Middle East and the Hungarian Civil War. The result was an order
requiring both a cease-fire and the withdrawal of British, French, and
Israeli troops

from the Suez area. The order was

to

be enforced by a
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United Nations Emergency Force consisting of troops from small neutral
countries, but it was not until December 22 that the British and French

completed the removal of their troops. A month later Israel had withdrawn
from all but the Gaza Strip, though it was March 4 when finally, under
threat of world sanctions, the Israeli forces vacated this violently contested
strip oi

territory

and the United Nations

moved

forces

in

to

safeguard

the frontier.

The arguments advanced by the antagonists in the
found in Documents 20-28, which consist of speeches
Nations both

in criticism

and

in defense of the

dispute are to be
before the United

Anglo-French-Israeli ac-

Document 29 includes the major United Nations Middle Eastern

tion.

resolutions offered during this period
as

If,

many

contend, the Anglo-French action was taken merely in deit resulted not so much in defense as in damage

fense of the Suez Canal,
to the

Canal and the disruption of oil transmission through major Middle
If the action was a measure taken in prevention of a major

East pipelines.

war, at least this objective was gained since no major war developed from
which can surely be termed a major world crisis. But

a sequence of events
if,

as

made

some observers
in collaboration

suggest, British-French intervention

was a bold move

with Israel to destroy Nasser's power, restore Anglo-

French control of the Suez, and recoup economic losses in the Middle East,
failed indeed Egypt continues to control the Suez Canal and Nasser

it

emerged

in a stronger position

than before, while Britain and France suf-

fered world-wide censure. Moreover, anti-Western

and

anti-Israeli feeling

has been increased throughout the Middle East.

The report to the United States Senate from the Senate Committees
on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, dated February 14, 1957, is
illustrative of the gravity with which the United States government viewed
this crisis in the

Middle East. The following

is

a selection from that report:

Soviet bloc economic or technical assistance has been extended to Egypt, SuYemen and has been offered to Iran, Israel, Leb-

dan, Syria, Turkey, and

anon, Libya, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia Soviet bloc arms have been furnished
to Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, and have been offered to Saudi Arabia and

Sudan
Concurrently with the burgeoning Soviet political and economic activity in
the Middle East, there has been a complete destruction of the British and
French position in the area This position was given its final blow by the

Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, but it had been in decline long before
The net result of these and other events of recent years is that the situation in the Middle East is very dangerous. Syria has moved much closer to
the Soviet bloc. Jordan

is

faced with chaos

Egypt has mortgaged

its

future
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Communist arms, large quantities of which have been
through capture or destruction Egypt has also lost the revenues of the
Suez Canal Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are suffering from the loss of oil
cotton crop to pay for

lost

revenues brought about by blockage of the Canal.

Bearing

in

mind

have contributed

this

to

survey of the
the crisis in

many

tensions

and complexities which

the Middle East, let us review briefly

the philosophies underlying the response of the United States to these

problems.

CHAPTER

The Shaping

7

of United States Foreign Policy

Creating a foreign policy for the United States is one of the most difficult
tasks which faces any presidential administration. Beginning with President Washington, each Chief Executive has had to meet the dual responsibility of

maintaining a foreign policy in keeping with the American ideal

as interpreted in his time, while simultaneously placating political opposition within and without his own party. This dual undertaking calls for
a constant combination of the proverbial wisdom of Solomon with the
patience of Job. With the recrudescence of violent nationalism in every
section of the globe and the parallel emergence of a much broader Ameri-

can political leadership, the task has become immeasurably more difficult.
The development of United States foreign policy has taken place within
the context of an ideological struggle which has been classified by political scientists as "realism" versus "idealism." Typical of the "idealistic"
approach are the following quotations from President Woodrow Wilson
and President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
In an address delivered in Mobile, Alabama, on October 27, 1913,
President Woodrow Wilson declared:

We

dare not turn from the principle that morality and not expediency is the
must guide us, and that we will never condone iniquity because it

thing that
is

most convenient

to

do

so.

In his message to Congress on January 6, 1941, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt expressed the now-famous concept of the "four freedoms."

We

are committed to the proposition that principles of morality
and considown security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace
dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers.
know that enduring
erations for our

We

peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a
world founded upon essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech
.

and expression
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everywhere in the world

.

.
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The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way
everywhere in the world.
The third is freedom from want
everywhere in the world.
The fourth is freedom from fear
anywhere in the world.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Our support goes

.

.

who

to those

struggle to gain those rights or keep

them.

Representative of the viewpoint of political "realism" are the following
quotations from Alexander Hamilton and the contemporary political analyst, Hans J. Morgenthau. In
Alexander Hamilton asserted:

his

Padficus Paper No.

3,

July,

1793,

duty of a nation .... Indeed, the rule of
not precisely the same between nations as between
individuals. The duty of making its own welfare the guide of its actions, is
much stronger upon the former than upon the latter; in proportion to the
Self-preservation

is

the

morality in this respect

first

is

greater magnitude and importance of national compared with individual happiness, and to the greater permanency of the effects of national than of
individual conduct

Hans

J.

Morgenthau wrote as

follows (see Bibliography):

The fundamental error which has thwarted American foreign policy in thought
and action is the antithesis of national interest and moral principles. The
equation of political moralism with morality and of political realism with
immorality is itself untenable. The choice is not between moral principles and
the national interest devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral
principles, divorced from political reality, and another set of moral principles derived from political reality. The basic fact of international politics
is the absence of a society able to protect the existence, and to promote the
interests, of the individual nations. For the individual nations to take care of
their own national interests is, then, a political necessity. There can be no
moral duty

to neglect them; for as the international society is at present
constituted, the consistent neglect of the national interest can only lead to
national suicide. Yet it can be shown that there exists even a positive moral

duty for the individual nation to take care of

its

national interests.

Self-preservation for the individual as well as for societies is not only a biological and psychological necessity, but in the absence of an overriding moral
obligation a moral duty as well.
.

.

.

becomes obvious that each

of these approaches to making foreign
of
tacit
based
series
a
assumptions of its own. It becomes
policy
upon
further evident that each of these approaches is laden with its own valueIt

is

necessary, therefore, to examine both the "realistic" and
"idealistic" viewpoints in order to determine their basic soundness. At

judgments. It

is

EAST IN

64

the outset

it

would seem that the

with each issue on
of

power

ply that

politics.

1

The

"realistic" viewpoint advocates dealing

merits and reaching conclusions on the basis

own

its

"idealistic'

some formal moral

view, on the other hand, seems to im-

criterion

must be established as an a

priori

basis for policy determination. Thus, the latter brings forth Atlantic Charu
ters while the former shies away from
utopian" manifestoes. The "real-

approach upon the acceptance of a prevailing Hobbesian
conflict among nations. Strife rather than harmony is seen as, or taken to
relations. In the absence of an "overbe, the general rule in international
ist" bases his

of valid

awing power" the goal

diplomacy and statesmanship

restriction

of

their

a com-

is

paratively limited one. It consists of the limitation of struggles

and the

Hence, the emergence of the "containment"

scope.

policy under the authorship of Mr. Kennan (see Bibliography). Here,
as always, the "realist" seeks not the Utopian society which he believes

can exist only on a blueprint, but rather the means of attaining a balance
power and an adjustment to existing conditions. There is, therefore,
within his approach constant emphasis upon checks and balances, comproof

mise, and maintenance of a flexible bargaining position. There is, in addition, frank acknowledgment that in international diplomacy there often
exists a discrepancy

between means and ends. Above

current theme that the struggle for power

and that the best we can do
and

relieve the

is

is

all,

there

is

permanent and ever present

try to limit the overconcentration of

tensions which

make

the re-

power

for war. Britain, for example, for

over one hundred years maintained peace in Europe through a carefully
controlled balance of power.

The

political "idealist"

that power politics

is

on the other hand, starts from the assumption

not only an abnormal but also a passing phase in

mankind's history, and that it is essentially a cynical distortion and corruption of history which is particularly out of place in our shrunken globe

where the alternative

to

"one world"

is

truly

no world.

It ascribes

great controversies in history to the clash between incompatible ideals
principles rather than an ubiquitous yearning for power.
practical alternatives to

power

On

politics the political "idealist"

all

and

the level of

would usu-

These include universal world governrelations with "bad" countries, or some form of

ally posit one of several alternatives.

ment, the foreswearing of
neutralism or isolationism.
Political

commentators are pretty much in agreement that regardless of
is essentially an "idealist" or a "realist" there exists a certain

whether one

underlying consensus as to the ends and means of American foreign policy.
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words that both schools adhere to a broad

policy which includes the following:
1. the containment of the Soviet
Union and

its outdistancing in the
race for competitive
coexistence;
2. establishment of a
peaceful world order in which American ideological and material interests are secure
;

the recognition that a reasonable reconciliation of individual freedom

3.

and mass welfare is possible.
There is also general agreement

that the means toward these ends must
not contradict the general rules of what we consider fair
play.
The history of United States foreign relations, for reasons discussed
below, has often been under the sway of the "idealistic" rather than the
"realistic" approach.

Thus, for example, we find the refusal to recognize
and then Red China on the grounds that they are

the Soviet Union

first

and corrupt powers."
Thus too, so many of our wars are fought to eliminate and extirpate the
"infidels and evildoers." When we go into
battle, our terms become "unconditional surrender" and our mottoes become "make the world safe for
democracy." The implication is that, once evil men are destroyed, evil too
"evil

will disappear. It is
against this

in

American

history, each of

background that two classic documents
which has become a guiding principle for

generations of "idealists," becomes clear.

President George Washington's Farewell Address on September 17, 1796,
advised:

The

great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations

our commercial relations, to have with them as

little

is,

in extending

political connection as

possible.

Why
entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European
ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?
It is our policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

the foreign world.

Thomas

Jefferson wrote to President

James Monroe on October

24, 1823:

fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the
Europe Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cisAtlantic [on this side of the Atlantic] affairs America, North and South,

Our

first

broils of

has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own.
She would therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that
of Europe.
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In the development of foreign policy, a democratic nation faces one of
most striking and difficult dilemmas. The executive position must some-

how
is

CRISIS

represent or reflect the consensus of the electorate. But the electorate
moody. Certainly the advantages of a foreign

often contradictory and

to reflect these contradictions, are offset

by the disWith so many involved in the
creation of a foreign policy, and so many more affected by its direction,
it is sometimes to be wondered that any policy can clearly reflect the "will
policy, fluid

enough

advantages of the resulting uncertainty.

of the people."

And

yet,

if

is

it

to

be truly democratic then somehow

it

must. Thus, for example, we find emerging within the formation of contemporary United States foreign policy an attempt at eclecticism a combining of both the "realistic" and "idealistic" approach.

new approach and then
way of
from an address to the nation by Presi-

Let us examine two statements which
proceed to

an analysis of the

its fulfillment.

The

first

reflect this

specific obstacles which stand in the

of these

is

dent Dwight D. Eisenhower which was delivered on April
It reads as follows:

The way chosen by

the United States

precepts, which govern

conduct

its

in

was

world

plainly

1953.

16,

marked by a few

clear

affairs

First: no people on earth can be held, as a people, to be an enemy, for
humanity shares the common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice
Second" no nation's security and well-being can be lastingly achieved

all

in

isolation but only in effective cooperation with fellow nations.

Third: any nation's right to a form of government and an economic system
of

its

own choosing

Fourth:

any

government

And
all

inalienable.

attempt

to

dictate

to

other nations their form of

indefensible.

a nation's hope of lasting peace cannot be firmly based upon
armaments but rather upon just relations and honest understanding

fifth,

a race in

with

is

is

nation's

other nations.

For the second quotation we turn to the words of Mr. George Kennan
(see Bibliography):

United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to
enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the
Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue
It is clear that the

to expect that Soviet policies will reflect

no

no abstract love of peace and

stabil-

permanent happy coexistence of the
Socialist capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward
the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.
Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the Western
world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly
ity,

real faith in the possibility of a
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and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will evenweaken its own total potential This would of itself warrant the United

flexible,

tually

States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment,
designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point

where they show

signs of encroaching

upon the

interests of a peaceful

and

stable world.

How

we prepared to meet the demands of such a
a commonplace among writers on the United States
to note that we have taken on very reluctantly the risky role of world
then, as a nation are

foreign policy? It

leadership.

The

is

inevitable

remark has

also

been made that the American

has been accompanied by the concomitant rise of a
ruthless, amoral, power-hungry Soviet Union. The question therefore natrise to the pinnacle

urally arises as to

which

how

capable we are of making the necessary decisions

will achieve for us the

maximum

national security.

cisions are vital not only to us but to the rest of the

That these de-

world as well

is

ap-

parent in the relationships between a successful American foreign policy

and the well-being, political and economic, of the entire free world. The
root of the problem lies in the relationship between the need for incisive
and intelligent decision-making on the part an informed leadership and a
democratic myth that

insists that the

wisdom, can make the decisions

Thus we

people as a whole, in their inherent

vital to their survival.

are faced with the question of whether the

mass of the Ameri-

can people can judge wisely the complex and often remote problems of

contemporary foreign policy. The question is complicated by the traditional pattern of American abstention from foreign "problems" except in
periods of great stress. The pattern of American life finds the average
citizen deeply involved in private pursuits. In fact, it is in just
involvement that men like T. V. Smith insist one finds the secret of

American
this

American freedom. Be that as it may, we nevertheless find that the average
American develops views on political matters in a ratio to their direct relationship and effect upon him. As a result, his main interests, politically
and wage and
speaking, lie in such matters as tax laws, social security,
price legislation. It

is

only on rare occasions that he

is

aroused to the

we
degree that he forms opinions relative to foreign policy. As a result,
often find a marked instability and a sharp fluctuation characterizing these
moods.

We

come face

to face then with the dual

the public alert, informed,

and

problem of how
and how

active in policy making,

to
to

make
make

posed by
leadership responsible to the public. No less a problem
the perpetual Executive-Congressional struggle over program direction and
of the very structure of our governleadership which is a normal result
official

is
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This struggle has become further
up under the Constitution.
constant demands of conflicting prescomplicated over the years by the
wants to form an intelligent opinion
who
citizen
The
sure groups.
average
know what the Chief Executive and
to
needs
not
about foreign policy
only
are
to
are striving
achieve, but also what pressure groups
the

ment

as set

Congress
behind what policy and for what reasons.
We need to take all these points of view into consideration, because we
that as American citizens

we are

called

come

finally to the realization

upon

before in our history, to participate
today, perhaps more than ever

our immediate lives but the
making of decisions affecting not only
is the need for
fate of Western civilization. Typical of this responsibility
East.
policy formulation in the Middle
of world tension resulting from the Middle
A reaction to the
in the

pressures

Eastern

was a

crisis

necessity, but the

Eisenhower Doctrine (see Docs.

to these pressures.
30-33) certainly was not the only possible reaction
American
of
alternative
proposals, while
are
34-36
Documents
examples
from other
statements
Eastern
Middle
policy
Documents 37-43 present

nations.

In the light of the succession of crises following upon the promulgation
it served
of the Eisenhower Doctrine, one cannot help but ask whether
of the
alone
Lebanon
that
at all. We need only be reminded
its

purpose

Arab nations requested aid under its terms. The hindsight of the "post
mortem" analyst begs the question of what would have been the history
of events in the Middle East if a policy other than that which emerged
in 1957 had been in force. In any case, the intervention in Lebanon
early

did occur, as did the re-entry of British troops into Jordan. These are the
cold facts. But the big questions remain.

Where would the "idealists' now direct us? What role would the "realists" demand of us? Of what importance and political effect will be the
1

propaganda and votes of the interested pressure groups
Shall

we

l

'go

it

in this

country?

alone" or cast our lot in a policy of collective security? Is

our foreign policy as

it

now

stands a valid representation of public opin-

ion? In a world which refuses to remain static,

is

United States foreign

enough to cope with emergencies as they arise?
In the American democracy, foreign policy must, in the long run, reflect the viewpoint of the majority. In the words of Paul H. Appleby,

policy flexible

in the barber shop or
of opinion on public affairs
at
a
club
at
a
a
party, union meeting,
meeting,
taxicab,
beauty
to the climate
contribution
is
a
or
wherever
farm organization meeting,

"Every expression
parlor, in

The Shaping of United
of opinion within

which the government acts

or maintain consent.

To
felt

the citizen

in the

Every

who

in its constant effort to achieve

withholding of expression similarly is a vote."

wishes to inform himself and to

shaping of our

collection of
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make

his opinions

this analysis

documents that follows are respectfully dedicated.

and the
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Convention on the Free Navigation of the Suez Canal:
The European Powers and the Ottoman Empire

October 29, 1888
Austria,

Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Russia, Spam, Great
and the Ottoman Empire

Britain, France,

ART

The Suez Maritime Canal

always be free and open, in time of war as
of war, without distinction of flag.
Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere
with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace.
The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade.
ART. II. The High Contracting Parties, recognizing that the Fresh-Water Canal
I

in time of peace, to every vessel of

shall

commerce or

indispensable to the Maritime Canal, take note of the engagements of His Highness the Khedive towards the Universal Suez Canal Company as regards the FreshWater Canal; which engagements are stipulated in a Convention bearing date the
is

18th March, 1863, containing an expose and four Articles.
They undertake not to interfere in any way with the security of that Canal
and its branches, the working of which shall not be exposed to any attempt at
obstruction.

ART. III. The High Contracting Parties likewise undertake to respect the plant,
establishments, buildings, and works of the Maritime Canal and of the Fresh-Water
Canal.

ART. IV. The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war as a free passage,
even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms of Article I of the
present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that no right of war, no act
of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the
Canal, shall be committed in the Canal and its ports of access, as well as within
a radius of 3 marine miles from those ports, even though the Ottoman Empire
should be one of the belligerent Powers.
Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in stores in the Canal
and its ports of access, except in so far as may be strictly necessary. The transit of
the aforesaid vessels through the Canal shall be effected with the least possible
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and without
delay, in accordance with the Regulations in force,
sion than that resulting from the necessities of the service.
Their stay at Port

Sai'd

and

in the roadstead of

Suez

Background

any other intermis-

shall not

exceed twenty-

four hours, except in case of distress. In such case they shall be bound to leave
as soon as possible. An interval of twenty-four hours shall always elapse between
the sailing of a belligerent ship from one of the ports of access and the departure
of a ship belonging to the hostile Power.
ART. V. In time of war belligerent Powers shall not disembark nor embark
its ports of access either troops, munitions, or materials of
war. But in case of an accidental hindrance in the Canal, men may be embarked
or disembarked at the ports of access by detachments not exceeding 1,000 men,
with a corresponding amount of war material

within the Canal and

ART. VI. Prizes shall be subjected, in all respects, to the same rules as the
war of belligerents.
ART. VII. The Powers shall not keep any vessel of war in the waters of the
Canal (including Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes).

vessels of

Nevertheless, they may station vessels of war in the ports of access of Port
Said and Suez, the number of which shall not exceed two for each Power.
This right shall not be exercised by belligerents.

ART. VIII, The Agents in Egypt of the Signatory Powers of the present Treaty
watch over its execution In case of any event threatening the

shall be charged to

security or the free passage of the Canal, they shall meet on the summons of three
of their number under the presidency of their Doyen, in order to proceed to the

necessary verifications. They shall inform the Khedivial Government of the danger
which they may have perceived, in order that the Government may take proper
steps to insure the protection and the free use of the Canal. Under any circumstances, they shall meet once a year to take note of the due execution of the Treaty.

The last-mentioned meetings shall take place under the presidency of a Special
Commissioner nominated for that purpose by the Imperial Ottoman Government. A
Commissioner of the Khedive may also take part in the meeting, and may preside
over it in case of the absence of the Ottoman Commissioner
They shall especially demand the suppression of any work or the dispersion of
any assemblage on either bank of the Canal, the object or effect of which might
be to interfere with the liberty and the entire security of the navigation.
ART IX, The Egyptian Government shall, within the limits of its powers resulting from the Firmans, and under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty,
take the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the said Treaty.
In case the Egyptian Government should not have sufficient means at its disposal,
it shall call upon the Imperial Ottoman Government, which shall take the necessary
measures to respond to such appeal; shall give notice thereof to the Signatory
Powers of the Declaration of London of the 17th March, 1885; and shall, if
necessary, ;concert with them on the subject.

The

provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not interfere with the
shall be taken in virtue of the present Article

measures which

ART X.

the provision of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not
measures which His Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the
the name of His Imperial Majesty, and within the limits of the Fir-

Similarly,

interfere with the

Khedive,

in

2

Establishment of the British Protectorate Over Egypt
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mans

granted, might find it necessary to take for securing by their own forces the
defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order
In case His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, or His
Highness the Khedive, should
find it necessary to avail themselves of the
exceptions for which this Article
provides, the Signatory Powers of the Declaration of
thereof by the Imperial Ottoman Government.
It

in

is

London

shall

be notified

likewise understood that the provisions of the four Articles aforesaid shall

no case occasion any obstacle

to the measures which the Imperial Ottoman
necessary to take in order to insure by its own forces the
other possessions situated on the eastern coast of the Red Sea.

Government may think
defence of

ART.
Articles

its

XL

it

The measures which

IX and

X

shall

be taken

in

the

cases provided

for

by

of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the free use of the

Canal. In the same cases, the erection of permanent fortifications contrary to the
provisions of Article

VIII

is

prohibited

ART XII. The High

Contracting Parties, by application of the principle of
equality as regards the free use of the Canal, a principle which forms one of the
bases of the present Treaty, agree that none of them shall endeavour to obtain

with respect to the Canal

territorial or commercial advantages or privileges in any
international arrangements which may be concluded. Moreover, the rights of Turkey
as the territorial Power are reserved.

ART. XIII. With the exception of the obligations expressly provided by the
clauses of the present Treaty, the sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty the
Sultan, and the rights and immunities of His Highness the Khedive, resulting

from the Firmans, are in no way affected
ART XIV The High Contracting Parties agree that the engagements resulting
from the present Treaty shall not be limited by the duration of the Acts of Concession of the Universal Suez Canal Company.
ART.

XV

The

stipulations

of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the

sanitary measures in force in Egypt.

ART. XVI. The High Contracting Parties undertake to bring the present Treaty
Knowledge of the States which have not signed it, inviting them to accede

to the
to

it.

Establishment of the British Protectorate Over Egypt

December

18-19,

1914

PROCLAMATION OF PROTECTORATE, 18 DECEMBER 1914
His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice that,
in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey, Egypt is placed
under the protection of His Majesty and will henceforth constitute a British
Protectorate.
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Egypt is thus terminated, and His Majesty's
adopt all measures necessary for the defence of Egypt, and
inhabitants and interests

suzerainty of Turkey over

Government
protect

its

will

DEPOSITION OF KHEDIVE ABBAS HILMI II, 19 DECEMBER 1914
His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice that,
in view of the action of His Highness Abbas Hilmi Pasha, lately Khedive of Egypt,
who has adhered to the King's enemies, His Majesty's Government have seen fit
to depose him from the Khediviate, and that high dignity has been offered, with
the

title

of Sultan of Egypt, to His Highness Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha, eldest
Mohammed Ali, and has been accepted by him

living Prince of the family of

NOTE ON THE PROTECTORATE BY ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER MILNE CHEETHAM
TO SULTAN HUSAYN KAMIL, 19 DECEMBER 1914

am

by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Highness the circumstances piecedmg the outbreak
of war between His Britannic Majesty and the Sultan of Turkey and the changes
which the war entails in the status of Egypt.
In the Ottoman Cabinet there were two parties. On the one side was a moderate
I

instructed

to bring to the notice of your

sympathy extended by Great Britain to every effort towards
Turkey, who recognized that in the war in which His Majesty was
already engaged no Turkish interests were concerned, and welcomed the assurance
of His Majesty and his Allies that neither in Egypt nor elsewhere would the war
party, mindful of the

reform

in

be used as a pretext for any action injurious to Ottoman interests. On the other
side a band of unscrupulous military adventurers looked to find in a war of aggression,

waged

in concert

with His Majesty's enemies, the means of retrieving the

and economic, into which they had already plunged
might prevail, His Majesty
of repeated violations of their rights, abstained from retal-

disasters, military, financial,

their country.

Hoping

to the last that wiser counsels

and his Allies, in spite
iatory action until compelled thereto

by the crossing of the Egyptian frontier by
armed bands and by unprovoked attacks on Russian open ports by the Turkish
naval forces under

German

officers.

His Majesty's Government are in possession of ample evidence that ever since
the outbreak of war with Germany His Highness Abbas Hilmi Pasha, late Khedive
of Egypt, has definitely thrown in his lot with His Majesty's enemies.
From the facts above set out, it results that the rights over Egypt, whether of

the Sultan, or of the late Khedive, are forfeit to His Majesty.
His Majesty's Government have already, through the General Officer

Command-

ing His Majesty's Forces in Egypt, accepted exclusive responsibility for the defence of Egypt in the present war It remains to lay down the form of the future
Government of the country, freed, as I have stated, from all rights of suzerainty
or other rights heretofore claimed by the Ottoman Government.
Of the rights thus accruing to His Majesty, no less than of those exercised in

Egypt during the last thirty years of reform, His Majesty's Government regard
themselves as trustees for the inhabitants of Egypt. And His Majesty's Government have decided that Great Britain can best fulfil the responsibilities she has
incurred toward Egypt by the formal declaration of a British Protectorate, and
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government of the country under such Protectorate by a Prince of the

Khedivial family.
In these circumstances

I am instructed by His Majesty's Government to inform
by reason of your age and experience, you have been chosen as
the Prince of the family of Mehemet Ali most worthy to occupy the Khedivial position, with the title and style of the Sultan of Egypt; and, in inviting your Highness

your Highness

that,

to accept the responsibilities of your high office, I am to give you the formal assurance that Great Britain accepts the fullest responsibility for the defence of the

under your Highness against all aggression whencesoever coming; and
His Majesty's Government authorize me to declare that after the establishment
of the British Protectorate now announced all Egyptian subjects wherever they may
be will be entitled to receive the protection of His Majesty's Government
territories

With the Ottoman suzerainty there will disappear the restrictions heretofore
placed by the Ottoman firmans upon the numbers and organisation of your High-

army and upon the grant by your Highness of honorific distinctions.
As regards foreign relations, His Majesty's Government deem it most consistent
with the new responsibilities assumed by Great Britain that the relations between
your Highness 's Government and the representatives of foreign Powers should

ness's

henceforth be conducted through His Majesty's representative in Cairo.
His Majesty's Government have repeatedly placed on record that the system
of treaties, known as the Capitulations, by which your Highness 's Government is

bound, are no longer in harmony with the development of the country; but, in the
opinion of His Majesty's Government, the revision of those treaties may most
conveniently be postponed until the end of the present war

In the

field of internal administration, I

am

to

remind your Highness

that, in con-

has been the aim of His Majesty's
Government, while working through and in the closest association with the constituted Egyptian authorities, to secure individual liberty, to promote the spread of

sonance with the traditions of British policy,

it

education, to further the development of the natural resources of the country, and,
measure as the degree of enlightenment of public opinion may permit, to

in such

associate the governed in the task of government. Not only is it the intention of His
Majesty's Government to remain faithful to such policy, but they are convinced
that the clearer definition of Great Britain's position in the country will accelerate

progress towards self-government.
The religious convictions of Egyptian subjects will be scrupulously respected as
are those of His Majesty's own subjects, whatever their creed. Nor need I affirm

Egypt free from any duty of obedience to
power at Constantinople, His Majesty's Governtowards the Caliphate The past history of Egypt

to your Highness that, in declaring

those

who have usurped

political

ment

are animated

by no

hostility

shows, indeed, that the loyalty of Egyptian
is

Mahommedans

towards the Caliphate

independent of any political bends between E^ypt and Constantinople.

Mahommedan institutions in Egypt is natuwhich His Majesty's Government take a deep interest and with
which your Highness will be specially concerned, and in carrying out such reforms
as may be considered necessary, your Highness may count upon the sympathetic
support of His Majesty's Government.
The

rally a

I

strengthening and progress of

matter

am

in

to add that His Majesty's

loyalty, the

good sense, and

Government

self-restraint of

rely with

confidence

Egyptian subjects to

upon the

facilitate the
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task of the General Officer Commanding His Majesty's Forces, who is entrusted
with the maintenance of internal order, and with the prevention of the rendering
of aid to the enemy.

The Htisayit-McMahoii Correspondence

July 14,

1915-March

FROM
Whereas

SHAJRIF

the whole of the

10,

1916

HUSAYN,

14

JULY 1915

Arab nation without any exception have decided

in

and to accomplish their freedom, and grasp the reins of their
administration both in theory and practice, and whereas they have found and felt
that it is to the interest of the Government of Great Britain to support them and
these last years to

live,

aid them to the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions (which are based
upon the maintenance of the honour and dignity of their life) without any ulterior

motives whatsoever unconnected with

And whereas

it is

this object;

to their (the Arabs') interest also to prefer the assistance of

the Government of Great Britain in consideration of their geographical position
and economic interests, and also of the attitude of the above-mentioned Government, which is known to both nations and therefore need not be emphasized;
For these reasons the Arab nation see fit to limit themselves, as time is short,
to asking the Government of Great Britain, if it should think fit, for the approval,

through her deputy or representative, of the following fundamental propositions,
leaving out all things considered secondary in comparison with these, so that it may
prepare all means necessary for attaining this noble purpose, until such time as it
finds occasion for

making the actual negotiations.
England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries,
bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37 of latitude, on which
Firstly.

degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn 'Umar), Amadia, up to
the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra,
on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to

remain as

England

Secondly.
shall

on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina.
approve of the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam.

it is

to

;

The Arab Government

have the preference

in all

of the Sherif to acknowledge that

economic enterprises

in the

England
Arab countries when-

ever conditions of enterprises are otherwise equal.

For the security of this Arab independence and the certainty of such
Thirdly.
preference of economic enterprises, both high contracting parties to offer mutual
assistance, to the best ability of their military and naval forces, to face any foreign
Power which may attack either party. Peace not to be decided without agreement
of both parties.

The Htisayn-McMahon Correspondence

3
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Fourthly.
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upon an aggressive

conflict,

the other

party to assume a neutral attitude, and in case of such party wishing the other to
join forces, both to meet and discuss the conditions.
Fifthly
countries,

England to acknowledge the abolition of foreign privileges in the Arab
and to assist the Government of the Sherif in an International Conven-

tion for confirming such abolition.

Articles 3

Sixthly.

and 4

of this treaty to

remain in vigour for fifteen years, and,

be renewed, one year's notice before lapse of treaty to be given.
Consequently, and as the whole of the Arab nation have (praise be to God)
agreed and united for the attainment, at all costs and finally, of this noble object,

if

either wishes

it

to

they beg the Government of Great Britain to answer them positively or negatively
days after receiving this intimation; and if this period should

in a period of thirty

lapse before they receive an answer, they reserve to themselves complete freedom
of action. Moreover, we (the Sherif's family) will consider ourselves free in word

and deed from the bonds

of

our previous declaration which

we made through

Ali Effendi

FROM
I

have received your

SIR

HENRY MCMAHON,

letter of the

24 OCTOBER 1915

29th Shawal, 1333, with

much

pleasure and

your expressions of friendliness and sincerity have given me the greatest satisfaction
I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I
regarded the question of the limits and boundaries with coldness and hesitation;
such was not the case, but it appeared to me that the time had not yet come when
that question could be discussed in a conclusive manner.
I have realised, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as
one of vital and urgent importance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the
Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and it is with great
pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which

am

confident you will receive with satisfaction.
districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the
west of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be

I

The two

purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.
With the above modification, and without prejudice of our existing treaties with

Arab
As

we accept

chiefs,

those limits.

for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to
act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the

name
make

of the

of Great Britain to give the following assurances and

Government

the following reply to your letter:
(1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize
and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits

demanded by
(2)

and

will

Mecca.

guarantee the Holy Places against

all

external aggression

will recognise their inviolability.

(3)

and

the Sherif of

Great Britain

When

will assist

government
(4)

On

the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice
them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of

in those various territories.

the other hand,

it is

understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the

Historical

g0

Background

advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and
of administration
officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form

be British.
the Arabs will recognise
(5) With regard to the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra,
that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special administrative arrangements in order to secure these territories from foreign aggresthe welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual
to
will

promote
economic interests.
I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of
the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her friends the Arabs and
will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the
and the freeing of the Arab peoples
expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries
from the Turkish yoke, which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.
I have confined myself in this letter to the more vital and important questions,
and if there are any other matters dealt with in your letters which I have omitted

sion,

we may discuss them at some convenient date in the future.
was with very great relief and satisfaction that I heard of the safe arrival of
the Holy Carpet and the accompanying offerings which, thanks to the clearness
of your directions and the excellence of your arrangements, were landed without
trouble or mishap in spite of the dangers and difficulties occasioned by the present
sad war May God soon bring a lasting peace and freedom to all peoples!
I am sending this letter by the hand of your trusted and excellent messenger,
Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Arif Ibn Uraifan, and he will inform you of the various
matters of interest, but of less vital importance, which I have not mentioned in
to mention,
It

this letter.

FROM SHARIF HUSAYN,

1

JANUARY 1916

received from the bearer your letter, dated the 9th Safar(the 14th DecemI have understood its contents,
ber, 1915), with great respect and honour, and
which caused me the greatest pleasure and satisfaction, as it removed that which

We

had made me uneasy.
Your honour will have realised, after the arrival of Mohammed (Faroki) Sherif
and his interview with you, that all our procedure up to the present was of no personal inclination or the like, which would have been wholly unintelligible, but that
that we
everything was the result of the decisions and desires of our peoples, and
are but transmitters and executants of such decisions and desires in the position
they (our people) have pressed upon us.
These truths are, in my opinion, very important and deserve your honour's

and consideration.
what had been stated in your honoured communication concerning
El Iraq as to the matter of compensation for the period of occupation, we, in order
to strengthen the confidence of Great Britain in our attitude and in our words and
actions, really and veritably, and in order to give her evidence of our certainty
and assurance in trusting her glorious Government, leave the determination of the
amount to the perception of her wisdom and justice.
As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our
was only
previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this
special attention
With regard to

done so to

fulfil

those aspirations whose attainment

is

desired

by the

will of the

The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence

3
|

SI

Blessed and Supreme

God It is this same feeling and desire which impelled us to
possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the
agreement made between them during the present wars and calamities
yet we find
it our duty that the eminent minister
should be sure that, at the first
avoid what

may

;

opportunity

war

after this
for

is

finished,

what we now leave

I

do not find

to

we

you (what we avert our eyes from to-day)
Beirut and its coasts

shall ask

France

in

necessary to draw your attention to the fact that our plan is of
greater security to the interests and protection of the rights of Great Britain than
it is to us, and will
necessarily be so whatever may happen, so that Great Britain
may finally see her friends in that contentment and advancement which she is enit

deavouring to establish for them now, especially as her Allies being neighbours to
us will be the germ of difficulties and discussion with which there will be no
peaceful conditions In addition to which the citizens of Beirut will
never

decidedly
accept such dismemberment, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures
which may exercise Great Britain, certainly not less than her
present troubles, because of our belief and certainty in the reciprocity and indeed the
of our
identity
the only cause that caused us never to care to negotiate with
any other Power but you. Consequently, it is impossible to allow any derogation
that gives France, or any other Power, a
span of land in those regions.

which

interests,

is

I declare this, and I have a
strong belief, which the living will inherit from the
dead, in the declarations which you gave in the conclusion of your honoured letter
Therefore, the honourable and eminent Minister should believe and be sure, to-

gether with Great Britain, that we still remain firm to our resolution which Storrs
learnt from us two years ago, for which we await the opportunity suitable to our
situation, especially in view of that action the time of which has now come near

and which destiny drives towards us with great haste and

who

those

are of our opinion

may

clearness, so that

we and

have reasons for such action against any

criti-

cisms or responsibilities imposed upon us in future.
Your expression "we do not want to push you to any hasty action which might
jeopardise the success of your aim" does not need any more explanation except
what we may ask for, when necessary, such as arms, ammunition, &c
I

offer

deem
you

this sufficient, as I

my

have occupied much of your Honour's time.

I

beg to

great veneration and respect.

FROM

SIR

HENRY MCMAHON,

25

JANUARY 1916

We have received with great

pleasure and satisfaction your letter of the 25th Safar
(the 1st January) at the hands of your trusty messenger, who has also transmitted
to us your verbal messages.

We

fully realise and entirely appreciate the motives which guide you in this important question, and we know well that you are acting entirely in the interests of
the Arab peoples and with no thought beyond their welfare

We

take note of your remarks concerning the vilayet of Bagdad, and will take
the question into careful consideration when the enemy has been defeated and the
time for peaceful settlement arrives.

As regards the northern parts, we note with satisfaction your desire to avoid anything which might possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France. It is,
as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be permitted to interfere
in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of this

war

to a victorious con-
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elusion. Moreover, when the victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain
and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of
Englishmen and Frenchmen who have died side by side fighting for the cause of
right and liberty
In this great cause Arabia is now associated, and God grant that the result of
our mutual efforts and co-operation will bind us in a lasting friendship to the
mutual welfare and happiness of us all.
We are greatly pleased to hear of the action you are taking to win all the Arabs
over to our joint cause, and to dissuade them from giving any assistance to our
enemies, and we leave it to your discretion to seize the most favourable moment
for further and more decided measures
You will doubtless inform us by the bearer of this letter of any manner in which
we can assist you and your requests will always receive our immediate consideration.
You will have heard how El Sayed Ahmed el Sherif el Senussi has been beguiled
by evil advice into hostile action, and it will be a great grief to you to know that
he has been so far forgetful of the interests of the Arabs as to throw in his lot
with our enemies Misfortune has now overtaken him, and we trust that this
will show him his error and lead him to peace for the sake of his poor misguided

followers

We

are sending this letter by the hand of your good messenger,
bring to you all our news.

The

British Balfour Declaration

June

4November,

will also

and Allied Statements

1917

CAMBON LETTER TO SOKOLOW,
You were good enough to present the project
which has for

who

JUNE 1919

4
to

which you are devoting your

object the development of Jewish colonization in Palestine
consider that, circumstances permitting, and the independence of the Holy

efforts,

You

its

Places being safeguarded on the other hand, it would be a deed of justice and of
reparation to assist, by the protection of the Allied Powers, in the renaissance of the

Jewish nationality

many

in that

Land from which

the people of Israel were exiled so

centuries ago.

The French Government, which entered this present war to defend a people
wrongfully attacked, and which continues the struggle to assure victory of right
over might, can but feel sympathy for your cause, the
triumph of which is bound
up with that of the Allies.
I

am happy

HM

to give

you herewith such assurance

OFFICIAL ZIONIST FORMULA, 18

JULY 1917

Government, after considering the aims of the Zionist Organisation, ac-

cepts the principle of recognising Palestine as the National

Home

of the Jewish

5
|
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people and the right of the Jewish people to build up its National life in Palestine
under a protection to be established at the conclusion of Peace, following upon the
successful issue of the

war

H.M. Government

regards as essential for the realisation of this principle the
grant of internal autonomy to the Jewish nationality in Palestine, freedom of immigration for Jews, and the establishment of a Jewish National Colonising Corporation for the re-settlement and economic development of the
country.

The conditions and forms of the internal autonomy and a charter for the
Jewish National Colonising Corporation should, in the view of
Government,
be elaborated in detail and determined with the representatives of the Zionist

HM

Organisation.

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION, 2 NOVEMBER 1917
have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of his Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which
has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a
I

home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate
the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be
done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non- Jewish

national

communities

in Palestine, or the rights

other country
I should be grateful
Zionist Federation

if

and

you would bring

political status

enjoyed by Jews

this declaration to the

in

any

knowledge of the

Tentative Recommendations for President Wilson:
Intelligence Section, American Delegation to the

Peace Conference

January 21, 1919

MESOPOTAMIA
(1)

It

is

recommended

that there be established a

Mesopotamian

state.

on map 20, is a racial unit. There is Arab
linguistic unity south of a line drawn from Alexandretta to the Persian border
Above this line live Arabs, Armenians, Turks, Kurds and Assyrians, each group

The Mesopotamian

area, as defined

speaking a distinct language. Below this line there

is

comparatively a

much

higher

development of the great irrigation projects
below Baghdad that the headwaters of the Tigris River, and as much of the Euphrates as possible, should be under a single administration. The welfare of the foothills of Kurdistan and of the great steppe region of Mesopotamia is bound up with
degree of unity It

is

essential to the

the irrigable lowlands of the Tigris and Euphrates basin.
To separate the headwater area of the Tigris and Euphrates drainage basins from
the irrigated valley floors and lowlands further down-stream would be to create

Historical
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sources of dispute and render doubly difficult the task of establishing a suitable

government

The southern border

of the area lies at the edge of the

Arabian desert, where new

come in and different political treatment
(2) It is recommended that there be applied to the Mesopotamian state the
mandatory principle, but no recommendation is made as to the Power to be selected
relationships

to carry out this principle.

which would preclude the
(3) It is recommended that no solution be adopted
for such incorporaincorporation of this state in an Arab confederation, if a desire
tion should take actual form in Mesopotamia
Nothing should be done to preclude the possibility of the future development of
an Arab confederation, including Mesopotamia, as an alternate solution which
would be desirable
SYRIA
(1)

It

is

recommended

While Syria belongs
pean population,

close

that there be established a Syrian state

Arab-speaking world, it has an unusually large Eurocommercial and cultural relations with Europe, a strong

to the

Christian element and a sedentary

mode

of life

should therefore be separated

It

from the nomad Arab area.
Its eastern boundary has been drawn with these considerations in mind, and runs
just beyond the border of the sown land, so as to include all of the grain-growing
The northern
regions, of which the Hauran, below Damascus, is the richest.
not be drawn
could
this
indeed
and
is
of
artificial,
boundary
boundary
quite
Syria
at the outset

on

racial lines

state would have a population of about 400,000, and would about
equal in area the state of Bulgaria.
(2) It is recommended that there be applied to the Syrian state the mandatory

The new

principle, but

no recommendation

is

made

as to the

Power

to

be selected to carry

out this principle.
(3) It is recommended that no obstacle be interposed against the final incorporation of the Syrian state in an Arab confederation, if the tendency toward this
solution should develop in the country.

There

a possibility of the future development of an Arab confederation which
Arab-speaking portions of the former Turkish Empire The

is

will include all of the

present strength of this Arab movement is hard to gauge. It would be the best
solution from the standpoint of the welfare and development of the Arab states

PALESTINE

recommended

that there be established a separate state of Palestine
The separation of the Palestinian area from Syria finds justification in the religious experience of mankind The Jewish and Christian churches were born in

(1) It

Palestine,

each

And

is

and Jerusalem was for long years, at different periods, the capital of
while the relation of the

Mohammedans

to Palestine

is

not so intimate,

from the beginning they have regarded Jerusalem as a holy place. Only by establishing Palestine as a separate state can justice be done to these great facts.
As drawn upon the map, the new state would control its own source of water
power and irrigation, on Mount Hermon in the east to the Jordan; a feature of

5
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great importance

since

the

possibilities of agricultural

success

of the

new

state

85

would depend upon the

development.

(2) It is recommended that this state be placed under Great Britain as a
mandatory of the League of Nations.
Palestine would obviously need wise and firm guidance Its population is without
political experience, is racially composite, and could easily become distracted by
fanaticism and bitter religious differences

The success of Great Britain in dealing with similar situations, her relation to
Egypt, and her administrative achievements since General Allenby freed Palestine
from the Turk,
(3) It

is

all

indicate her as the logical mandatory.
that the Jews be invited to return to Palestine

recommended

there, being assured

by the Conference

of

all

proper assistance

in so

and

settle

doing that

be consistent with the protection of the personal (especially the religious)
rights of the non- Jewish population, and being further assured
that it will be the policy of the League of Nations to recognize Palestine as a

may

and the property

Jewish state as sooon as
It

it

is

a Jewish state in fact
become a Jewish state,

right that Palestine should

if the Jews, being given
opportunity, make it such. It was the cradle and home of their vital race,
which has made large spiritual contributions to mankind, and is the only land in
which they can hope to find a home of their own; they being in this last respect

the

is

full

unique among significant peoples

At present, however, the Jews form barely a sixth of the total population of
700,000 in Palestine, and whether they are to form a majority, or even a plurality,
of the population in the future state remains uncertain. Palestine, in short, is far
from being a Jewish country now England, as mandatory, can be relied on to give
the Jews the privileged position they should have without sacrificing the rights of
non- Jews.
in

(4) It is recommended that the holy places and religious rights of all creeds
Palestine be placed under the protection of the League of Nations and its

mandatory.

The

basis for this

recommendation

is

self-evident.

ARABIA
(1) It is recommended that the desert portion of the Arabian peninsula, exclusive of the agricultural areas of Syria and of the Euphrates and Tigris valleys, be
treated as a separate block.

In regard to

this large desert area of Arabia,

it

is

unwise to take decisive action

of Hedjaz under the Cherif of Mecca is at the present
time the strongest in the group of Arabian tribal states; nevertheless it is not so
powerful that a successful single Arab confederation can be built around it It is
at present.

The Kingdom

only this week that the Hedjaz forces have been able to recapture their
of Medina.

own

city

(2) It is recommended that in regard to the present tribal states, numbering
over twenty, which exist in the peninsula, no definite action be taken.
The chieftains of the inner desert tribes, especially Ibn Saud, are absolutely
opposed to extension on the part of the king of Hedjaz. The sheikhs of Asir and

Yemen would
(3)

It is

look with equal hostility on the consolidation of his power,

recommended that the area with regard

to

which no

definite action

Historical

86

Background

shall be taken be that bounded on the north by the Euphrates River from the
bend where it turns southeast to a point just below the town of Hit, and from that
point onward by a line which stretches out into the desert, ending at the Persian
Gulf below Koweit, and on the west by the Red Sea, the eastern boundary of
of Syria
Palestine, and a line through the desert delimiting the agricultural portions
The boundaries of this Arab bloc, in which no definite action can be taken, are
so drawn as to distinguish the desert tribal civilization from the civilization of the
sedentary Arabs of the irrigable lands of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, below
Baghdad, and of the fertile and very productive lands of the Syrian Arabs, from
Aleppo down to a point below Damascus. In the north the desert tribes must be
given access to the Euphrates river from Hit to the northward bend of the river,

for the purpose of watering their flocks
(4) It is recommended that the policing of the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and
Persian Gulf Coasts of Arabia, and the border lands behind these, be left to the

British

Empire
The Power which understands

pire
at

By

how to handle the Arabs is the British Emand the markets along the edge of the desert
must trade, the British Indian Office has been able to
best

controlling the coastal areas

which the desert

tribes

some influence over the inland tribes.
(5) It is recommended that in spite of the political prominence of the King of
the Hedjaz, he be not aided to establish an artificial and unwelcomed dominion
exercise

over tribes unwilling to accept his rule

The King
to establish

of the

an

his sons should not receive support in an attempt
domination over tribes of about similar strength. If, how-

Hedjaz and

artificial

ever, it can be shown that the movement for Arab unity is natural and real, and
that such unity can be developed without the use of force, the movement should

be given encouragement and support

The proposal

of the delegates of the

King of the Hedjaz

that a

mixed commission

be sent to Syria to learn the actual desires of the Syrians and report to the peace
conference,

is

entirely fair

and should receive support.

The 1919 Weizmann and Feisal Agreement:
Chaim Weizmann

Discussed by Dr.

June 10, 1936

The present

disturbances in Palestine have given renewed currency to the story
Home for the Jewish people in Palestine

that the promise to set up a National

made

Arabs during the War. I desire here
namely, the attitude adopted at the
Peace Conference by the Arab Delegation itself towards the establishment of the
Jewish National Home in Palestine
The leading figure among the Arab representatives was Emir Feisal, later King
of Iraq Working with T. E Lawrence, he appeared before the Supreme Council

was

inconsistent with promises

to the

to refer to one aspect only of this matter
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whom he submitted the Arab claims to an independent
had myself met him in June, 1918, at Amman, and on many
subsequent occasions I had conversations with him and with Lawrence on the
subject of Zionism and Palestine
conversations which led to the friendship which
lasted many years between King Feisal and myself.
of the Conference, to

national existence

When

I

came to Europe in 1919 we submitted to him our plans. Both
Lawrence approved of them, and early in 1919 these conversations
culminated in the Treaty of Friendship, a copy of which is appended. The text
of that Treaty was approved by
Lawrence, who discussed it with Feisal.
The agreement, the original of which is in my possession, opens as follows*
Feisal

Feisal and

His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, representing and acting on behalf of
Kingdom of Kedjaz, and Dr Chaim Weizmann, representing and
acting on behalf of the Zionist Organization, mindful of the racial kinship and
ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people, and realizing
the Arab

means of working out the consummation of their national asthrough the closest possible collaboration in the development of

that the surest
pirations

is

the Arab State and Palestine, and being desirous further of confirming the
good understanding which exists between them, have agreed upon the following
articles:

The

(some of which have been summarized) were,
State and Palestine in all their relations and undertakings shall be controlled by the most cordial good will and understanding,
and to this end Arab and Jewish duly accredited agents shall be established
and maintained in the respective territories
Articles

Article

I.

The Arab

Article II provided for the determination of the boundaries between the

Arab State and Palestine
Article III

of Palestine

In the establishment of the Constitution and Administration

such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest
guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's Declaration of

November

2,

all

1917.

IV

All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimuimmigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as
possible to settle Jewish immigrants on the land through closer settlement

Article

late

and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such measures the Arab peasant
and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights, and shall be assisted in
forwarding their economic development
Article V provided for full religious freedom
Article VI The Mohamedan Holy Places shall be under Mohamedan
control.

In Article VII the Zionist Organization undertook to assist the Arab State
its economic experts They agreed in Article VIII to act in
accord on the matters embraced in the Pact before the Peace Congress, and
with the advice of
in Article

IX

to submit

any dispute

to the British

Government's

arbitration.

Feisal signed the pact in London on January 3, 1919, with a reservation in
Arabic (a translation of which was attached in Lawrence's own handwriting and
is given below in facsimile) making his obligations under the pact dependent on
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in the Arab
by the British Government of the demands put forward
of June 4, 1919 It is significant, too, that when, on January 29,
Conference on the subject of
1919, Feisal addressed the Supreme Council of the
the Arab claims, and asked for the independence of all Arabic -speaking peoples

the fulfillment

Memorandum

in Asia,

On

with regard to Palestine he
account of

its

made an

exception in the following terms-

universal character, I shall leave Palestine on one side
With this exception, I
all parties interested

for the mutual consideration of

ask for the independence of the Arabic areas enumerated
I

may add

in

the

Memorandum

and dated
sympathy with the Zionist

that in a letter addressed to Professor Felix Frankfurter

March 1, 1919,
movement

the

Emir

The Mandate
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for Palestine

July 24, 1922

The Council of the League of Nations.
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have

agreed, for the purpose of giving

Covenant of the League of Nations,
to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the
the Turkish Empire, within
territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to
such boundaries as may be fixed by them and
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory
effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the

,

should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on
November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted

by

the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national
it being clearly understood that nothing should be

for the Jewish people,

which might prejudice the

civil

and

religious rights of existing

home
done

non-Jewish com-

munities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
other country; and
Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the

Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national

home

in that country;

and

the Principal Allied Powers have selected
the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas

His Britannic Majesty as

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval, and
Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of
Palestine and undertaken to exercise

it

on behalf of the League of Nations

conformity with the following provisions; and
Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8),

it

is

in

provided that
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the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised
by the
tory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the

Manda-

League, shall

be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations
Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows
ART. 1. The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.
ART. 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such
political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment
;

:

of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the
preamble, and the development
of self-governing institutions, and also for
safeguarding the civil and religious
rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

ART.

3.

The Mandatory

shall,

so far as circumstances permit, encourage local

autonomy.
ART. 4

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for
the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in
such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the
Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and,
subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in
the development of the country.
The Zionist organisation, so long as

its organisation and constitution are in the
opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency It shall
take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the

co-operation of
national home

all

Jews who are

willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish

ART 5. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the
Government

ART

of

any Foreign Power.

The Administration

of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and
position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate
Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation
with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the
6.

land, including State lands

and waste lands not required for public purposes.

ART

7.

The Administration

ART

8.

The

of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a
nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to
facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their
permanent residence in Palestine.
privileges

and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of

consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in
the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and
1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their

immunities on August

reestablishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period,
these privileges, and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have

been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.
ART. 9. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the

judicial

system

established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete
guarantee of their rights.
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Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and
for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed In particular, the control and
administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and
the dispositions of the founders.
ART 10. Pending the making
Palestine,

foreign

extradition

the

Powers

shall

of

treaties

in

special

force

extradition agreements relating to
between the Mandatory and other

apply to Palestine

The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to
safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of
the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Manda-

ART

11.

have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of
the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities
established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system approtory, shall

other things, to the
priate to the needs of the country, having regard, among
desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land

The Administration may arrange with

the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4

upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services
and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far
as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration
Any such
such
or
distributed
no
that
shall
directly
by
agency,
profits
arrangements
provide
indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any
further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner
to construct or operate,

approved by the Administration.
ART. 12. The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by
foreign Powers He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine

ART. 13

when

All responsibility

in

outside

its territorial limits.

connection with the Holy Places and religious

buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of
securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free
exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum,
assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of

is

Nations in

all

shall prevent

deem

matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article
Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may

the

reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions
and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be

of this article into effect,

construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric
or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are
guaranteed.
14. A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study,
and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places
and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine
The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission

ART

define

shall

its approval, and the Comfunctions without the approval of

be submitted to the Council of the League for

mission shall not be appointed or enter upon
the Council

ART

15

The Mandatory

free exercise of

all

its

shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the
forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public
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order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made
between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language.
No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious
belief.

its

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of
own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational require-

ments of a general nature as the Administration may impose,

shall

not be denied

or impaired.
ART 16

The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision
over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required
for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against
them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

any representative or member of

ART 17 The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the
forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence
of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall
not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent
of the Mandatory Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall

be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing

from conmaintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in

in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine

tributing to
Palestine

the

cost

The Mandatory

shall

of

the

be entitled at

all

times to use the roads, railways and ports

movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies
The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine

of Palestine for the

ART.

18.

Member of the League of Nations (including
companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory
or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation,
the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels

against the nationals of any State

or civil aircraft

Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against

or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be
under equitable conditions across the mandated area.
Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and

goods originating

freedom of

in

transit

customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think
best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to
safeguard the interests of the population It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which
1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

in

ART.

19.

The Mandatory

shall

adhere

on behalf

of

the

Administration

of

international conventions already existing, or which may
be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the

Palestine to

any general

arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating
commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and
postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial
slave traffic, the traffic in

to

property

ART

20.

The Mandatory

shall

co-operate on behalf of the Administration of
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and other conditions may permit, in the execuany common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and
combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.
ART 21. The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from
this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the
matter of excafollowing rules This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the
Palestine, so far as religious, social
tion of

vations and archseological research to the nations of all States Members of the
League of Nations.
(l; "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity
earlier

than the year

AD

1

700

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed
rather than by threat

Any

by encouragement

person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with

reports the same to an official of the
to the value of the discovery
of
to
the competent Department,
be
No
except
may
disposed
antiquity
(3)
unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

the authorisation referred to in paragraph

competent Department,

No

antiquity

may

5,

rewarded according

shall be

leave the country without an export licence

from the

said

Department

Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity
be liable to a penalty to be fixed.
(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of rinding antiquities shall
(4)

shall

be permitted, under penalty of

fine,

except to persons authorised by the competent

Department
(6)

Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent,

of lands which might be of historical or archseological interest.
(7) Authorisation to excavate shall only be granted to persons

who show
The Administration of Palestine

suffi-

cient guarantees of archseological experience.

shall

not, in granting these authorisations, act in

such a way as to exclude scholars of

any nation without good grounds.
(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and
the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division

seems impossible for

scientific reasons, the

excavator shall receive a fair indemnity

in lieu of a part of the find.

ART. 22. English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine.
statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be
repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated

Any

in Arabic.

ART. 23

The Administration

of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the
members of such

respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the

communities.

ART 24. The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an
annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during
the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate.
Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the
report.
ART. 25. In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern
of
boundary

Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be
entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to
postpone or withhold application
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26
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as he

may consider inapplicable to the existing
provision for the administration of the terriconsider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall
and

is

to

make such

inconsistent with the provisions of Articles IS, 16 and 18.

The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise
Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to

or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such
cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent
Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations.
interpretation

dispute,

if it

ART. 27. The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for
any modification of the terms of this mandate.
ART 28 In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon
the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such
arrangements
as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under
guarantee of
the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for
securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will
fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration
of Palestine during the period of the mandate,
servants to pensions or gratuities.
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In the Statement of Palestine, issued on 9th November, 1938, His Majesty's
their intention to invite representatives of the Arabs of
Palestine, of certain neighbouring countries and of the Jewish Agency to confer
with them in London regarding future policy It was their sincere hope that, as a

Government announced

and frank discussion, some understanding might be reached.
Conferences recently took place with Arab and Jewish delegations, lasting for a
period of several weeks, and served the purpose of a complete exchange of views
result of full, free

between British Ministers and the Arab and Jewish representatives. In the light
of the discussions as well as of the situation in Palestine and of the Reports of
the Royal Commission and the Partition Commission, certain proposals were
formulated by His Majesty's Government and were laid before the Arab and
Jewish delegations as the basis of an agreed settlement. Neither the Arab nor the
Jewish delegations felt able to accept these proposals, and the conferences therefore did not result in an agreement. Accordingly His Majesty's Government are
free to formulate their own policy, and after careful consideration they have
decided to adhere generally to the proposals which were finally submitted to, and
discussed with, the Arab and Jewish delegations.
2. The Mandate for Palestine, the terms of which were confirmed by the Council
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League of Nations in 1922, has governed the policy of successive British
Governments for nearly 20 years. It embodies the Balfour Declaration and
imposes on the Mandatory four main obligations. These obligations are set out in
Articles 2, 6 and 13 of the Mandate There is no dispute regarding the interpretation of one of these obligations, that touching the protection of and access to the
Holy Places and religious buildings or sites. The other three main obligations are
of the

generally as follows
(i) To place the

country under such

political,

administrative and

conditions as will secure the establishment in Palestine of a national

(ii)

To

for the

Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to
co-operation with the Jewish Agency, close settlement by Jews on

Jewish people, to
encourage, in
the land

economic

home

facilitate

safeguard the

civil

and

religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine

irrespective of race and religion, and, whilst facilitating Jewish immigration and
settlement, to ensure that the rights and position of other sections of the population

are not prejudiced
(iii)

To

place the country under such political, administrative and economic con-

development of self-governing institutions
of Enquiry have drawn
attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the
expression "a national home for the Jewish people," and they have found in this
ditions as will secure the
3

The Royal Commission and previous Commissions

ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental
cause of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews His Majesty's Government
are convinced that in the interests of the peace and well-being of the whole people
of Palestine a clear definition of policy and objectives is essential The proposal
of partition recommended by the Royal Commission would have afforded such
clarity, but the establishment of self-supporting independent Arab and Jewish
States within Palestine has been found to be impracticable It has therefore been

necessary for His Majesty's Government to devise an alternative policy which
will, consistently with their obligations to Arabs and Jews, meet the needs of the
situation in Palestine Their views and proposals are set forth below under the
three heads, (I)

The

Constitution, (II) Immigration, and (III) Land.
I

THE CONSTITUTION

has been urged that the expression "a national home for the Jewish
people" offered a prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish
State or Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government do not wish to contest the
4.

It

view, which was expressed by the Royal Commission, that the Zionist leaders at
the time of the issue of the Balfour Declaration recognized that an ultimate Jewish
State was not precluded by the terms of the Declaration But, with the Royal
Commission, His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate
in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that
Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab

population of the country. That Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish
State might be held to be implied in the passage from the Command
Paper of
1922 which reads as follows:
u

Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in
view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that
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'Palestine is to become as Jewish
ment regard any such expectation

as

England

is

Nor have

Governand have no such aim in view.

English.' His Majesty's

as impracticable

the disappearance or the subthey at any time contemplated
ordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would
draw attention to the fact that the terms of the (Balfour) Declaration referred to
.

.

do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish
National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine!
But this statement has not removed doubts, and His Majesty's Government
3

therefore

now

declare

Palestine should

unequivocally

become a Jewish

that

State.

it

is

not

part

of

their

They would indeed regard

it

policy

that

as contrary

to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances
which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population

made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will.
of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was further described
Paper of 1922 as follows:

of Palestine should be
5.

The nature

in the

Command

"During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine
a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are fanners or
workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs, an elected
assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns;
and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is
conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its
needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic
activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political,
religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life,
has in fact 'national' characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not
the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole,
but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assist-

ance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in
which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an
interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best
prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people
to display its capacities, it is essential that it should
as of right and not on sufferance That is the reason

know that it is in Palestine
why it is necessary that the

existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic
connection."
6. His Majesty's Government adhere to this interpretation of the Declaration of
1917 and regard it as an authoritative and comprehensive description of the character of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. It envisaged the further develop-

ment

of the existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts
Evidence that His Majesty's Government have been carrying out

of the world

their obligation in this respect

is

to

be found

in the facts that, since the

statement

of 1922 was published, more than 300,000 Jews have immigrated to Palestine, and
that the population of the National Home has risen to some 450,000, or approaching a third of the entire population of the country. Nor has the Jewish community
failed to take full advantage of the opportunities given to it The growth of the
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and its achievements in many fields are a remarkable
which must command the admiration of the world and must

Home

constructive effort

be, in particular, a source of pride to the

Jewish people
In the recent discussions the Arab delegations have repeated the contention
that Palestine was included within the area in which Sir Henry McMahon, on
behalf of the British Government, in October, 1915, undertook to recognise and
based on the terms of the
support Arab independence The validity of this claim,
McMahon and the Sharif of
correspondence which passed between Sir Henry
Mecca, was thoroughly and carefully investigated by British and Arab representaTheir Report, which has been
tives during the recent conferences in London
7

British representatives endeavoured
published, states that both the Arab and the
to understand the point of view of the other party but that they were unable to

reach agreement upon an interpretation of the correspondence There is no need
summarize here the arguments presented by each side. His Majesty's Government regret the misunderstandings which have arisen as regards some of the
to

phrases used For their part they can only adhere, for the reasons given by their
representatives in the Report, to the view that the whole of Palestine west of
Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge, and they therefore

cannot agree that the

McMahon

correspondence forms a just basis for the claim

that Palestine should be converted into an

8

Arab State

His Majesty's Government are charged as the Mandatory authority "to

secure the development of self-governing institutions" in Palestine Apart from
this specific obligation, they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of
the

Mandate system

Mandatory

that the population of Palestine should remain for ever

tutelage

It is

under

proper that the people of the country should as early

as possible enjoy the rights of self-government

of neighbouring countries His Majesty's
foresee the exact constitutional forms which

which are exercised by the people

Government are unable

at

present to

government in Palestine will eventually
take, but their objective is self-government, and they desire to see established
ultimately an independent Palestine State. It should be a State in which the two
peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a

way

that the essential interests of each are secured.

The establishment of an independent State and the complete relinquishment
Mandatory control in Palestine would require such relations between the Arabs
and the Jews as would make good government possible. Moreover, the growth of
self-governing institutions in Palestine, as in other countries, must be an evolu9

of

A transitional period will be required before independence is
achieved, throughout which ultimate responsibility for the Government of the
country will be retained by his Majesty's Government as the Mandatory authority,
tionary process.

while the people of the country are taking an increasing share in the Government,
and understanding and co-operation amongst them are growing. It will be the
constant endeavour of His Majesty's Government to promote good relations

between the Arabs and the Jews.
10. In the light of these considerations His Majesty's Government make the
following
Palestine

(Y)

declaration

The objective

of

their

intentions

of His Majesty's

regarding

Government

the

is

future

government of

the establishment within

8
|
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ten years of an independent Palestine State in such
treaty relations with the United
Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and

strategic require-

ments of both countries in the future This proposal for the establishment of the
independent State would involve consultation with the Council of the League of
Nations with a view to the termination of the Mandate.
(2)

The independent

State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in
to ensure that the essential interests of each com-

government in such a way as
munity are safeguarded.

(3) The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transitional period throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain
responsibility
for the government of the country
During the transitional period the people of
Palestine will be given an increasing part in the government of their
country Both
sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate in the ma-

chinery of government, and the process will be carried on whether or not they
both avail themselves of it
(4) As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine
steps will be taken to carry out this policy of giving the people of Palestine an
increasing part in the government of their country, the objective being to place
Palestinians in charge of all the Departments of Government, with the assistance
of British advisers and subject to the control of the

High Commissioner. With

this

object in view His Majesty's Government will be prepared immediately to arrange
that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of certain Departments, with British
advisers. The Palestinian heads of Departments will sit on the Executive Council,
which advises the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be

invited to serve as heads of Departments approximately in proportion to their
respective populations The number of Palestinians in charge of Departments will
be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of Departments are Palestinians, exercising the administrative

performed by British

officials.

When

and advisory functions which are at present
that stage

is

reached consideration will be

given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of
Ministers with a consequential change in the status and functions of the Palestinian heads of Departments.

(5) His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the
establishment of an elective legislature Nevertheless they would regard this as an

appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine
hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared,
provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery
(6) At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appro-

body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements
during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding

priate

the constitution of the independent Palestine State
(7) His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty
contemplated by sub-paragraph (1) or in the constitution contemplated by subparagraph (6) adequate provision has been made for:
(a) the security of, and freedom of access to, the Holy Places, and the
protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies.
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in accordance
(6) the protection of the different communities in Palestine

with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews
and for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home
as may be regarded
(c) such requirements to meet the strategic situation
as necessary

by His Majesty's Government

in the light of the circumstances

then existing

His Majesty's Government

will also require to

be satisfied that the interests of

certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of

which they are at

present responsible, are adequately safeguarded.
(8) His Majesty's Government will do everything in their
conditions which will enable the independent Palestine State to

within ten years.

If, at

the end of ten years,

it

power
come

to

create

into being

appears to His Majesty's Govern-

ment

that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the
establishment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives of

the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring
Arab States before deciding on such a postponement If His Majesty's Government come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the

co-operation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a view to
achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.
11. During the transitional period steps will be taken to increase the powers
and responsibilities of municipal corporations and local councils
II

IMMIGRATION

Under

Article 6 of the 'Mandate, the Administration of Palestine, "while
ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not
prejudiced," is required to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable condi12.

Beyond this, the extent to which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to
be permitted is nowhere defined in the Mandate But in the Command Paper of
1922 it was laid down that for the fulfilment of the policy of establishing a Jewish
tions."

National

Home:

necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration This immigration cannot be so great in volume
as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time
"It

is

to absorb

a burden

new

arrivals

immigrants should not be
and that they should not deprive

It is essential to ensure that the

upon the people of Palestine

as a whole,

33

any section of the present population of their employment.
In practice, from that date onwards until recent times, the economic absorptive
capacity of the country has been treated as the sole limiting factor, and in the
letter which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, sent to Dr Weizmann
in February 1931 it was laid down as a matter of policy that economic absorptive
capacity was the sole criterion. This interpretation has been supported by resolutions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. But His Majesty's Government
do not read either the Statement of Policy of 1922 or the letter of 1931 as implying that the Mandate requires them, for all time and in all circumstances, to
facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the
country's economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in the Mandate
or in subsequent Statements of Policy to
support the view that the establishment

of a Jewish National

Home

in Palestine

cannot be effected unless immigration

is

8
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allowed to continue indefinitely
nomic position in the country,

If immigration has

99
an adverse

effect

on the eco-

should clearly be restricted; and equally, if it
has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a
factor that should not be ignored Although it is not difficult to contend that the large
number of Jewish immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absorbed
it

economically, the fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the

Jewish population is in a position to dominate them has produced consequences which
are extremely grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of
Palestine The lamentable disturbances of the past three years are only the latest and

most sustained manifestation of this intense Arab apprehension The methods employed by Arab terrorists against fellow-Arabs and Jews alike must receive unqualified condemnation But it cannot be denied that fear of indefinite Jewish immigration
is widespread amongst the Arab population and that this fear has made possible
disturbances which have given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the
Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a bitterness
between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable between citizens of
the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued up to the
economic absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other considerations,
a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in
Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in the

Near and Middle

Government cannot take the view that
Mandate, or considerations of common sense
require that they should ignore these circumstances in framing immiEast. His Majesty's

either their obligations under the

and

justice,

gration policy.
13. In the view of the Royal Commission, the association of the policy of the
Balfour Declaration with the Mandate system implied the belief that Arab

former would sooner or later be overcome. It has been the hope of
Governments ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that in time the
Arab population, recognizing the advantages to be derived from Jewish settlement
and development in Palestine, would become reconciled to the further growth of
the Jewish National Home. This hope has not been fulfilled. The alternatives
before His Majesty's Government are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish
hostility to the

British

Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly expressed will
Arab people of the country, or (ii) to permit further expansion of the
Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce
in it. The former policy means rule by force. Apart from other considerations,
such a policy seems to His Majesty's Government to be contrary to the whole
spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their
specific obligations to the Arabs in the Palestine Mandate. Moreover, the relations
between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine must be based sooner or later on
mutual tolerance and goodwill; the peace, security and progress of the Jewish
National Home itself require this. Therefore His Majesty's Government, after
earnest consideration, and taking into account the extent to which the growth of
National
of the

the Jewish National

Home

decided that the time has

has been facilitated over the

come

last

twenty years, have

to adopt in principle the second of the alternatives

referred to above.
14. It has been urged that all further Jewish immigration into Palestine should
be stopped forthwith. His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a proposal.
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It

would damage the whole of the

financial

Background

and economic system of Palestine and

thus affect adversely the interests of Arabs and Jeus alike Moreover, in the view
of His Majesty's Government, abruptly to stop further immigration would be unjust to the Jewish National

conscious of the present

from certain European

Home

But, above

all,

His Majesty's Government are

plight of large numbers of Jews who seek a refuge
countries, and they believe that Palestine can and should

unhappy

a further contribution to the solution of this pressing world problem In all
these circumstances, they believe that they will be acting consistently with their
Mandatory obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and in the manner best calculated

make

7

to serve the interests of the

whole people of Palestine, by adopting the following

proposals regarding immigration
(1) Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if
economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country Taking into account
the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number
of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of the admission,
from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next

as

five years.

These immigrants would, subject

to the criterion of

economic absorptive

capacity, be admitted as follows.
(0) For each of the next five years a quota of 10000 Jewish immigrants will
be allowed, on the understanding that a shortage in any one year may be added
to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five-year period, if economic

absorptive capacity permits
(b) In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee
problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner
satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured,
special
consideration being given to refugee children and dependants

is

(2) The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will
be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for
deciding the limits of economic capacity Before each periodic decision is taken,
Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted
(3) After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be
permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.
(4) His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration,

and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish ilimmigrants who. despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the
country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas
15. His Majesty's Government are satisfied
that, when the immigration over
five years which is now contemplated has taken
place, they will not be justified

legal

in facilitating, nor will they be under
any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes
of the Arab population.

LAND

III.

16

The Administration

of Palestine

required, under Article 6 of the Mandate,
"while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the
population are
is

not prejudiced," to encourage "close settlement
by Jews on the land," and no restriction has been imposed hitherto on the transfer of land from Arabs to
Jews.

8
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The Reports

of several expert Commissions have indicated that, owing to the natugrowth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land
to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land
whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless
Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land.
These powers will date from the publication of this statement of policy and the
High Commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.
17 The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of
the land and the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation In the
light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be
satisfied that the "rights and position" of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or
ral

restriction of the transfer of land.

18 In framing these proposals His Majesty's Government have sincerely endeavoured to act in strict accordance with their obligations under the Mandate to
both the Arabs and the Jews. The vagueness of the phrases employed in some
instances to describe these obligations has led to controversy and has made the
task of interpretation difficult. His Majesty's Government cannot hope to satisfy
the partisans of one party or the other in such controversy as the Mandate has
aroused Their purpose is to be just as between the two peoples in Palestine whose
destinies in that country have been affected by the great events of recent years, and

who, since they live side by side, must learn to practise mutual tolerance, goodwill
and co-operation. In looking to the future, His Majesty's Government are not blind
to the fact that

some events

of the past

make

the task of creating these relations

but they are encouraged by the knowledge that at many times and in
many places in Palestine during recent years the Arab and Jewish inhabitants
have lived in friendship together Each community has much to contribute to the
welfare of their common land, and each must earnestly desire peace in which to
difficult;

whole people of the country. The responthan upon His Majesty's Government, to cois
operate together to ensure peace is all the more solemn because their country
revered by many millions of Moslems, Jews and Christians throughout the world
who pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people.

assist in increasing the well-being of the
sibility

which

falls

on them, no

less
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Pact of the League of Arab States

March

His
His
His
His
His
His
His

22, 1945

Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic;
Royal Highness the Amir of Trans- Jordan
;

Majesty the King of Iraq;
Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia,
Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic;

Majesty the King of Egypt;
Majesty the King of the Yemen;
Who, after having exchanged their plenary powers, which were found to be in
good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions'
ART 1. The League of Arab States is composed of the independent Arab States
which have signed this Pact
Any independent Arab State has the right to become a member of the League.
If it desires to do so, it shall submit a request which will be deposited with the
Permanent Secretariat General and submitted to the Council at the first meeting
held after submission of the request
ART 2 The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the relations between the member states; the coordination of their policies in order to achieve

cooperation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty;
a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries It has

and

also as

its

purpose the close cooperation of the

member

states,

with due regard to

the organization and circumstances of each state, on the following matters

A. Economic

and financial affairs, including commercial relations, customs,
questions of agriculture and industry
Communications, this includes railroads, roads, aviation, navigation, telegraphs,

currency, and

B

and posts.
C. Cultural affairs.

D

Nationality,

passports,

visas,

execution

of

judgments, and extradition

of

criminals.

E

Social affairs.

F. Health problems.

ART 3. The League shall possess a Council composed of the representatives of
member states of the League; each state shall have a single vote, irrespective

the

of the

number of

its

representatives.

be the task of the Council to achieve the realization of the objectives
of the League and to supervise the execution of
agreements which the member
states have concluded on the questions enumerated in the
preceding article, or on
It shall

any other questions
It likewise shall be the Council's task to decide

upon the means by which the

9
I
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to cooperate with the international bodies to

be created in the future
and peace and regulate economic and social relations.
ART 4 For each of the questions listed in Article 2 there shall be set up a
special committee in which the member states of the League shall be represented.
These committees shall be charged with the task of laying down the principles
and extent of cooperation. Such principles shall be formulated as draft agreements,

League

is

in order to guarantee security

to

be presented to the Council for examination preparatory to their submission to

the aforesaid states

Representatives of the other Arab countries may take part in the work of the
aforesaid committees.The Council shall determine the conditions under which these
representatives

may be

permitted to participate and the rules governing such

representation.
or

ART 5. Any resort to force in order to resolve
more member states of the League is prohibited

them a

disputes arising between two
If there should arise among

which does not concern a state's independence, sovereignty, or
and if the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council
for the settlement of this difference, the decision of the Council shall then be
enforceable and obligatory.
In such a case, the states between whom the difference has arisen shall not
participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.
The Council shall mediate in all differences which threaten to lead to war between two member states, or a member state and a third state, with a view to
difference

territorial integrity,

bringing about their reconciliation.
Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be taken

ART.

member

by majority vote.
In case of aggression or threat of aggression by one state against a
state, the state which has been attacked or threatened with aggression may

6.

demand the immediate convocation
The Council shall by unanimous
repulse the aggression

counted

in

of the Council
decision determine the measures necessary to

If the aggressor

is

a

member

state, his vote shall not

be

determining unanimity.

If, as a result

of the attack, the government of the state attacked finds itself

unable to communicate with the Council, that state's representative in the Council
shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council for the purpose indicated in the foregoing paragraph. In the event that this representative is unable
to

communicate with the Council, any member

state of the

League

shall

have the

right to request the convocation of the Council.

decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all member
League; majority decisions shall be binding only upon those states
which have accepted them.
In either case the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in each member

ART

7.

Unanimous

states of the

state according to its respective basic laws.

ART.

Each member

respect the systems of government estaband regard them as exclusive concerns of those
states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established
systems of government.
ART 9. States of the League which desire to establish closer cooperation and
stronger bonds than are provided by this Pact may conclude agreements to that end.
Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in the futuie
8.

lished in the other

state

member

shall

states
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state shall not be binding or restrictive upon
members
ART. 10. The permanent seat of the League of Arab States is established in
Cairo. The Council may, however, assemble at any other place it may designate.
ART. 11 The Council of the League shall convene in ordinary session twice a
session upon the
year, in March and in October It shall convene in extraordinary

between a member state and another
other

League whenever the need arises
have a permanent Secretariat-General which shall
of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries, and an appropiate number of

member
The League

request of two

ART

12

consist

states of the
shall

officials.

The Council of the League shall establish an administrative i emulation for the
of two-thirds of the states of the League The Secretary-General, with the approval
of the Council shall appoint the Assistant Secretaries and the principal officials of
the League.

The Council

of the League shall appoint the Secretary-General

by a majority for

the functions of the Secretariat-General and matters relating to the Staff.

The Secretary-General

shall

have the rank of Ambassador and the Assistant

Secretaries that of Ministers Plenipotentiary

The
ART

first

13

League and

Secretary-General of the League

The Secretary-General
shall

submit

it

is

named

in

an Annex to this Pact.

prepare the draft of the budget of the
to the Council for approval before the beginning of each
shall

fiscal year.

The Council

shall fix the share of the

League. This share

ART.

14.

may

be reconsidered

The members

expenses to be borne by each state of the
if

necessary.
of the Council of the League as well as the

of the committees and the officials

who

regulation shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and
exercise of their functions

The

members

are to be designated in the administrative

immunity when engaged

in

the

by the organs of the League shall be inviolable.
meeting of the Council shall be convened at the invitation
of the head of the Egyptian Government Thereafter it shall be convened at the
buildings occupied

ART.

15.

The

first

invitation of the Secretary-General.

The representatives of the member states of the League shall alternately
the presidency of the Council at each of its ordinary sessions.

assume

ART. 16. Except in cases specifically indicated in this Pact, a majority vote
of the Council shall be sufficient to make enforceable decisions on the following
matters:
A. Matters relating to personnel.
B. Adoption of the budget of the League.
C. Establishment of the administrative regulations for the Council, the

com-

mittees, and the Secretariat General.

D. Decisions to adjourn the sessions.
17. Each member state of the League shall
deposit with the SecretariatGeneral one copy of every treaty or agreement concluded or to be concluded in
the future between itself and another member state of the League or a third state.
ART.

ART
shall

18

If

a

member

state

inform the Council of

go into

effect.

its

contemplates withdrawal

from the League,

intention one year before such withdrawal

is

it

to

Pact of the League of Arab States
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The Council

of the League may consider any state which fails to fulfill its obthis Pact as having become separated from the League, this to go
into effect upon a unanimous decision of the states, not counting the state concerned.

ligations

ART

under

may be amended

This Pact

19.

with the consent of two-thirds of the

states belonging to the League, especially in order to

the ties between the

member

states, to

make

firmer and stronger
of Arbitration,

Arab Tribunal

create an

and

to regulate the relations of the League with any international bodies to be
created in the future to guarantee security and peace.

amendment cannot be taken

Final action on an

was initiated.
does not accept such an amendment

prior to the session following

the session in which the motion
If a state

the

amendment goes

preceding

into effect, without being

it may withdraw at such time as
bound by the provisions of the

article.

ART. 20. This Pact and
laws in force

among

The instruments

the

its

Annexes

shall

High Contracting

be

ratified

according to the basic

Parties.

of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretariat-General

become operative as regards each ratifying state
days after the Secretary-General has received the instruments of ratification

of the Council and the Pact shall
fifteen

from four

states.

This Pact has been drawn up in Cairo in the Arabic language on this 8th day
of Rabi' II, thirteen hundred and sixty-four (March 22, 1945), in one copy which
shall be deposited in the safe keeping of the Secretariat-General.

An

identical

copy

be delivered to each state of the League.
[Here follow the signatures]

shall

(1) Annex Regarding Palestine
Since the termination of the last great war the rule of the Ottoman Empire
over the Arab countries, among them Palestine, which had become detached from
that Empire, has come to an end. She has
to any other state.

The Treaty

of

come

to

be autonomous, not subordinate

Lausanne proclaimed that her future was

to be settled

by the

parties concerned.

However, even though she was as yet unable to control her own affairs, the
Covenant of the League (of Nations) in 1919 made provision for a regime based
upon recognition of her independence.
Her international existence and independence in the legal sense cannot, therefore, be questioned, any more than could the independence of the other Arab
countries.

Although the outward manifestations of this independence have remained obscured for reasons beyond her control, this should not be allowed to interfere
with her participation in the work of the Council of the League.

The States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League are therefore of the
opinion that, considering the special circumstances of Palestine and until that
country can effectively exercise its independence, the Council of the League should
take charge of the selection of an Arab representative from Palestine to take part
in its

(2)

work.

Annex Regarding Cooperation With Countries Which Are Not Members
the Council of the League

of
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Whereas the member

states of the

League

will

have to deal

Background

in the Council as

well as in the committees with matters which will benefit and affect the

Arab

world at large;
And whereas the Council has to take into account the aspirations of the Arab
countries which are not members of the Council and has to work toward their
realization

Now

;

therefore,

Arab League

it

particularly behooves the states signatory to the Pact of the

to enjoin the Council of the League,

when considering the admission

of those countries to participation in the committees referred to in the Pact, that
it should do its utmost to cooperate with them, and furthermore, that it should

spare no effort to learn their needs and understand their aspirations and hopes;
it should work thenceforth for their best interests and the safeguarding

and that

all the political means at its disposal
Annex Regarding the Appointment of a Secretary-General of the League
The states signatory to this Pact have agreed to appoint His Excellency Abdul-Rahman 'Assam Bey, to be the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.
This appointment is made for two years The Council of the League shall
hereafter determine the new regulations for the Secretariat-General.

of their future with

(3)

Resolution on the Partition of Palestine:
United Nations General Assembly

November

29,

1947

The General Assembly,
Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the
question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session;
Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all
questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals

and
Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document
A/364) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition
with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,
Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair
the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;
Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete
for the solution of the problem,

its

evacuation of Palestine by

1 August 1948;
United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine,
and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation,
with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with

Recommends

to the

Economic Union
Requests that

set out

below;

Resolution on the Partition of Palestine

10
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The

(a)

plan for

Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the

its

The
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implementation;
Security Council consider

if circumstances during the transitional period
require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat
to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain interna-

(b)

and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization
of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the
Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution,

tional peace

which are assigned to it by this resolution;
Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any
attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;
to exercise in Palestine the functions

The

(c)

The Trusteeship Council be informed

(d)
it

Calls

on

of the responsibilities envisaged for

in this plan;

upon

the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as

may

be necessary

their part to put this plan into effect;
Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain

from taking any action
which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations.
.

.

.

PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION
PART

FUTURE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

I.

A TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE
The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any

1.

not later than

1

The armed

2.

forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn
Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any

from

case not later than

1

August 1948.

The mandatory Power
of

case

August 1948.

its

Commission, as far in advance as possible,
to evacuate each area.
best endeavours to ensure that an area sit-

shall advise the

intention to terminate the

Mandate and

The mandatory Power shall use its
uated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland
adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated

and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.
Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime

at the earliest possible date
3.

for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the

mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948.
The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem
shall be as described in parts II and III below.
4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of
the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.
B.
1.

five

A

Commission

Member

States.

STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE
be set up consisting of one representative of each of

shall

The Members represented on

the Commission shall be elected

Historical
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by the General Assembly on as broad a

basis, geographically

Background

and otherwise, as

possible
2.

administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its
which shall act in
forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission,
with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance

The

armed

conformity

of the Security Council The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent
cordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over

and administer areas which have been evacuated
In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have
authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required
shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay
implementation by the Ccmmissicn of die measures recommended by the
General Assembly
3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures

The mandatory Power

the

for the establishment of the frontiers of the

Arab and Jewish States and the City
recommendations of the

of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the

General Assembly on the partition of Palestine Nevertheless, the boundaries as
described in part II of this plan are to be modified in such a way that village
areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make
that necessary.

4 The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other
public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in
each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be
carried out under the general direction of the

Commission

April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for
either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission
If

by

1

communicate that

fact to the Security Council for such action with respect
Security Council may deem proper, and to the SecretaryGeneral for the communication to the Members of the United Nations.

shall

to that State as the

5. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional
period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall
have full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters

of immigration and land regulation.
6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State,
acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the

administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate
and the establishment of the State's independence.
7. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of
both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local
8 The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest
time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient
in number to maintain internal order and to
prevent frontier clashes
This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the
command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political

and military control, including the choice of the
exercised by the Commission.

militia's

High Command,

shall

be
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The

Government of each State shall, not later than
armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold
elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.
The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional
Council of Government and approved by the Commission Qualified voters for
9

Provisional Council of

two months

after the withrawal of the

each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age

who

are.

Palestinian citizens residing in that State and (b) Arabs and Jews residing
in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a
notice of intention to become citizens of such State
(a)

Arabs and Jews residing

become

intention to

Jewish State,

shall

Women may
During the

in the City of

citizens,

be entitled to vote

in the

Arab State and the Jews of the
Arab and Jewish States respectively.

vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.

transitional period

in the area of the proposed
lish

Jerusalem who have signed a notice of

the Arabs of the

Arab

no Jew
State,

shall be permitted to establish residence
and no Arab shall be permitted to estab-

residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave

of the Commission
10.

The Constituent Assembly

of each State shall draft a democratic constitu-

and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional
Council of Government appointed by the Commission The constitutions of the
States shall embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C
below and include inter alia provisions for.
tion for its State

(a) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage
and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive
body responsible to the legislature;
(6) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice,

are not endangered;
(c] Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-

pendence of any State, or

in

any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of

the United nations;
all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil,
economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including freedom cf religion, languages, speech and publica-

(d] Guaranteeing to

political,

tion education, assembly

and association;

Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the
other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of
national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its
(e]

borders.
11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three
members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation,
with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the
Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.
7

12. During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the
question of Palestine by the General Assemblv and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for

administration in areas from which

it

has not withdrawn

its

armed

forces.

The

Historical
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shall assist the

Similarly the mandatory
execution of its functions

Background

mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions
Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the

13. With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of
administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the
mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Pro-

and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the
Commission; there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to
the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including
that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn
14. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations
of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may
visional Councils

consider necessary to issue
The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the
General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has

previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council
The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports,

or

more

frequently if desirable, to the Security Council
15 The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of
the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously

C DECLARATION
United Nations by the provisional government
of each proposed State before independence It shall contain inter alia the following

A

declaration shall be

clauses

made

to the

:

General provision

The

stipulations contained in the declaration are recognized as

fundamental laws

of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with
these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them

Chapter

1

Holy Places, religious buildings and sites
Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall
not be denied or impaired,
2. In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit
1

shall

be guaranteed,

of the other State

in conformity with existing rights, to
and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as

all

residents

to aliens,

and

citizens

without distinc-

tion as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order

and

decorum.

freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing
maintenance of public order and decorum
3 Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved No act shall be
permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it apSimilarly,

rights, subject to the

pears to the Government that any particular
in

need of urgent

repair, the

Holy Place, religious building or site is
Government may call upon the community or com-

10
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The Government may

at the

expense of the community or communities concerned
taken within a reasonable time.

itself

if

carry it out
no action is

No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or
which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State
No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either
discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or
sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in rela4.

site

tion to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption
of the Assembly's recommendations
5 The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine

whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places,
religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights
appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make
decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise
between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community
with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full co-operation
and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.

Chapter

2

Religious and minority rights
the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject
only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all
2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the

Freedom of conscience and

1

ground of race,

religion,

language or sex

All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
3.

4.

The family law and personal

status of the various minorities

and

their religious

be respected
5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good
government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise
of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any repre-

interests, including

sentative or
6.

The

endowments,

member

shall

of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab

and Jewish minority respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its
own members in its own language, which conforming to such educational requirements
of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their
existing rights.
7

No

restriction shall be

imposed on the free use by any

private intercourse, in commerce
1
publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

any language
1

The

State:

in

following; stipulation shall be

"In

the

added

Jewish State adequate

citizen of the state of

in religion, in the Press or in

to the declaration concerning the Jewish

facilities

shall

be given to Arabic-speaking

citizens for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, in the legislature,

before the Courts and in the administration."
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an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in
expropriation of land owned by
all cases of exshall be allowed except for public purposes In
the Arab State
Court shall be paid previous
the
fixed
as
full
Supreme
by
compensation
propriation

No

8

)

to dispossession.

Chapter 3
Citizenship, international conventions and financial obligations
in Palestine outside the City of JerCitizenship Palestinian citizens residing
reside
usalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship,
of
the
independrecognition
of
in Palestine outside the
shall, upon
1.

Jerusalem
which they are resident and enjoy

City

become

ence,

and

full civil

citizens of the State in

political rights.

Persons over the age of eighteen years

may

opt within one year

from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside for
Arab residing in the area of the
citizenship of the other State, providing that no
in the proposed
proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship
State shall have the right
Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish

to opt for citizenship in the proposed

option will be taken to include the

Arab State The exercise of

this

right of

wives and children under eighteen years of age

of persons so opting.

Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the
area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for
in the elections to the Concitizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote
stituent

Assembly of that

State, but not in the elections to the Constituent

Assembly

of the State in which they reside.
(a) The State shall be bound by all the internaagreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has
become a party Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such
agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period
2

International conventions

tional

which they were concluded.
Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international
conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf
of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance
for

(b)

with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
3. Financial obligations, (a) The State shall respect and fulfil all financial
obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory
Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provi-

sion includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.
(b) These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Eco-

nomic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and
individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the
States.

(c)
of one
-

A

Court of Claims,

with the Joint Economic Board, and composed
the United Nations, one representative of the United

affiliated

member appointed by

In the declaration concerning the Arab State, the words "by an Arab in the Jewish
State" should be replaced by the words "by a Jew in the Arab State."
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Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established Any
dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized
by the latter should be referred to that Court
(d) Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to
the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid
according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-

holder and the State.

BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY

B

The City

of

Jerusalem

shall include the present municipality of

Jerusalem plus
the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis;
the most southern, Bethelehem, the most western, Ein Karirn (including also the
and the most northern Shu Tat, as indicated on the atbuilt-up area of Motsa )
;

tached sketch-map (annex B).

STATUTE OF THE CITY
within five months of the approval of the present
plan, elaborate and approve a detailed Statute of the City which shall contain inter
C.

The Trusteeship Council

alia the
1.

shall,

substance of the following provisions

Government machinery;

discharging
jectives

its

administrative

.

special objectives

obligations

shall

The Administering Authority in
pursue the following special ob-

:

(f) To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located
in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian,

Jewish and Moslem; to

this

end to ensure that order and peace, and especially

religious peace, reign in Jerusalem.

(b)

To

foster co-operation

among

all

the inhabitants of the city in their

own

and support the peaceful development of
the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land;
to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development
interests as well as in order to encourage

of the residents, having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the
various peoples and communities
2. Governor and administrative staff. A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall

be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to

it.

He

shall

selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality
shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.

The Governor
on

shall represent the

United Nations

in the City

and

be

He

shall exercise

powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers
in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from
their behalf all

the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis.
A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be sub-

mitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.
3. Local autonomy, (a] The existing local autonomous units in the territory of
the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local
government and administration.
(b) The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of
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the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting,
respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem The new town

form part of the present municipality of Jerusalem
(a) The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; its
Security measures
neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exerunits shall continue to

4

or activities shall be permitted within its borders

cises

(6) Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed
or prevented by the non-co-operation or interference of ,one or more sections of the
population, the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as
necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration

may be

(c) To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order and especially for the
the city, the
protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites
Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of

m

\\hich shall be recruited outside of Palestine
direct such budgetary provision as

may

The Governor

shall

be empowered to

be necessary for the maintenance of this

force

A

5 Legislative organization
Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of
the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and
proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation No legis-

lative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will
be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action

prevail over them The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills
inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also

empower him
in

time a

bill

to

promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails to adopt
essential to the normal functioning of the administration.

deemed

6 Administration oj justice The Statute shall provide for the establishment of
an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal All the inhabitants of
the City shall be subject to it
7

Economic union and economic regime. The City of Jerusalem shall be included
Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the under-

in the

taking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions of the Joint
Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in
the territory of the City.
The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling
within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and nondiscrimination for

all

Members

of the United Nations and their nationals.

Freedom

oj transit and visit ; control of residents Subject to considerations of
security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the direc8

freedom of entry into, and residence within, the
borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and
Jewish States Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for
tions of the Trusteeship Council,

nationals of other States shall be controlled

by the Governor under the directions

of the Trusteeship Council.
9. Relations with the Arab and Jewish States
Representatives of the Arab and
Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the
protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connexion with the inter-

national administration of the City

10

Official languages.

Arabic and

Hebrew

shall

be the

official

languages of the

10
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This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working lanmay be required

city.

guages, as
11.

Citizenship

All the residents shall

become

ipso facto citizens of the City of

Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the

Arab or Jewish State

respectively, according to part I, section B, paragraph 9, of

this plan.

The Trusteeship Council

shall

mak

arrangements for consular protection of the

citizens of the City outside its territory.

12 Freedoms of citizens, (a) Subject
only to the requirements of public order
and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and

worship,

language,

education,

speech and Press, assembly and association, and

petition.

(b)

No

discrimination of any kind shall be
religion, language or sex.

made between

the inhabitants on the

grounds of race,
(c)

(d)

and

All persons within the City shall be entitled to
equal protection of the laws.
status of the various persons and communities

The family law and personal

their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order

and good
be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise
of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality
(e)

government, no measures

shall

(/) The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the
Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accord-

ance with their cultural traditions.
its

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of
own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational re-

quirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or
impaired/ Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the
basis of their existing rights

(g) No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City
of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in
publications of any kind, or at public meetings.
13.

Holy

Places, (a) Existing rights in respect of

Holy Places and

religious build-

ings or sites shall not be denied or impaired
(b) Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites

and the

free

exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to
the requirements of public order and decorum

(c)

Holy Places and

permitted which

religious buildings or sites shall

be preserved.

No

act shall be

any way impair their sacred character If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in
need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities
concerned to carry out such repairs. The Governor may carry it out himself at the
expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a

may

in

reasonable time.
(d) No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building
or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No
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change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discrimbetween the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or
would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the
general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the
Assembly's recommendations
inate

14
Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious
buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine (a) The protection of
the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall
be a special concern of the Governor
() With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city,

the Governor shall determine on the ground of powers granted to him by the
Constitutions of both States whether the provisions of the Constitutions of the Arab
and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected
(c) The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of
existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious
communities or the rights of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places,
religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine

In

he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of
denominations acting in an advisory capacity

this task

different

D,

DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME

The

Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948 It shall remain in force
in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it

necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After
the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to re-examination
by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the City shall be then free to express by means of a referen-

dum

their washes as to possible modifications of the

regime of the City

PART IV. CAPITULATIONS
whose nationals have

in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and
immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are
invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the reestablishment of such
privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of

States

Jerusalem,

11
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Agreement

Egyptian-Israeli Armistice

Agreement

February 24, 1949

PREAMBLE

The

Parties to the present Agreement, responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 calling upon them, as a further provisional measure

under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the
transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an
Armistice; having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations Chairmanship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 and
16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate
and conclude an Armistice Agreement;
The undersigned representatives, in the full authority entrusted to them by their
respective Governments, have agreed upon the following provisions:
ART, I. With a view to promoting the return to permanent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which
shall

be fully observed by both Parties during the Armistice, are hereby affirmed;
injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the

The

1.

settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by

both Parties

No

of either Party
land, sea, or air
aggressive action by the armed forces
be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces
of the other; it being understood that the use of the term "planned" in this context
2.

shall

has no bearing on normal

staff

planning as generally practiced in military organiza-

tions.
3.

the

The

right of each

Party to

armed forces of the other

security and freedom from fear of attack

its

by

shall be fully respected.

The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties
accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the

4.
is

restoration of peace in Palestine.
ART II. 1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolutions of the
Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed

forces of the
2.

No

two Parties

land, sea

and

element of the land, sea or

air

is

hereby established.

air military or para-military forces of either

Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against
the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for

any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line set forth in Article VI of
this Agreement except as provided in Article III of this Agreement; and elsewhere
shall not violate the international frontier;

or enter into or pass through the air

Historical
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Background

within three miles of the coastline
space of the other Party or through the waters
of the other Party

III 1 In pursuance of the Security Council's resolution of 4 November
and
with a view to the implementation of the Security Council's resolution
1948,
of 16 November 1948, the Egyptian Military Forces in the AL FALUJA area shall
be withdrawn.
2 This withdrawal shall begin on the day after that which follows the signing of
this Agreement, at 0500 hours, GMT, and shall be beyond the Egypt-Palestine

ART

frontier
3. The withdrawal shall be under the supervision of the United Nations and in
accordance with the Plan of Withdrawal set forth in Annex I to this Agreement.
ART. IV With specific reference to the implementation of the resolutions of

the Security Council of 4 and 16
poses are affirmed.

November

1948, the following principles

and pur-

1
The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under
the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized
2. It is also recognized that the basic purposes and spirit of the Armistice would

not be served by the restoration of previously held military positions, changes from
those now held other than as specifically provided for in this Agreement, or by the
advance of the military forces of either side beyond positions held at the time this

Armistice Agreement
3.

is

signed

It is further recognized that rights, claims or interests of a

Party, and that these,

non-military char-

Agreement may be asserted by either
by mutual agreement being excluded from the Armistice

acter in the area of Palestine covered

by

this

negotiations, shall be, at the discretion of the Parties, the subject of later settlement.
It is emphasized that it is not the purpose of this Agreement to establish, to recognize, to strengthen,

or to weaken or nullify, in any way, any

territorial, custodial or

other rights, claims or interests which may be asserted by either Party in the area
of Palestine or any part or locality thereof covered by this Agreement, whether

such asserted rights, claims or interests derive from Security Council resolutions,
including the resolution of 4 November 1948 and the Memorandum of 13 November 1948 for

Agreement

its

implementation, or from any other source

are dictated exclusively

The

provisions of this

by military considerations and are valid only for

the period of the Armistice.
ART, V. 1. The line described in Article

Demarcation Line and

VI

of this Agreement shall be designated

delineated in pursuance of the purpose
and intent of the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948

as the Armistice

2

The Armistice Demarcation Line
and

is

is

not to be construed in any sense as a po-

delineated without prejudice to rights, claims
and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the
Palestine question
litical

or territorial boundary,

is

3. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Line is to delineate the line
beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move except as
provided in Article III of this Agreement
4. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall
remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the Armis-

tice

Demarcation Line defined

in Article VI.
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In the GAZA-RAFAH area the Armistice Demarcation Line

shall

be

as delineated in paragraph 2 B (i) of the Memorandum of 13 November 194S on
the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 4 November 1948, namely
line from the coast at the mouth of the Wadi Has! m an easterly direction
through Deir Suneid and across the Gaza-Al Majdal Highway to a point 3 kilometres east of the Highway, then in a southerly direction parallel to the Gaza-Al

by a

Madjal Highway, and continuing thus to the Egyptian frontier
2. Within this line
Egyptian forces shall nowhere advance beyond their present
positions, and this shall include Beit Hanun and its surrounding area from which
Israeli forces shall be withdrawn to north of the Armistice Demarcation Line, and
any other positions within the
Israeli forces as set forth in

line delineated in

paragraph

paragraph

1

shall

be evacuated by

3.

3 Israeli outposts, each limited to platoon strength, may be maintained in this
area at the following points: Deir Suneid, on the north side of the Wadi (MR
of Saad (MR 10500982); Sulphur Quarries
09870924
10751090); 700

SW
(MR 09720887);

Tali-Jamma

(MR

KH AL Ma 'in (MR

and

outpost maintained at the Cemetery

(MR

09320821). The Israeli
08160723) shall be evacuated on the day

after that which follows the signing of this Agreement The Israeli outpost at Hill
79
10451017) shall be evacuated not later than four weeks following the day

(MR

on which

is signed Following the evacuation of the above outposts,
be established at
08360700, and at a point due east of
Hill 79 east of the Armistice Demarcation Line

new

4.

this

Agreement

Israeli outpost

In the

MR

may

BETHLEHEM-HEBRON

forces, the provisions of this

area,

Agreement

wherever positions are held by Egyptian
apply to the forces of both Parties in

shall

locality, except that the demarcation of the Armistice Line and reciprocal arrangements for withdrawal and reduction of forces shall be undertaken in such
manner as may be decided by the Parties, at such time as an Armistice Agreement

each

be concluded covering military forces in that area other than those of the
Parties to this Agreement, or sooner at the will of the Parties
ART. VII. 1 It is recognized by the Parties to this Agreement that in certain

may

sectors of the total area involved, the proximity of the forces of a third party not
covered by this Agreement makes impractical the full application of all provisions
of the Agreement to such sectors. For this reason alone, therefore, and pending the

conclusion of an Armistice Agreement in place of the existing truce with that third
Agreement relating to reciprocal reduction and with-

party, the provisions of this

drawal of forces shall apply only to the western front and not to the eastern front.
2. The areas comprising the western and eastern fronts shall be as denned by the
United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, on the basis
of the deployment of forces against each other and past military activity or the
future possibility thereof in the area This definition of the western and eastern
is set forth in Annex II of this Agreement.
In the area of the western front under Egyptian control, Egyptian defensive
forces only may be maintained. All other Egyptian forces shall be withdrawn from
this area to a point or points no further east than El Arish-Abou Aoueigila.

fronts
3.

In the area of the western front under Israeli control, Israeli defensive forces
only, which shall be based on the settlements, may be maintained. All other Israeli
forces shall be withdrawn from this area to a point or points north of the line de4.

Historical
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A

of the Memorandum of 13 November 1948 on the imlineated in paragraph 2
plementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 4 November 1948

The defensive forces referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall be as dem Annex III to this Agreement
ART VIII 1 The area comprising the village of El Auja and vicinity, as defined
5

fined

in

paragraph

armed

2

forces

Armistice

of this Article, shall be demilitarized, and both Egyptian and Israeli
be totally excluded therefrom The Chairman of the Mixed

shall

Commission established

in

X

Article

Nations Observers attached to the Commission

of

this

Agreement and United

shall be responsible for

ensuring

the full implementation of this provision
The area thus demilitarized shall be as follows
2

From a point on the EgyptPalestine frontier five (5; kilometres northwest of the intersection of the Rafah-El
08750468), south-east to Khashm El Mamdud
Auja road and the frontier

(MR

09650414), thence south-east to Hill 405 (MR 10780285), thence south-west
to a point on the Egypt-Palestine frontier live (5) kilometres south-east of the
intersection of the old railway tracks and the frontier (MR 09950145), thence

(MR

returning north-west along the Egypt-Palestine frontier to the point of origin
3. On the Egyptian side of the frontier, facing the El Auja area, no Egyptian

defensive positions shall be closer to El Auja than El Qouseima and Abou Aoueigila.
4 The road Taba-Qouseima-Auja shall not be employed by any military forces

whatsoever for the purpose of entering Palestine
5

The movement of armed

forces of either Party to this

Agreement

into any

part of the area defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, for any purpose, or failure
by either Party to respect or fulfil any of the other provisions of this Article, when

confirmed by the United Nations representatives, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this

Agreement

IX

All prisoners of war detained by either Party to this Agreement and
belonging to the armed forces, regular or irregular, of the other Party shall be
exchanged as follows

ART.

1. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be under United Nations supervision
and control throughout The exchange shall begin within ten days after the signing
of this Agreement and shall be completed not later than twenty-one days following.
Upon the signing of this Agreement, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article X of this Agreement, in consultation with the appro-

priate military authorities of the Parties, shall formulate a plan for the exchange
of prisoners of war within the above period, defining the date and places of ex-

change and

all

other relevant details

Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution may be pending, as well
as those sentenced for crime or other offence, shall be included in this exchange of
2.

prisoners
3. All articles of personal use, valuables, letters, documents, identification marks,
and other personal affects of whatever nature, belonging to prisoners of war who are

being exchanged, shall be returned to them, or,

Party to whose armed forces they belonged.
4. All matters not specifically regulated

if

they have escaped or died, to the

in this

Agreement

shall

be decided in

accordance with the principles laid down in the International Convention relating
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929.
5. The Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article
of this Agreement

X

11
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shall assume responsibility for locating
missing persons, \\hether military or civilian,
within the areas controlled by each
Party, to facilitate their expeditious exchange.
Each Party undertakes to extend to the Commission full co-operation and assistance in the discharge of this function

ART

X

The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be superMixed Armistice Commission composed of seven members, of whom

1.

vised by a

each Party to this Agreement shall designate three, and whose Chairman shall be
the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce
Supervision Organization or a senior

from the Observer personnel of that Organization designed
consultation with both Parties to this Agreement

officer

by him following

The Mixed Armistice Commission

2

shall maintain its headquarters at El Auja,
meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work

and

shall hold its

3 The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first
meeting by
the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later

than one week following the signing of this Agreement.
4 Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall
be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall
be taken by a majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting.

On

questions of principle, appeal shall lie to a Special Committee, composed of the
United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and one member each of the Egyptian and Israeli Delegations to the Armistice Conference at

Rhodes or some other
final.

from

senior officer, whose decisions on all such questions shall be
If no appeal against a decision of the Commission is filed within one week
the date of said decision, that decision shall be taken as final. Appeals to the

Committee shall be presented
Truce Supervision Organization, who
Special

to the
shall

United Nations Chief of Staff of the

convene the Committee at the

earliest

possible date.
5.

The Mixed Armistice Commission

Meetings

shall

shall

formulate

its

own

rules of procedure.

be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The
meetings shall be a majority of its members

quorum for its
6. The Commission

shall be empowered to employ Observers, who may be from
the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such numbers

among

may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event
United Nations Observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization.
Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations Observers at-

as

tached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the
United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission,

whichever

is serving as Chairman.
Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of
this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission
through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or

7.

complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem
appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.
8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agree-

ment

is

at issue, the

Commission's interpretation

shall prevail, subject to the right

Historical
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The Commission,

of appeal as provided in paragraph 4.
the need arises,

may from

m

its

Background

discretion and as

time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in

the provisions of this Agreement.

The Mixed Armistice Commission

9

activities as frequently as

it

may

shall

submit to both Parties reports on its
A copy of each such report

consider necessary

presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission
to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations.
10. Members of the Commission and its Observers shall be accorded such free-

shall be

dom

of

movement and

access in the areas covered by this

Agreement as the Com-

determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the
Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations Observers only shall

mission

may

be employed.
11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations
Observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this

Agreement

ART XI. No provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights,
claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of
the Palestine question.

ART XII The

present Agreement

into force immediately

upon being

not subject to ratification and shall

is

come

signed.

This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the
November 1948 calling for the establish-

2

resolution of the Security Council of 16

ment

of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine

to facilitate the transition
shall

remain

in

force until

from the present truce

to

permanent peace
a peaceful settlement between the parties

and

in Palestine,
is

achieved,

except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article.
3

The

or any of
at

Parties to this
its

any time

been
call

Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise

provisions, or

may suspend

its

this

Agreement
and II,

application, other than Articles I

In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has
one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may

in effect for

upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of

representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising or sus-

pending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles I and
ticipation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties

II.

Par-

If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article does not result
an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter
before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the
4.

in

grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security action
toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine
5 This Agreement supersedes the Egyptian-Israeli General Cease-Fire Agreement entered into by the Parties on 24 January 1949
6. This Agreement is signed in
quintuplicate, of which one copy shall be retained
by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations for transmission to the Security Council and to the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the
Acting Mediator on

Palestine

12
|

Treaty Between the States of the Arab League

123

Treaty Between the States of the Arab League

April 13, 1950

The Governments of:
The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan
The Syrian Republic
The Kingdom of Iraq
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
The Lebanese Republic
The Kingdom of Egypt
The Motawakilite Kingdom of Yemen
In view of the desire of the above-mentioned Governments to consolidate

rela-

between the States of the Arab League; to maintain their independence and
their mutual heritage, in accordance with the desire of their peoples, to cooperate
for the realization of mutual defense and the maintenance of security and peace
according to the principles of both the Arab League Pact and the United Nations
Charter together with the aims of the said Pacts; and to consolidate stability and
security and provide means of welfare and development in the countries.
The following government delegates of
having been duly accredited and

tions

.

fully authorized

ART.

1.

by

.

.

,

their respective governments,

The Contracting

States, in

an

effort to

approve the following:
maintain and stabilize peace and

security, hereby confirm their desire to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, whether such disputes concern relations among themselves or with other

Powers.
ART.
against

2

The Contracting

States consider any (act of) armed aggression
or their armed forces, to be directed against

any one or more of them

made
them

Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-defense, individually and collectively they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State or States against
all.

is made, and immediately to take, individually and
steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the
aggression and restore security and peace In conformity with Article 6 of the
Arab League Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Arab League

which such an act of aggression
collectively,

all

U N. Security Council shall be notified of such
means and procedure taken to check it.
ART 3 At the invitation of any one of the signatories of

Council and

act of aggression and

the

this Treaty the Conwhenever there are reasonable grounds for
that the territorial integrity, independence, or security of any one of the
threatened. In the event of the threat of war or the existence of an

tracting States shall hold consultations

the belief

parties is
international emergency, the Contracting States shall immediately proceed to unify
their plans and defensive measures, as the situation may demand

ART.

4.

The Contracting

States, desiring to

implement

fully the

above obliga-

Historical
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tions

in

effectively carry

them

and
preparing individual and

armed

ing their

forces,

out, shall cooperate in consolidating

Background

and coordinatand needs

shall participate according to their resources

collective

means

of defense to repulse the said

armed

aggression

ART

A

5

Permanent Military Commission composed of representatives of the

General Staffs of the armies of the Contracting States shall be formed to draw up
The duties of the Permanent
plans of joint defense and their implementation.
in an Annex attached to this Treaty,
forth
set
are
which
Commission
Military
include the drafting of necessary reports on the method of cooperation and particimentioned in Article 4 The Permanent Military Commission shall submit
pation

to the Joint

Defense Council, provided hereuhder

in Article 6, reports dealing

with

questions within its province
ART 6 A Joint Defense Council under the supervision of the Arab League
Council shall be formed to deal with all matters concerning the implementations
of the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Treaty It shall be assisted in
the performance of its task by the Permanent Military Commission referred to
in Article 5 The Joint Defense Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers and

the Defense Ministers of the Contracting States or their representatives Decisions
taken by a two-thirds majority shall be binding on all the Contracting States
ART. 7 The Contracting States, in order to fulfill the aims of this Treaty, and

about security and prosperity in the Arab countries, and in an effort to
them, undertake to cooperate in the development

to bring

raise the standard of living in

of their economies

and the exploitation of

their natural resources; to facilitate the

to
exchange of their respective agricultural and industrial products; and generally
conclude the necessary
organize and coordinate their economic activities and to

agreements to realize such aims.
An Economic Council consisting of the Ministers in charge of economic
affairs, or their representatives if necessary, shall be formed by the Contracting
States to submit recommendations for the realization of all such aims as are set
forth in the previous article The Council may, in the performance of its duties,
inter- Arab

ART. 8

seek the cooperation of the Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs referred
to in Article 4 of the Arab League Pact.

ART. 9
part of

The Annex

to this

Treaty

shall

be considered an integral and indivisible

it.

ART. 10 The Contracting States undertake to conclude no international agreements which may be contradictory to the provisions of this Treaty, nor to act, in
their international relations, in a way which may be contrary to the aims of this
Treaty.

ART. 11

No

provision of this Treaty shall in any

way

affect, or is

intended to

any of the rights or obligations devolving upon the Contracting States from
the United Nations Charter or the responsibilities borne by the United Nations
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
ART. 12 After a lapse of 10 years from the date of the ratification of this
Treaty any one of the Contracting States may withdraw from it, providing 12
affect

is previously given to the Secretariat-General of the Arab League.
Secretariat-General of the League shall inform the other Contracting States of

months' notice

The

such notice.

ART,

13.

This Treaty shall be ratified by each Contracting State according to

12
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the constitutional procedure of its own government The Treaty shall come into
force for the ratifying States 15 days after the receipt by the Secretariat-General
of the instruments of ratification from at least four States. This Treaty

is

drafted

on April 13, 1950 One signed copy shall be deposited with the
Secretariat-General of the Arab League; equally authentic copies shall be transin Arabic in Cairo

mitted to each of the Contracting States.

MILITARY ANNEX
1.

The Permanent

Military Commission provided for in Article 5 of the Joint

Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League,
shall

undertake the following:

(a) in cooperation with the Joint Defense Council, to prepare plans to deal with
inticipated dangers or armed aggression that may be launched against one or

all

more

of the Contracting States or their armed forces, such plans to be based on
the principles determined by the Joint Defense Council;
(b) to submit proposals for the organization of the forces of the Contracting
States, stipulating the

minimum

force for each in accordance with military exi-

gencies and the potentialities of each State
(c) to submit proposals for increasing the effectiveness of the forces of the
Contracting States in so far as their equipment, organization, and training are
;

concerned so that they may keep pace with modern military methods and development; and for the unification and coordination of all such forces;
;

(d) to submit proposals for the exploitation of natural, agricultural, industrial,
in favor of the Inter-Arab military

and other resources of all Contracting States
effort and joint defense;

(e) to organize the exchange of training missions between the Contracting States
for the preparation of plans, participation in military exercises and maneuvers
and the study of their results, recommendations for the improvement of methods
to ensure close cooperation in the field,

and for the general improvement of the

the Contracting States
(f) to prepare the necessary data on the resources and military potentialities
of each of the Contracting States and the part to be played by the forces of
forces of

all

;

each in the joint military effort;
Con(g) to discuss the facilities and various contributions which each of the
be asked
tracting States, in conformity with the provisions of this Treaty, might
to provide, during a state of war, on behalf of the armies of such other
tracting States as might be operating on its territory.

2

The Permanent

may form temporary
own members to deal with any of

Military Commission

committees from among

its

Con-

or permanent subthe matters falling

its jurisdiction It may also seek the advice of any experts whose views on
certain questions are deemed necessary.
3 The Permanent Military Commission shall submit detailed reports on the results

within

its activities and studies to the Joint Defense Council provided for in Article 6
of this Treaty, as well as an annual report giving full particulars of its work and
studies during the year,

of

4.

The Permanent Military Commission

shall establish its

headquarters in Cairo

Historical
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but may hold meetings in any other place the Commission may specify. The Commission shall elect its Chairman for two years, he may be reelected Candidates for
the Chairmanship shall hold at least the rank of a high

member

Commission must have

of the

commanding

officer

as his original nationality that of the

Each
Con-

tracting State he represents

In the event of war, the supreme

5

command

of the joint forces shall be entrusted

to the Contracting State possessing the largest military force taking actual part in
field
unless, by unanimous agreement, the Commander-in-Chief shall

operations,

be assisted

in directing military operations

The

by a Joint

Staff

Tripartite Declaration:

France, United Kingdom, United States

May

"I.

The

25,

three

to maintain a

1950

Governments recognize that the Arab States and Israel all need
level of armed forces for the purposes cf assuring their

certain

and their legitimate self-defence and to permit them to play their
of the area as a whole All applications for arms or war material
defence
part
for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles In this con-

internal security
in the

nection the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the state-

ments made by their representatives on the Security Council on 4th August, 1949,
in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between
Arab States and Israel
The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all
the States in question to which they permit arms to be supplied from their counthe

2

tries that

the purchasing State does not intend to undertake any act of aggression
Similar assurances will be requested from any other States

against any other State

which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.
The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest
and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and

in the area to
3.

in

and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat
of force between any of the States in that area The three Governments, should
they find that any of these States was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice
lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations,
stability in the area,

immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent
such violation."
Assurances in the terms of paragraph 2 of the statement were received by the
United Kingdom from Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia; by the United States
from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Syria, and by France from Syria and the

Lebanon.

Law
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1,

With

1

1951

a view to arranging the enforcement of the law of 24th and 29th

Esfand, 1329 (15th and 20th March, 1951), concerning the nationalisation of the
oil industry throughout Persia, a mixed board composed of five Senators and five
Deputies elected by either of the two Houses and of the Minister of Finance or
his

shall

Deputy

be formed

The Government

is bound to dispossess at once the former Anglothe supervision of the mixed board If the Company
refuses to hand over at once on the grounds of existing claims on the Government,

ART.

2.

Company under

Iranian Oil

the

Government

other bank

up

can,

by mutual agreement, deposit

to 25 per cent

in the

Bank

of current revenue from the

oil

Milli Iran or in

any

after deduction of

meet the probable claims of the Company
bound to examine the rightful claims of the Gov-

exploitation expenses in order to

ART.

The Government

3

is

ernment as well as the rightful claims of the Company under the supervision of
the mixed board and to submit its suggestions to the two Houses of Parliament in
order that the same may be implemented after approval by the two Houses
ART 4 Inasmuch as the nationalisation of the oil industry was also approved
by the Senate on 29th Esfand (20th March, 1951) and inasmuch as all income
from oil and oil products are the established property of the Persian nation the
Government is bound to audit the Company's accounts under the supervision of
the mixed board which must also closely supervise exploitation as from the date
of the implementation of this law until the appointment of an executive body.

ART

5.

The mixed board must draw

up. as soon as possible, the statute of the

which provision is to be made for the setting up of an
executive body and a supervisory body of experts, and must submit the same to the
two Houses for approval.
ART. 6. For the gradual replacement of foreign experts by Persian experts the
mixed board is bound to draw up regulations for sending, after competitive examNational Oil

inations, a

Company

number

in

of students each year to foreign countries to undertake study

knowledge and gain experience in oil industries,
the said regulations to be carried out by the Ministry of Education after the apwith the study of such
proval of the Council of Ministers The expenses connected
in the various branches of required

students shall be

met out

of

oil

revenues.

All purchasers of products derived from the wells taken back from the
former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company can in future buy annually the same quantity
used to buy annually from the Company from the beginning of the
of oil

ART.

7.

they

Christian year 1948 up to 29th Esfand, 1329 (20th March, 1951), at a reasonable
international price. For any surplus quantity they shall have priority in the event

of equal terms of purchase being offered.
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ART. 8 All proposals formulated by the mixed board for the approval of the
Majlis and submission to the Majlis must be sent to the Oil Commission
ART 9 The mixed board must finish its work within three months as from the
date of approval of this law and must submit the report of its activities to the
Majlis in accordance with Article 8 In the event of requiring an extension it must
apply, giving valid reasons, for such extension Whilst, however, the extension is

before the two Houses for approval the mixed board can continue

From Agreement on Suez Canal
United Kingdom and Egypt

its

functions.

Base:

October 19, 1954

ART 1. Her Majesty's Forces shall be completely withdrawn from Egyptian
of Annex 1 within a
Territory in accordance with the Schedule set forth in Part
period of twenty months from the date of signature of the present Agreement.

A

ART.

2

The Government of the United Kingdom declare that the Treaty of
London on 26th August, 1936, with the Agreed Minute, Ex-

Alliance signed in

changed Notes, Convention concerning the immunities and privileges enjoyed by
the British Forces in Egypt and all other subsidiary agreements, is terminated.
ART 3. Parts of the present Suez Canal Base, which are listed in Appendix

A

Annex

be kept in efficient working order and capable of immediate use
in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the present Agreement To this
to

II, shall

end they shall be organized in accordance with the provisions of Annex II.
ART. 4 In the event of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country
which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty
of Joint Defence between Arab League States, signed in Cairo on 13th April, 1950,
or on Turkey, Egypt shall afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be

necessary in order to place the Base on a war footing and to operate it effectively.
facilities shall include the use of Egyptian ports within the limits of what is
strictly indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes.

These

ART
in

5

In the event of the return of British Forces to the Suez Canal Base area

accordance with the provisions of Article

ately

upon the cessation of the

4, these forces shall

withdraw immedi-

hostilities referred to in that Article.

ART. 6 In the event of a threat of an armed attack by an outside power on
any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to
the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States, or on Turkey, there shall
be immediate consultation between Egypt and the United Kingdom.
ART. 7. The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall afford over-flying,
landing and servicing facilities for notified flights of aircraft under Royal Air
Force control For the clearance of any flights of such aircraft, the Government
of the Republic of Egypt shall accord treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the aircraft of any other foreign country with the exception of States
parties to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States. The landing

16
|

From "The Baghdad

and servicing

facilities

Fact": Iraq and Turkey

mentioned above

129

shall be afforded at

Egyptian

airfields in

the Suez Canal Base area.

ART.

8.

The two Contracting Governments

Canal, which

is

an integral part of Egypt,

is

recognize that the Suez Maritime
a waterway economically, commer-

cially and strategically of international importance, and express the determination to
uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal
signed at Constantinople on 29th October, 1888.
ART. 9. (a) The United Kingdom is accorded the right to move any British

equipment into or out of the Base at its discretion.
(b) There shall be no increase above the level of supplies as agreed upon in
Part C of Annex II without the consent of the Government of the Republic of
Egypt.
ART. 10. The present Agreement does not affect and shall not be interpreted as
affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of
the United Nations.
ART. 11 The Annexes and Appendices to the present Agreement shall be considered as an integral part of

ART.

12

it.

The

present Agreement shall remain in force for the period of
seven years from the date of its signature.
(b) During the last twelve months of that period the two Contracting Governments shall consult together to decide on such arrangements as may be necessary
(a)

upon the termination

of the Agreement.
Unless both the Contracting Governments agree upon any extension of the
Agreement it shall terminate seven years after the date of signature and the Gov(c)

ernment of the United Kingdom shall take away or dispose of their property then
remaining in the Base.
ART. 13 The present Agreement shall have effect as though it had come into
force on the date of signature. Instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in
Cairo as soon as possible.

From "The Baghdad

Pact":

Iraq and Turkey

February 24, 1955

ART. 1. Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the high
contracting parties will co-operate for their security and defence Such measures as
they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special
agreements with each other.
ART. 2. In order to ensure the realization and effect application of the co-operation provided for in Article

1

above, the competent authorities of the high con-

tracting parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present
pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have

been approved by the Governments of the high contracting

parties.
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ART

The

3

whatsoever

in

Background

from any interference
high contracting parties undertake to refrain
affairs They will settle any disputes between themselves

each others'

way in accordance with the United Nations Charter
ART 4 The high contracting parties declare that the dispositions

in a peaceful

of the present
contracted
pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations
not
do
from, and
States
or
State
third
derogate
with
of
them
They
either
any
by

cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The
international obligation
high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any
incompatible with the present pact
ART. 5 This pact shall be open for accession to any member State of the Arab
League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this
region and which is fully recognized by both of the high contracting parties Accession shall

come

into force

from the date on which the instrument of accession

deposited uith the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq
acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements in
accordance with Article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact The
of the State concerned

is

Any

competent authorities of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance
with Article 2 These measures will become operative as soon as they have been
approved by the Governments of the parties concerned

ART

6.

A

permanent council at ministerial

ART

7.

will be set up to function
when at least four Powers beits own rules of procedure

level

within the framework of the purposes of this pact
come parties to the pact The council will draw up

This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other

Any contracting party may withdraw from the pact by notifying
the other parties in writing of its desire to do so, six months before the expiration
of any of the above mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for
five-year periods

the other parties

[In an exchange of letters, the Parties placed on record their understanding that

two countries to co-operate in resisting any aggression
them and that, in order to ensure the maintenance of
the Middle East region, we have agreed to work in close

"this pact will enable our

directed against either of

peace and security in

co-operation for effecting the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine Great Britain, Pakistan, and Iran joined the Pact under Article 5 "]

Egyptian Agreement with Czechoslovakia for the Purchase of Arms:
Prime Minister Gamal Abdul Nasser

September 27, 1955

My

Brothers,

am

glad today to see this exhibition which the armed forces have set up to show
the extent of progress and development which the army has made
I am glad also to speak to you today for I now recall my last talk to the men
I

of the

armed

forces

some months ago

I

remember

also that I spoke then to thou-
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sands of

on the

officers.

Now

frontiers of our
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them amongst us I see them carrying out their duty
homeland for the safety of our country and for the glory of
I see

our country.

When

I speak to

brothers, I speak to all the men of the armed
of the fatherland, I speak to Egypt
Egypt which
Egypt which placed its faith in the goals of this Revolu-

you now,

forces, I speak to all the

revolted on July 23, 1952

my

men

Egypt which was determined to achieve these goals Egypt which finally
off the occupation and threw off slavery When I
speak to you today, I speak

tion;

threw

to all Egypt,

My

is my feeling when I look at the battlefield, and I see the men
armed forces on guard along the frontiers; when I look at the frontiers of
Egypt and see the men of the armed forces standing staunch and firm and faithful,
exerting every effort for the safety of this country and its sons
The fifth goal of your Revolution was to set up a strong national army From

brothers, this

of the

the beginning of the Revolution you have

exerted every effort to achieve this
our might and with every means at our
disposal. We have worked with you to achieve this goal because to achieve it means
liberty; to achieve it means glory; to achieve it means dignity.

goal and

we have worked with you with

all

all

My

we met many difficulties in achievbrothers, we met the greatest obstacles
did everything we could to set up military factories; we did everying our aim.
thing we could to provide the army with the heavy armaments it needed; and we

We

did everything

Yes,

But

we

to create such an

that

if

come

My

could so that Egypt's

army might be

brothers, we did a lot.
there were the greatest difficulties in our

a strong national army.

my

army

we wanted

for

Egypt we had

to achieve this strong national

free in our internal

and our foreign

We believed

way

to preserve

army

that

our freedom
for Egypt,

if

we wanted

We

believed

we had

to be-

policies

we will never agree that this army be formed at the expense of
freedom, or at the expense of this country's glory, or at the expense
of this country's dignity. We have always been determined that the formation of
brothers,

this country's

army should go hand

this strong national

in

hand with true

liberty

and with

real

glory

have proclaimed Egypt's policy on many occasions We declared that Egypt
would go forward with its independent policy; it
would go forward having rid itself of imperialism; it would go forward having rid
and it would go forward having rid itself of foreign influence
itself of domination
These were our hopes and these were your hopes We did everything we could to

We

after the Revolution of July 23

;

We

did everything we could,
preserve these hopes
and we were confronted by many obstacles.
goals

my

brothers, to preserve these

You know that heavy weapons are controlled by the big powers. You know that
the big powers have never agreed to supply our army with heavy weapons except
with conditions and except with stipulations You know that we refused these conditions and these stipulations because we are jealous of our true freedom and we

We

are anxious that Egypt have a strong
are jealous of our independent policy.
independent policy so that we may make of Egypt a new independent personality

which

will really rid itself of imperialism, will really rid itself of occupation, will

itself of foreign domination in
progress along this path.

really rid

all

its

aspects

We

have been making
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Today, my brothers, we hear an outcry from London, we hear an outcry from
Washington about the arming of Egypt's troops But I would like to tell you that
throughout the last three years we have tried to get heavy weapons for the army
by every means, not for aggressive purposes, not to attack, not to make war, but
for defense, for security, for peace

We wanted to strengthen our army so as to provide security for "ourselves, to
wanted
provide security for our nation, to provide security for our "Arabism
to get weapons for the army so that we could always feel secure, safe, and tranquil

We

We

We

never
never intended to strengthen our army for aggressive purposes.
intended to strengthen the army for wars But the army which is the defender and
protector of our homeland must always stand prepared to defend the borders and
the country's honor. Such is our purpose and this is our goal We have always
declared this throughout the last three years. \Ve do not want arms for aggression.
want arms so that we can be tranquil, so that we feel at peace and not

We

threatened.

my

Today,

these outcries

which

is

it

brothers, I sense an outcry here and I sense an outcry there. I sense
now that we have been able to obtain for the army the weapons of

in need, without conditions

and without

the goal which this Revolution undertook
tional army to defend its true independence

On

this occasion I

When

our troops

would

like to tell you,

that

and protect

my

its

true freedom.

brothers, the story of the arming of
went to each of the states, we went

the Revolution took place we
weapons for the army.

to every quarter to get

restrictions, so as to achieve

Egypt should have a strong na-

We

went

to Britain;

we went

to

America; we went to the rest of the states to get weapons for
the army in the interest of peace and defense. What did we get? We got only
demands They wanted to arm the troops after we had signed a document or after
France;

we went

to

We

declared that even though we had wanted and had
were arming our
sign a document
the interest of our freedom, of our independent personality, of our

we had

signed a pact.
decided to arm our troops,

troops

in

We

we would never

Revolution, of the glory of our country, of Egypt's dignity

We

declared that

we

would not arm our troops at the expense of our freedom
We requested arms but what was the result? The result, my brothers, is a long
and bitter story. I remember now, I remember as I talk to you that we sometimes
humiliated ourselves but we never abandoned our principles. We humiliated ourwe begged for arms but at the same time we
selves when we requested arms
were determined to hold to our principles and we were determined to preserve our
high ideals. And what was the result? Never, my brothers, could we achieve our
goal, the greatest goal for which this Revolution was undertaken, the creation of a
strong national army.

France always bargained with us. She bargained with us over North Africa She
"We will give you arms on the condition that you should not criticize

says to us,

our position in North Africa, and on condition that you relinquish your 'Arabism,'
you relinquish your humanitarianism and on condition that you should keep

that

silent

We

and

close

your eyes when you see the massacres

T

said to her,

humanitarianism?

"How

We

can

we

in

relinquish our 'Arabism'?
never can."

North Africa."

How

can

we

give

up our

France's arms offer to us was always like a suord above our necks. We were always being threatened, my brothers, with the cutting off of arms. We were always
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arms

my
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brothers, with the supply of arms to Israel and the cutting off
is the story of France and now I'll tell you the story of

for Egypt. This

America.

From the time of the Revolution we
And what was the result?
The promise was
we signed a mutual

asked for arms and we were promised arms.

a promise circumscribed with conditions.

We

would get arms
security pact.
T
e refused to sign a mutual security pact.

W

of alliance

if

We

would get arms if
sign some form
refused to sign any form

we would

We

And, my brothers, we could never get a single weapon from America.
What was the story of England. England told us that she was ready to supply us
arms. We accepted gratefully. W7 hat was the result? England provided us with a
quantity of arms which was not sufficient to achieve the goals of this Revolution
What was the result of all this, my brothers? The army opposing us is obtaining
arms from various parts of the world Israel's army has been able to obtain arms
from England, France, Belgium, Canada, Italy and from various other states It can
always find someone to supply it arms, while we read in the foreign press in the
that Israel's army can defeat all the Arab
British, American or French newspapers
of alliance

armies combined. It was only

last

month,

my

brothers, that I read

many

articles

in that sense, that the Israeli

beat the Arabs, that the

army was

army could defeat Egypt, that the Israeli army could
Israeli army w as superior in armament, that the Israeli
r

superior in equipment.

what they have

said in their press and I said to them, since you feel like
prevent us from obtaining arms? I asked them this, and what w as
the result? France complained about our feelings toward North Africa, and pre-

This

is

why do you

this

?

vented us from obtaining arms.

When we saw this, when we saw this domination, when we saw this influence
which was being used against us, we decided to ask all the states of the world to
supply us arms without conditions. I told them these arms would not be used for
aggression, that they would be used for defense, that we had no aggressive intent,
that our intentions were peaceful, that we wanted to have a strong independent
army to defend our country and help it to achieve its free and independent goals,
that we want to have a strong army not for aggression but for defense.
name of Egypt to America, to England to France,
and to the rest of the states and I waited for their
answers. I waited, and what was the result 5 I got answers from some of them that
I could get arms with conditions. I refused, for I have already told you that although we are ready to humiliate ourselves by asking for arms, we will never
abandon our principles.
e received a reply from Czechoslovakia saying that she was prepared to supply
arms in accordance with our needs and those of Egypt's army on a commercial
basis, the transaction to be considered like any other commercial transaction. We
I said this,

my

brothers, in the

to Russia, to Czechoslovakia

W

T

agreed and last week Egypt signed a commercial agreement with Czechoslovakia to
supply us arms. This agreement permits Egypt to pay in Egyptian products such
as cotton and rice. This offer w e gratefully accepted. In this way, my brothers, we
achieve one of the goals of the Revolution, the formation of a strong national army.
Today, my brothers, as I talk to you I sense the outcry raised here and there
r

an outcry

in

London, an outcry

in

Washington These outcries seek

control us, to continue to influence us.

to continue to
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We

We will fight to destroy this influence.
Revolution and we will fight to create a strong
national army able to achieve the greatest goals of the Revolution, able to obtain
peace Yes, my brothers, peace that peace which we proclaimed at Bandung, the
We

will fight to destroy this control

will fight to achieve the goals of the

peace which we have proclaimed on many occasions
This army which we create is for the sake of peace.
be secure
create

it

nation's

When

in

our

lot,

we

create

against aggression,

it

we

so that

create

it

Egypt

We

will not

against

any

create

it

so that

we can

We

be a state of refugees

territorial designs against

our

soil.

someone say that

I hear

opens the way for Russian influence or

this

foreign influence in Egypt or the Middle East, I think of the remote past and I
say that this commercial agreement without conditions does not open the way for

Russian or foreign influence, but,
foreign influence

My

brothers,

my

brothers,

it

means the eradication

of the

which so long oppressed and dominated us

when we

are able to equip our

army with

the necessary

arms with-

we destroy

that control which I have
foreign control
felt and which you have felt in the guise of equipping our army and in the guise of
providing it with arms Those who talk to us about foreign influence know that they

out conditions or restrictions,

themselves have no intention of seeing foreign influence wiped out.

We intend to destroy foreign influence Egypt independent Egypt, revolutionary
Egypt, strong Egypt will never allow foreign influence in her land They know we
will never accept their influence, and their control. They know that Egypt after
determined to destroy forever foreign influence,
and to go forward as a free independent
power with her own foreign policy, motivated by her own interests and not by the
the Revolution of July 23 has

foreign oppression and foreign control
interest of

any of the foreign carnps.

They know

this

fluence which has

when they talk of influence for they think that it is their income to an end in this country that it is their influence which

has gone

away forever.
Today we are a free and independent nation We will fight
we will fight for our independence and may God be with us all.

Nationalization of the Suez Canal
Presidential

for our liberty

and

Company:

Decree

July 26, 1956

President of the Republic Order concerning the issuance of Law No. 285 of 1956
on the Nationalization of the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal.
In the Name of the Nation

The President

of the Republic,
Considering the two firmans issued on

(respectively)

November

30, 1854

and January

5,

1856

concerning the preferential rights related to the administration of
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the Suez Canal Transit Service and the establishment of an
Egyptian joint-stock

company
and
and
and

to operate

Law No. 129
Law No. 317
Law No. 26

it

;

of 1947 concerning public utility
concessions;
of 1952 concerning individual labor contracts;
of 1954 concerning joint-stock
companies, limited partnerships

by shares and limited

liability companies
with the advice of the State Council;
has issued the following law

;

:

The Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal (Egyptian jointstock Company) is hereby nationalized. All its assets, rights and
obligations are
transferred to the Nation and all the organizations and committees that now operate
its management are hereby dissolved
ART.

1

Stockholders and holders of founders shares shall be compensated for the
ordinary or founders shares they own in accordance with the value of the shares
shown in the closing quotations of the Paris Stock Exchange on the day preceding
the effective date of the present law.

The payment
delivery of

all

of said indemnity shall be effected after the Nation has taken

the assets and properties of the nationalized company.

ART. 2. An independent organization endowed with juristic personality and
annexed to the Ministry of Commerce, shall take over the management of the Suez
Canal Transit Service. The composition of the organization and the remuneration
of

its

members

shall

be fixed in an order of the President of the Republic. In so

far as

managing the Transit Service is concerned the organization shall have ail the
necessary powers required for the purpose without being restricted by Government
regulations and procedures.
Without prejudice to the auditing of its final accounts by the State Audit Department, the organization shall have an independent budget prepared in accordance
with the rules in force for commercial concerns Its financial year shall begin on
July 1, and end on June 30 each year. The budget and final accounts shall be

approved by an order of the President of the Republic. The first financial year
shall begin on the effective date of the present law and end with June 30, 1957.
The organization may delegate one or several of its members to implement its
decisions or to discharge any duty assigned to these members.
It may also set up from among its own members of from among other people,
a technical committee to assist it in its own research work and studies.
The chairman of the organization shall represent it before the courts, government
agencies, and other places, and in its dealings with third parties.
ART. 3. The assets and rights of the nationalized company in the Republic of
Egypt and abroad, are hereby frozen. Without specific permission obtained in advance from the organization provided for in Article 2 above, banks, organizations
and private persons are hereby prohibited from disposing of those assets or making
any payment requested them or due by them.
ART. 4. The organization shall retain all the present officials, employees, and
laborers of the nationalized company at their posts they shall have to continue with
the discharge of their duties; no one will be allowed to leave his work or vacate
his post in any manner and for any reason whatsoever except with the permission
;

of the organization provided for in Article 2
ART. 5. All violations of the provisions of Article 3 above shall be punished

Historical
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by imprisonment and
in the offense

imprisonment

a fine equal to three times the value of the

Background

amount involved

All violations of the provisions of Article 4 shall be punished by
in addition to the forfeiture by the offender of all right to com-

pensation, pension or indemnity
ART 6 The present order shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall
have the force of law It shall come into force on the date of its publication. The

Minister

of

Commerce

issue

shall

the

necessary administrative

orders

for

its

implementation
It shall bear the Seal of the State and be implemented as one of the State laws.
(July 26, 1956)
Given this 18th day of Zul Heggah, 1375 A

H

Gamal Abdul Nasser

Nationalization Speech:

Gamal Abdul Nasser
July 26, 1956
This speech makes reference to a meeting with Mr. Eugene R.
Black, president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, with which Egypt had been negotiating for a loan
to help finance the construction of a high dam on the Nile at

Aswan
I

(translation

began to look

at

Mr

Black

before Ferdinand de Lesseps.
I recalled the words which
rived in

Egypt

He went

to

made from

tape recording),

sitting in his chair

we used

Mohammed

imagining that I was sitting

In 1854, Ferdinand de Lesseps arSaid Pasha, the Khedive He sat beside him

to read.

u

We want to dig the Suez Canal. This project will greatly benefit
you It is a great project and will bring excellent returns to Egypt/'
While Black was speaking to me, I felt the complexes which his words revived.
I was again carried back to Ferdinand de Lesseps.
I told him we have complexes from such matters, and we do not want to see
another Cromer governing us again. Loans and interests on these loans have ended
in the occupation of our country. I requested him to take this into consideration. We
have complexes from de Lesseps and from Cromer, and from political occupation
and told him,

through economic occupation.

That was the picture

November

7,

1854.

He

had in mind, the picture of De Lesseps who arrived on
arrived in Alexandria and began to work cautiously and

I

treacherously. On November 30, 1854, he had already contacted the Khedive and
obtained the Concession for the Canal from him The Concession said. "Our friend

De

Lesseps has drawn our attention to the benefits which will accrue to Egypt by
waterway for the passage of ships

joining the Mediterranean and the Red Sea by a
He informed us of the possibility of forming a
prise the investors of capital

We

company for this purpose to comhave approved the idea and have authorised him
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form and to operate a company for the digging of the Suez Canal and to exploit
between the two seas."
This was in 1854. In 1856, a hundred years ago, a Firman was issued whereby
the company was formed Egypt got 44 per cent of the shares and bound herself
to
it

with certain obligations to De Lesseps The De Lesseps company is a
private company' It has nothing to do with governments, domination, occupation or imperial-

De

am your friend, I have come to benefit you
between the two seas for your advantage "
The Suez Canal Company was formed, and Egypt got 44 per cent of the shares
Egypt undertook to supply labour to dig the Canal by corvee, of whom 120,000 died
without getting paid We also paid De Lesseps in order that he might give up some
concession. We gave up the 15 per cent of the profits which we were supposed to
get over and above the profits of our 44 per cent of the shares Thus, contrary- to
the statements made by De Lesseps to the Khedive in which he said that the Canal
was dug for Egypt, Egypt has become the property of the Canal.
Article 16 of the agreement concluded on February 22, 1866, stipulated that in
view of the fact that the Suez Canal Company is an Egyptian company, it is subism!

and

Lesseps told the Khedive, "I

to dig a canal

ject to the country's laws.

nor

[But

it

has been] subject neither to the country's laws

The disputes which
between Egypt and the Company or between individuals of any nationality
are to come before Egyptian courts in accordance with the regulations set forth
by the laws of the country Egyptian courts are competent in giving their verdict
with regard to disputes which may come up between the Egyptian government and
its

regulations. It considers itself a state within a state.

arise

the

company according to Egyptian laws
The result of the words of De Lesseps

in 1856, the result of friendship

and loans,

was the occupation of Egypt in 1882
Egypt then borrowed money What happened? Egypt was obliged, during the
reign of Ismail, to sell its 44 per cent of the shares in the company. Immediately,
England sent out to purchase the shares It bought them for 4 million pounds. Then,
Ismail gave up his 5 per cent of the company's profits against the ceding of some
concessions by the Company which were granted to it.
Then Ismail was obliged to pay to Britain the 5 per cent profit which he had
relinquished This amounted to over 4 million pounds. In other words, Britain got

Egypt's 44 per cent of the Company's shares free. This was the history which took
place a century ago.
T
ill economic indeIs history to repeat itself again with treachery and deceit ?

W

pendence ... or economic domination and control be the cause of the destruction of our political independence and freedom?
impossible that history should repeat itself.
in the past. We are eradicating the
are building our country on strong and sound bases.
traces of the past.
Brothers,

it is

Today, we do not repeat what happened

We

Whenever we turn backwards, we aim

at the eradication of the past evils

which

brought about our domination, and the vestiges of the past which took place despite
ourselves and which were caused by imperialism through treachery and deceit.
Today, the Suez Canal where 120,000 of our sons had lost their lives in digging
it by corvee, and for the foundation of which we paid 8 million pounds, has become a state within the state. It has humiliated ministers and cabinets.
This Canal

is

an Egyptian

canal. It is

an Egyptian Joint Stock Company. Britain

Historical
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has forcibly grabbed our rights, our 44 per cent of its shares Britain still collects
All countries
the profits of these shares from the time of its inauguration until now
state within the state, an Egyptian Joint Stock
and shareholders get their profits.

A

Company.

The income

of the Suez Canal

100 million dollars

Of

Company

million pounds or 3 million dollars This is
which, according to the Firman, was dug for the sake

died in digging the Canal, take only
the Suez Canal

Company,

1955 reached 35 million pounds, or
lost 120,000 persons, who have

in

sum, we, who have

this

'

1

Egypt and its benefit
Do you know how much assistance America and Britain were going to offer us
over five years? 70 million dollars. Do you know who takes the 100 million dollars,
the Company's income, every year? They take them of course.
It is no shame that I may be poor and borrow money to build my country It is
of

'

no shame that I should attempt to get aid for the sake of
shameful that I suck peoples blood and rights

my

country But,

it

is

1

We

shall

Suez Canal
is

not repeat the past We shall eradicate it by restoring our rights in the
This money is ours This Canal is the property of Egypt because it

an Egyptian Joint Stock

Company

The Canal was dug by Egypt's sons and 120,000 of them died while working. The
Suez Canal Company in Paris is an imposter company It usurped our concessions.
When De Lesseps came over to Egypt, his arrival was the same as Black who
came to Egypt to talk with me. The same action.
But history will never repeat itself On the contrary, we shall build the High
Dam We shall restore our usurped rights We shall build the High Dam as we
want it. We are determined to do it. 35 million pounds the company gets every
comyear; let Egypt take it. 100 million dollars are collected every year by the
pany which collects them for the benefit of Egypt Let it be so, and Egypt will
100 million dollars for the benefit of Egypt.
Thus, today, citizens, when we build the High Dam, we are actually building
the dam to defend our dignity, freedom, and pride, and to eradicate humiliation
collect the

and submission.
the whole of

Egypt
be like

Egypt

one national front

drop of
Salah Mustafa and Mustafa Hafez We

announces that

it

will fight to the last

its

one unified and solid front
blood.

Everyone of

shall all fight to the last

its

sons will

drop of our

blood for building our country, for the sake of Egypt. We shall not let war
mongers, imperialists or those who trade in human beings dominate us. We shall
depend on our hands and on our blood We are rich, but we were careless We shall
restore these rights.

step

We

The

battle continues

shall realize everything.

We

We

shall restore these rights step

shall build a strong

by
and dignified Egypt, the

Arab Egypt.
Therefore, I have signed today the following law which has been approved
[reads text of decree Doc. 18]

the Cabinet

by

:

Citizens,

or exploiters dominate us. We shall not let history
have gone forward to build a strong Egypt. We go
forward towards political and economic independence. We go forward towards national economy for the sake of the whole people. We go forward to work. But,

We

shall

not

let imperialists

repeat itself once more.

We
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whenever we look behind, we do so to destroy the traces of the past, the traces of
and domination.
Today, citizens, rights have been restored to their owners. Our right in the Suez
Canal have been restored to us after 100 years

slavery, exploitation

Today, we actually achieve true sovereignty, true dignity and true pride The
Suez Canal Company was a state within a state It was an Egyptian Joint Stock

Company, relying on imperialism and its stooges.
The Suez Canal was built for the sake of Egypt and

for

its

benefit

But

is

was a

source of exploitation and the draining of wealth
As I said a short while ago, it is no shame to be poor and to work for the building of my country. But it is shameful to suck blood They used to suck our blood,

our rights and take them.

Today, when we regain our rights, I say in the name of the people of Egypt
we shall defend these rights and shall hold fast We shall sacrifice our lives and

that

We shall make up for the past.
Today, when we build the edifice of our dignity, freedom and pride, we feel
that it will not be completely sound until we eradicate domination, humiliation and
submission The Suez Canal constituted an edifice of humiliation.
Today, citizens, the Suez Canal Company has been nationalized This order has
our blood in defending them.

been published in the Official Journal. It has become a matter of fact.
Citizens, today we say our wealth has been restored to us
Citizens. Today, the Suez Canal income is estimated at 35 million pounds or 100
million dollars per

annum

or 500 million dollars in five years.

We

shall not seek

the 70 million dollar American aid.

Today, fellow-countrymen, by our sweat, our tears, the souls of our martyrs and
who died in 1856, a hundred years ago during the corvee, we
are able to develop this country We shall work, produce and step up production
despite all these intrigues and these talks. Whenever I hear talk from Washington,
the skulls of those

I shall say,

"Die of your fury

"

We shall build up industry in Egypt and compete with them They do not want
us to become an industrial country so that they can promote the sale of their
towards
products and market them in Egypt I never saw any American aid directed
industrialization as this would cause us to compete with them. American aid is
everywhere directed towards exploitation

On entering upon the fifth anniversary of the Revolution, as I said at the beginfaithful than during the
ning of my speech, we feel stronger, more resolute and
former years

was

expelled
On embarking upon the fifth year of the Revolution, as Farouk
on July 26, 1952, the Suez Canal Company will depart on the very same day. We
are conscious of accomplishing glories and achieving true dignity. Sovereignty in

Egypt

will belong only to

her sons.

one nation confident in itself, its motheritself in work and in the sacred march
on
nation
one
land and its power,
relying
a solid
one nation
towards construction, industrialization and creation
and
resist
and
agents of imbloc to hold out treason and aggression
imperialism

We

shall

march forward united

.

.

.

perialism.

In

this

manner, we

shall

accomplish

much and

feel dignity

and pride and

feel
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We build what we want
we are building up our country to suit ourselves
and do what we want with nobody to account to
When we obtain our usurped and stolen rights, we shall turn towards strength. We
shall become stronger each year, and, God willing, next year we shall become more
powerful with increased production, work and factories
that

.

.

.

while I am speaking to you, fellow countrymen, brothers of yours are takover the administration and the management of the Canal Company, the
Egyptian Canal Company not the foreign Canal Company They are taking over

Now,

ing

the Canal

Company and

the Canal which

its

facilities for the direction of

navigation in the Canal,

situated in the territory of Egypt, cuts through the territory of
now perform this task to
Egypt, is a part of Egypt and belongs to Egypt.
compensate for the past and build up new edifices for pride and dignity.
is

We

May God

guide you and peace be with you.
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The
bound
of

objective of the security measures which the Israel defense forces have felt
to take in the Sinai Peninsula is the exercise of our country's inherent right

self-defense.

The

object

of

these

to eliminate the Egyptian
under the special care and
territory for the purposes of murder,

operations

Fedayeen bases from which armed Egyptian

is

units,

authority of Colonel Nasser, invade Israel's
sabotage and the creation of permanent insecurity to peaceful life. World opinion
is naturally asking itself what these Fedayeen units are; what their activities imply
for Israel's security, whether their actions in the past and their plans for the future
are really full of peril for Israel; and whether this peril is so acute that Israel
reasonably regard its elimination a primary condition of its security and indeed

may
of

its

existence

The Government

of Israel

is

the representative of a people endowed with a
are not unaware of the limitations
facts

mature understanding of international

We

We

of our strength.
fully understand how certain measures might at first sight evoke
a lack of comprehension, even in friendly minds. Being a democracy, we work under
the natural restraints of a public opinion which might compel us to weigh drastic

choices with care and without undue precipitation. It is therefore a Government
which governs its actions by a single exclusive aim to insure life and security and

opportunities for self-development for the people whom it represents while also
safeguarding the honor and trust of millions linked to it by the strongest ties of
a
fraternity. In recent days and months the Government of Israel has had to face

Do its obligations under the United Nations Charter require
us to resign ourselves to the existence of uninterrupted activity to the South and
North and East of our country, of armed units practising open warfare against us
and working from their bases in the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere for the maintormenting question:

tenance of carefully regulated invasions of our home, our lands and our very lives?
On the other hand, are we acting with an inherent right of self-defense when, having
found no other remedy for over two years, we cross the frontier against those who
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have no scruple or hesitation in crossing the frontier against us? Members of the
Security Council may be in a better position to evaluate this choice and to identify
themselves with this situation if they hear something about the Fedayeen movement, of its place in the total pattern of Egyptian belligerency, of its extension
under Egyptian direction, to other Arab countries falling under Nasser's sway, and
of what would happen if we made no attempt at this time to resist that movement
in its drive

towards

The system
Nasser's mind

total conflict.

war against Israel by Fedayeen is the product of Colonel
one of his contributions to the international life and morality

of waging
It

is

of our times. After intensive preparations during the Spring and Summer of 1955,
this new weapon was launched in August of that year, breaking a period of relative
tranquillity on the Egyptian front, and indeed coming at a time when Egypt and
Israel were engaged in hopeful negotiations with the United Nations Chief of Staff,
looking towards integral implementation of the 1949 Armistice Agreement The
Government of Egypt made no secret of these activities or of its responsibility for

them. It might be convenient, to summarize some of the effects of these actions, if
were to tell the Security Council the entire toll of violence and murder inflicted

I

upon Israel by this phase of Egyptian belligerency During the six years during
which this belligerency has operated in violation of the Armistice Agreement, there
have occurred 1,843 cases of armed robbery and theft, 1,339 cases of armed
clashes with Egyptian armed forces, 435 cases of incursions from Egyptian-controlled territory, 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by Egyptian military units and
Fedayeen in Israel As a result of these actions of Egyptian hostility within Israel
364 Israelis were wounded and 101 killed. In 1956 alone, as a result of this aspect
of Egyptian aggression, 28 Israelis were killed and 127 were wounded.

cannot be seriously suggested that these activities are not the direct reGovernment of Egypt In recent months it has become apparent
to us that the Arab Governments, and especially Egypt, have come to
regard the
It

sponsibility of the

Fedayeen weapon as an instrument not for mere harrassment but for Israel's
destruction The Commander-in-Chief himself, Colonel Nasser, defined their mission on

May

28 when he said

The Fedayeen,

men

1

the Palestine army,

which started as a small force of 1,000

today greater in number and in training and equipment. I
believe in the strength, the ability, the loyalty and the
courage of this army.
Its soldiers will be responsible for
taking revenge for their homeland and
last year, is

people.

On June

We

19,

Colonel Nasser declared, in the context of this Fedayeen

are obliged to be strong in order to liberate the entire

Morocco

to

Baghdad and

movement

.

Arab land from

in order to retrieve the rights of Palestine's
people.

Having concerted his military plans with Syria and Saudi Arabia, the Commanderin-Chief of the Egyptian army, General Abdel Hakim Amer,
spoke as follows
:

Now

that the hour is approaching, I, and the members of the
Revolutionary
Council will be in the front line of battle. In this battle our enemies will be
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convinced of their weakness, and the victories will be yours and that of

all

the Arab states.

A little later,
The

the

Israeli

Israel off the

The

same Commander-in-Chief

danger no longer

exists.

said

:

Egypt has enough strength to wipe

map.

Security Council will observe that this was merely the spearhead of Egyptian
was a new device for making war, and for making it with safety.
doctrine was that of unilateral belligerency The Egyptian-Israeli frontier is to

belligerency. It

The

be a one-way street;

it is

to be wide open for these

armed Egyptian

units to pene-

trate as deeply as possible into Israel as they like, to accomplish their mission
then return. It is to be closed in their favor against any defensive response
I

and

have spoken of these penetrations into Israel by armed units under the reand control of Colonel Nasser. No one ever called a session of the

sponsibility

Security Council to condemn these penetrations or to call for their withdrawal, or
to threaten Egypt with the consequences of non-compliance Can Israel be required

which any Arab country which chooses to send
murder its population, to plunder and destroy, should be able to
measure of international apathy?

to reconcile itself with a situation in

units into Israel to

rely

upon a

large

one thing to present resolutions for protecting the Fedayeen against the risks
that they might not be safe in their abode It is a fact that there have never been
It is

any resolutions adopted by the Security Council designed specifically to protect the
Israel civilian population against the encroachments and the depradations of the

Fedayeen units The people of Israel are not able to understand the meaning of this
They do not know why the shelter of the Charter should not be spread
over innocent workers tilling their fields, over women in their homes, over children
in the sacred hour of religious observance who were mowed down and killed by
Fedayeen encroachments, and why this protection should only apply to those who,
across the frontier, organize these penetrations for death and destruction. Would it
distinction

not be a paradox

Middle East, were

if

to

these Fedayeen units, the greatest plague to security in the
become inadvertently, the beneficiaries of international pro-

tection?

In discussing the Suez Canal case on a previous occasion, I referred to this
paradox of unilateral belligerency I ask leave to recall what I said in that context:

At the

root of these tensions lie a theory and practice of belligerency. Egypt
considers and proclaims that there is a state of war. In the name of that state
of war Egypt asserts a right to perform hostile acts of its own choice against
Israel On the other hand, Egypt claims from the United Nations immunity

from any response emanating from Israel This is the doctrine of unilateral
belligerency, and it has no parallel or precedent in the jurisprudence of nations.

The Government of Israel has had ample reason to fear that this activity was to
be renewed on a scale unprecedented even during the first wave of Fedayeen invasions in August 1955, or during its recrudescence in the Spring of 1956. Following
the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in Amman, we had
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stronger reason than ever before to believe that this recrudescence would take place.
duly gave this information to many Governments concerned with the mainte-

We

nance of peace and security in the Middle East The very day after we gave notice
the Fedayeen units began to arrive. Three of these units
entered our territory on Sunday (October 21), two of them being captured, the
of this apprehension,

other retreating to one of their bases in the Sinai Peninsula
From a study of official Arab sources it is quite clear that again there

Here

a refreshing candor about the renewal of this assault.

is

one

was

official

be

to

Arab

broadcast on October 16, 1956, at 1630 hours'

The Fedayeen Headquarters in Gaza has issued a communique stating that a
group of Fedayeen succeeded on October 13 to cross the southern border of
Palestine in order to discover the concentration points and the factories which
the Zionists have started to transfer to the coastal region so as to get them
out of the firing-range of Egyptian guns which threaten to destroy them. The
communique of Fedayeen Headquarters in Gaza states also that all the

Fedayeen returned safely to their bases, except two who are believed to have
been killed in an encounter which took place between them and the guards of
Prime Minister Ben Gurion's home at Sde Boker. Further, it is believed that
two other Fedayeen have been wounded and taken to a hospital in Rehovoth.

The

Fedayeen has not yet returned from

fifth of the

his

mission in occupied

Palestine.

This was a broadcast heard in Damascus, giving the text of the communique
from Fedayeen Headquarters in Gaza.

issued

In these circumstances, both the position and the attitude of the Israel Governclear. The attitude is based on our fundamental concept of reciprocity.

ment are

If the frontier

between Egypt and Israel

Israeli entry, then

it

must protect

is

to protect

as a self-evident truth that the lives of Israeli
less

Egyptian territory against

Israel territory against

worthy of international protection or

men,

Egyptian entry.

women and

less sacrosanct

We

hold

children are not

than the lives of these

main instrument of Nasserism in its assault
upon the peace and the decencies of Middle Eastern life.
Behind these incidents, grave as they are, we discern issues of even greater
moment. World opinion must choose between two candidates for its confidence: on
the one hand, farmers and workers, the men, women and children of Israel; on the
other hand, these fanatic warriors of the Fedayeen groups Behind this confrontation, there stands the broader alignment between Israel and Nasser. A small
people builds its society and culture in its renascent homeland In the early days
of its independence it is set on by the armed might of all its neighbors, who attempt
hired Fedayeen gangs which are the

to

wipe

My

it

off the face of

the earth.

me

that it took something like eight weeks for the Security
Council to secure the withdrawal of Egyptian and other Arab armies from the
sovereign soil of Israel. The effort to secure that withdrawal was, perhaps, not

memory

tells

marked by a

sufficient urgency or zeal. In the following years of the conflict,
neighbors have continued to assault her with warlike acts of their own
choice, to attempt her destruction by armed intervention, by blockade and boycott.

Israel's

They send armed

units into her territory to

murder and plunder. They

strive

by

20
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every means to ensure that nowhere in Israel shall there be tranquillity for peaceful pursuit

blare forth the

They

most violent

accumulate vast armaments for bringing that
did last week from Cairo, that it is they \\ho

and that

the final assault,

it

threats for Israel's destruction
result
will

They

about They announce, as they

choose the time and the place for

for us to wait passively for that selection,

is

proclaim that a state of war with Israel already exists
the world's international waterways and convert

it

They

They

seize the greatest of

into an instrument for unilateral

national pressure, while maintaining a constant violation of international maritime
law.

Across Africa and Asia, wherever Nasserism spreads its baneful influence, it
all peace and progress to establish an ambitious and

works actively to subvert
insatiable

hegemony. Now, having considered that

it

has humbled the international

community and maritime Powers, Nasser's action returns to his first targetIsrael
which is to be swamped from three sides with a new wave of Fedayeen
violence

Accordingly, while studying with attention

all

proposals for strengthening

Middle East, we reject with vehement indignation the charge of
aggression launched against us. There is aggression, there is belligerency in the
Middle East; but we are its victims and not its authors. That is what I mean when
security in the

I say that

world opinion must decide

whom

to trust. Shall

it

be a small, free people

establishing
peace and constructive progress, or shall it be the
which
has
bullied
and blustered and blackmailed its way across the
dictatorship
international life of our times, threatening peace in many continents, openly avowits

homeland

ing belligerency, placing

in

its fist

on the jugular vein of the world's communications,

bringing the Middle East and the \\orld ever nearer to the precipice of conflict;
all except one people, at least, which
all those who stand in its path
be intimidated, one people which no dictator in history has even intimidated, a people which has risen up against all the tyrants of history, a people which
knows that the appeasement of despots yields nothing but an uneasy respite and

intimidating

will not

citizens to be

that a

Government which allowed

would

lose the essential justification for \^hich

its

in their

homes

instituted

among

murdered daily

Governments are

men.
This

is

the background, and these are the issues which have guided

ment's choice.

We

have faced them alone, and we made a decision

to

my

Govern-

invoke for this

not out to conpurpose, and no other, our sovereign right of self-defense. Israel is
in the Sinai wilderbases
the
out
to
determined
but
is
new
wipe
territory,
quer any
ness from which

We

murder and death and destruction are launched against

believe, as

we have always

it.

believed, in our destiny of peace, and for that

we are ready now, but it must be a real peacepeace by agreement, peace without
in short,
boycott or blockade, peace without murdering Fedayeen gangs peace,
within a framework of a reciprocal regard for the ideals and principles of the
United Nations Charter.

.

.

.
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Letter and Statement to the Security Council:

United States

October

30,

1956

UNITED STATES LETTER

The Government

of the United States has received information to the effect that

Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt, the armed forces
have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory. This military action commenced Oct. 29 and is continuing in the Sinai area. This situation makes imperative
an immediate meeting of the Security Council, charged as it is with the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as well as
in violation of the

of Israel

responsibility for the observance of the Armistice Agreement
Government to request to
I have the honor, therefore, in behalf of

my

convene

a meeting of the Security Council as soon as possible to consider "The Palestine
Question Steps for the immediate cessation of the military action of Israel in

Egypt."

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES
The United Nations has requested this urgent meeting of

the Security Council

immediate cessation of military
action by Israel against Egypt The Security Council has been meeting on the
Palestine question within the last few days and repeatedly in recent months to
to consider steps to be taken to bring about the

consider actions which the Council unanimously believed constituted a grave danger,
I am therefore sure that there can be no question about the adoption of the

and

agenda.
I therefore request the president to put to the vote the question of the adoption
of the agenda, which I am certain each member of the Council will consider appropriate in these grave circumstances, and I am sure that the Council will act with
the same unanimity now with which it has acted on the Palestine question in
numerous recent meetings. After the adoption of the agenda, I would appreciate the

opportunity to speak immediately on the substance of the question.
[The agenda was then adopted ]

We

have asked for

this urgent meeting t>f the Security Council to consider the
developments which have occurred and which are unfortunately still continuing in the Sinai Peninsula as the result of Israel's invasion of that area

critical

yesterday
It comes as a shock to the United States Government that this action should
have occurred less than twenty-four hours after President Eisenhower had sent a
second earnest personal appeal to the Prime Minister [David Ben-Gurion] of

Israel urging Israel not to undertake

any action against

its

Arab neighbors, and

21

Letter and Statement to the Security Council: United States

pointing out that

we had no

147

reason to believe that those neighbors had taken any

steps justifying Israel's action of mobilization.

Certain things are clear.

The

first is that,

by

their

own

admission, Israeli armed

moved

forces

into Sinai in force "to eliminate the Egyptian Fedayeen bases in the
"
Sinai Peninsula
They have admitted the capture of Quseima and Ras el Naqb.

Second, reliable reports have placed Israeli armed forces near the Suez Canal
Third, Israel has announced that both the Egyptian and Israeli armed forces were
in action in the desert battle.

An

official

Israeli troops

announcement in Tel Aviv stated that Egyptian fighter planes strafed
We have a report that President [Gamal Abdel] Nasser has called

for full mobilization in

Egypt today and

that the Egyptian

Army

claims that

it

has

halted the advance of major Israeli forces driving across the Sinai Peninsula The
Secretary General [Dag Hammarskjold] may receive more information from

General [E L.
that

we

M. Burns] and

shall continue to

the Truce Supervision Organization, and I

am

sure

be fully informed as we proceed with our deliberations

here.

These events make the necessity for the urgent consideration of this item all too
plain Failure by the Council to react at this time would be a clear avoidance of its
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The United
Nations has a clear and unchallengeable responsibility for the maintenance of the
Armistice Agreements.

The Government

of the United States feels that

it is

imperative that the Council

act in the promptest manner to determine that a breach of the peace has occurred,
to order that the military actions undertaken by Israel cease immediately, and to

make

clear its view that the Israeli armed forces should be immediately withdrawn
behind the established armistice lines Nothing else will suffice.
It is also to be noted that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [General Burns] has already issued a cease-fire order on his

own

authority which Israel has so far ignored. Information has reached us also that
of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization have

military observers

been prevented by

Israeli authorities

from performing

their duties

upon all members of the
United Nations to render prompt assistance in achieving a withdrawal of Israeli
forces Ail members, specifically, should refrain from giving any assistance which
might continue or prolong the hostilities. No one, certainly, should take advantage
cf this situation for any selfish interest Each of us here, and every member of the
United Nations, has a clear-cut responsibility to see that the peace and stability

We,

as

members

of the Council, accordingly should call

of the Palestine area

is

restored forthwith. Anything less

is

an invitation to disaster

in this part of the world.

an immediate responsibility which derives from the Council's obligations
orders and the Armistice Agreements between the Israelis and
the Arab states endorsed by this Security Council It derives, also, of course, from
the larger responsibility under the United Nations Charter
This

under

is

its cease-fire

On behalf of the United States Government, I give notice that I intend at the
afternoon meeting to introduce a draft resolution whereby the Council will call
upon Israel to withdraw and will indicate such steps as will assure that it does.
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I should like at the outset to associate myself with the expression of regard for the
Secretary General which have been voiced by various members of the Council
have the highest regard for the integrity and imparliality of Mr Hammarskjold

We

As members
it

of the Council will be a^are, since our meeting yesterday evening
has been announced that the Egyptian Government regrettably has rejected the

communication from Her Majesty's Government and from the French Government
dated 30 October, and as a consequence Her Majesty's Government and the French
Government have intervened in accordance v.ith that communication
I should like to say at once that I have informed myself on the true nature of
the press and agency reports which have been quoted around this table in regard
to military operations I am authorized to say that the action which is being taken
is

strictly limited to military targets, primarily air-fields,

tion

to

the

fact that

and I would draw atten-

the civilian population was warned to keep clear of such

targets before the operations started.

This intervention, as I hope to show in the course of my remarks, has as its
overriding purposes the safeguarding of the Suez Canal and the restoration of
peaceful conditions in the Middle East
It is

one facet of a highly complex and dangerous situation and

it

cannot there-

fore be considered, as the Egyptian representative in his letter contained in

ment S/3712

Docu-

and isolated development
I do not, of course, for one moment accept the implications and insinuations in
that letter. But in so far as this matter relates to an aspect, and a troubling aspect,
invites us to do, as a separate

of the general situation, naturally I

am

ready to discuss

it.

The

Soviet representative told us yesterday, and he has repeated it again today,
that this intervention was part of a long-prepared plot hatched by the British,

French and

Israeli Governments, designed to stir up trouble in the Middle East in
order to restore old colonial empires, or words to that effect.
I think nobody will take this very seriously. I think we can all understand why

the representative of the Soviet Union would wish to invent such stories in view of
his own country's troubles in East Europe.
I need only make this simple point It is common knowledge that over the past
few months our relations with Israel have been very difficult and even strained. And
why? Because of the strenuous efforts made by Her Majesty's Government to reduce the tensions around its borders.

Indeed, my colleagues will recollect that it v\as only a few days ago that the
representative of Israel had some sharp words to say about the sympathy I had
expressed for Jordan

We

have also heard the argument

that, since the

Government of

Israel has agreed

From Address
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keep its troops ten miles away from the Suez Canal, no threat to the canal now
and the Anglo-French intervention is no longer justified
But I must point out that the Israel Government accepted the terms of the
communications of the United Kingdom and French Governments on the assumption that the Egyptian response would be positive. But, as we know, the Egyptian
response was unfortunately negative.
to

exists

From all the information at our disposal, and we can claim, I think, to be
reasonably well informed about affairs in the Middle East, we judged that the
danger of a major clash between Israel and its Arab neighbors had become more
imminent than

at any time since the signing of the armistice agreements.
not, of course, in a position to reveal the full evidence, and I must ask
colleagues to accept that this judgment was well founded It was in the light of this

I

am

my

weighty judgment that Her Majesty's Government and the French Government took
the grave decision that their immediate intervention was required to safeguard the
Suez Canal and prevent a disastrous conflagration which might spread.

Whether

or not our intervention will extinguish the conflict

as

it

is

intended to

not dependent on us alone. It depends very much on the understanding support of those members of the international community who are also concerned to
see peace and order restored in the Middle East.

do,

of

is

As there has regrettably been a
Her Majesty's Government and

considerable misunderstanding of the policies
the French

Government

in this matter,

may

I

once again formulate what are the objectives behind our intervention. They are, in
the first place, to stop all warlike action on land, sea and air as soon as possible
;

secondly, to enforce a separation of the belligerents; and thirdly, to protect the
Suez Canal for the free passage of ships of all nations.
Any prolonged fighting along the banks of the [Suez] Canal would seriously

endanger the lives and shipping of many nations of the world. Great Britain and
France are the main users of this canal, and our vital interests would be endangered
if

free passage

I need not go far back into the past, but I should
circumstances in which the canal was seized were circum-

were interrupted

like to recall that the

stances in which violence and resort to illegal methods were employed.
have a right to defend these vital interests, and we believe, moreover, that in

We

we are also defending the interests of all nations, and there are many,
whose economies depend on this great international right-of-way.
But although we have acted to protect our vital interests and those of other
nations in this international waterway, our other purpose, as I have made abundantly clear, has been, and remains, to prevent an armed clash between Israel and
so doing

Egypt leading to a general conflagration.
Our intervention is a temporary measure which we were obliged to take in the
absence of any effective collective machinery for restoring peace and order in a
matter of such extreme emergency.
Moreover, it is our firm intention to insure that the Israel forces now in the
neighborhood of the canal should be withdrawn as soon as possible from Egyptian
territory.

Let

me

state also with emphasis that

we do not and could not condone any

Israel

action aimed at the occupation of positions in Egyptian territory. Let there be no
misunderstanding about this. It is our view that Israel should withdraw its forces

from

their present positions as soon as this can

be satisfactorily arranged. As I
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hesitation in regarding Israel's incursion across the

Egyptian border as a violation of the armistice agreement
In the misleading version of events contained in the letter from the delegation
of Egypt now before us, and in the statement made this afternoon by the representative of Egypt, my Government and the French Government are accused of
committing an act of aggression
This is a very serious charge to make

in the Security Council,

bearing in mind

We

strongly deny such charges and
the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter
do not think it will be profitable for the Council to discuss them What does constitute and what does not constitute an act of aggression is, as we all know, a

matter of debate

But the matter
for the

\\hich the Council should consider today and on

Council's understanding support

which we ask

temporary intervention by the two
restore peace and order effectively and
is

a

are in a position to
threatens us. Our
speedily in an area of the world where a major conflagration
intervention is not aimed at the sovereignty of Egypt, still less at the territorial

Governments that

integrity of

Egypt

Address to the Security Council
Louis de Guiringaud

October 31, 1956

I shall now speak as representative of France It is with regret that the French
delegation found itself compelled last night to oppose the adoption of the draft
resolutions submitted to the Council, If we did this, it was because we thought

that in the present

case the Council could not only confine itself merely to the

consideration of only one aspect of the problem, and that in our view it
necessary for us to take account of all the elements involved in the situation.

was

The French Government considered that the tension in the Middle East had
become gradually so serious that it ^as no longer possible not to view the situation
in every aspect and to act accordingly
were confronted with an attack carried out by Israel forces in the Suez
Canal Zone and in the direction of the Canal. We had every reason to believe that

as a

whole and

We

the military developments might go so far as to hinder free transit through the
canal The latest news received from Egypt, which referred to the positions of the

show how well founded our apprehensions were.
Experience has also taught us that, whatever the moral weight of the Council's
decisions, unfortunately, in that part of the world, they had little practical effect,
as the United Kingdom representative pointed out yesterday, for lack of force to
Israel troops,

implement them.
The French and British Governments considered, therefore, that a serious threat
existed against the Suez Canal and that if rapid, effective and decisive action were
not undertaken immediately, we were running the risk of seriously jeopardizing
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through the Canal for an indefinite period of time. Now, free navigation
through the Suez Canal is of vital importance to most countries of the world.
The French and British Governments considered it their duty to take all necessary measures, even if these measures would be misunderstood at first by some of

traffic

7

their friends, in order to guarantee

and prevent any impairment of freedom of
navigation through the Canal The French Government considered that the attack
carried out by the Israel forces was only an episode in the permanent state of
hostilities which exists between Egypt and the state of Israel It seemed to us
that the time had come to take measures likely to prevent any repetition of these
incidents.

These are the reasons underlying the action taken by the French Government in
In our view, this action is designed to assure an immediate
settlement of the current incidents and to make it possible to find a solution very
quickly which would be likely to eliminate the threats to the Canal
The French Government would stress the temporary nature of the presence of its
troops in the Canal Zone and would stress also the fact that it in no way intends
the Suez Canal area

7

to infringe

upon Egyptian sovereignty
Like the United Kingdom Government, the French Government cannot accept
the accusations that it has acted counter to the principles of the Charter The deci-

was taken only with the desire to insure as effectively as possible the restoration
Zone before it was too late
In these circumstances the French Government is convinced that the purposes
which it pursues are the same as those of the majority of members of the Council
which we wish to reach, and we ask them to understand the motives which inspired
it and to assist it in carrying out the action which, in agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom, the French Government has undertaken in the intersion

of order in the Canal

ests of the international

community.

Address to the Security Council:
Arkady A. Sobolev

October 31, 1956

May I begin by stating that the Soviet delegation trusts the Secretary General of
the United Nations and supports him.
The situation in the Near East has grown sharply worse since yesterday's meeting
of the Security Council. According to information just received, an invasion has
begun an invasion of joint United Kingdom French troops in Egypt. Thus the
Governments of the United Kingdom and France, from the threat of armed intervention in the Near East, have proceeded to the implementation of their proclaimed
plan of occupation of the Suez Canal Zone

The
ment

Soviet delegation expresses

of

Egypt confronted with

its

deep sympathy with the people and GovernWe have no doubt that the people

a severe ordeal
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many trials, in this difficult hour as well will be
freedom against any attacks from without.
and
independence
The acts of the United Kingdom and France, which have committed aggression
of their obligations assumed under the
against Egypt, constitute a crude violation
United Nations Charter. The Charter requires members of the United Nations to
of Egypt, which has gone through

able to defend

its

refrain from the threat of the use of force or the use of force in their relations with
other states. France and the United Kingdom, in their acts against Egypt, not only
threatened to use force but, at the present time, are carrying out aerial bombardments of Egyptian towns and landing their armed forces on the territory of

Egypt, a member of the United Nations. That
Nations Charter they are using force

is

to say, in violation of the

United

The responsibility of the Governments of the United Kingdom and France for
the extremely dangerous situation created by their acts in the Near East is aggravated by the fact that they did not allow the Security Council to carry out its
functions in connection with the maintenance of international peace as defined

by

the Charter.

The Governments

of the United

Kingdom and France have assumed

the heavy

responsibility for a serious aggravation of the international situation, committing
armed intervention against Egypt at a time when Egypt was repelling Israel agIsrael aggression and
gression. Attention has already been called to the fact that

the aggression of the United Kingdom and France against Egypt is being carried
out according to a single plan prepared in advance. The Israel aggression was
calculated to create conditions facilitating the seizure by United Kingdom and

French forces of the Suez Canal.
The Governments of the United Kingdom and France are attempting to justify
their acts by the statement that they are taking the Suez Canal under their protection and insuring freedom of transit through the canal.

that this artificial justification

the United

is

Kingdom and France

designed only to cover

it is quite clear
the aggressive acts of

However,

up

against Egypt.

Indeed, on the one hand, Israel aggression is instigated against Egypt and, on
the other hand, the United Kingdom and France are striking a blow against the
victim of that aggression, which is Egypt
If the United Kingdom and France really wanted a just settlement of the Suez
question, they have at their disposal other, peaceful ways and means. As is known,
the Security Council in the past considered the question of the Suez Canal and

prepared a plan for the settlement of the Suez question by peaceful means.
Under that plan, it would have been possible to secure a settlement of the Suez
question which would have

corresponded both to the national interests of the

sovereign Egyptian state and to the interests of the users of the canal
However, such a method was not to the liking of the United Kingdom and

France. They preferred a forcible solution of this question, and precisely for that
purpose they utilized Israel aggression against the Egyptian state.

The representatives of the United Kingdom and France here attempted to
justify the aggressive acts by stating that the United Kingdom and France were
attempting to put an end to combat and restore peace and quiet in the area. However, the behavior of the United Kingdom and France testifies to the contrary.
At the moment when the Security Council was considering the question of Israel
aggression against Egypt and was attempting to find ways and means to reach a
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peaceful settlement of the conflict, the United Kingdom and France bypassing
the Security Council and violating the standards of international law and the prin-

United Nations issued a crude ultimatum
This ultimatum, incompatible with the dignity of a sovereign state, had the
purpose of serving as a pretext for the seizure of the Suez Canal by United
Kingdom and French troops. In that ultimatum the United Kingdom and France
ciples of the

that Egypt withdraw Egyptian troops ten miles from the Suez Canal.
In issuing such an ultimatum, the United Kingdom and France are, on the one
hand, attempting to force Egypt to hand over to the Israel troops territory to the

demanded

east

in violation of
of the Suez Canal and, on the other hand, demanding
that Egypt give up its protection of the Suez Canal

all

agreements

Thus the United Kingdom and France are acting like colonialists used to dictatthis
ing their will to the peoples of the past. But the time of the domination of
area by colonialists has long since passed. This action can only cause regret on the
part of

The

all peace-loving peoples in the world.
action of the United Kingdom and French

violation of the United Nations Charter

Governments constitute a crude
and of the dignity and sovereign rights of

the Egyptian state. It constitutes a denial of the inalienable right of peoples to

independence and freedom.
The Security Council cannot remain idle in the face of such a complicated
situation. It must adopt immediate measures to put an end to the aggression
of the world.
against the Egyptian state and to restore peace and calm to that area
in the Near East, the Soviet Union delegation connecessary for the Security Council to condemn the aggressive acts of the
United Kingdom and France, acts which have taken the form of bombing populated Egyptian territory and landing United Kingdom and French forces in Egypt.
think that the Security Council should request the Governments of the

Concerned by the situation

siders

it

We

United Kingdom and France immediately to withdraw their armed forces from
is prepared to submit
Egyptian territory. If necessary, the Soviet Union delegation
an appropriate draft resolution to the Security Council.
The Security Council, which bears the main responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security, cannot remain aloof; it must fulfill its direct
and immediate responsibility. The peoples all over the world are waiting for the
Security Council's decision.

Address to the Security Council:
Nasroilah Entezam

November

1,

1956

The only excuse they [Britain and France] had found for their act was a referin the
ence to the threats existing at present in the Middle East, and in particular
Suez Canal area.

But where did those threats come from?

If

it

was Egypt that had created a
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menacing

situation, then, sir,

may

I ask,

why
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did not your countries

the Security Council and explain their case and seek a solution?
Then it would have been for Egypt to find an excuse to explain

it

why

she had

held in respect of the situation and justify the
had undertaken. However, I believe that an excuse of that kind, coming

sent troops and state the views

action

come before

it

from those who had themselves sent troops, is completely unjustified.
The second excuse that might have been invoked was that a threatening situation
existed in the canal zone because of the aggressive action undertaken by one state.
In that case, what did your countries do to stop that aggression? Your countries,

instead of
opposed the draft resolution that was submitted yesterday. Today,
victim of that aggression How could
punishing aggression, you have attacked the
it be possible for your countries to find some excuse before world opinion?
of these issues in accordance
delegation stands for a peaceful settlement
sir,

My

with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, avoiding all armed intervention and respecting the sovereignty of states None of that has been done No
heed has been paid to those principles The council must not simply listen to
speeches,
attack

but must find practical means to bring an end to this unwarranted

Address to the General Assembly:

Omar

Loutfi

November

1,

1956

Mr. President:
I sincerely

favor of the

thank the members of the Security Council who yesterday voted
draft

resolution

in

representative of
states which were kind enough to advise the

presented by

the

distinguished

Yugoslavia and likewise the member
Secretary General that they supported that resolution and

who today voted

in favor

of the inclusion of this matter in the agenda.

They have given me
world forum

the opportunity to address the General

in the cruel ordeal

through which

my

country

is

are fully alive to the question, I am sure, gentlemen
I told the Security Council, this is not the time for oration

You

subjected to bloody aggression.
of aggression

is

The shedding

passing.
I shall be brief.

My

of blood which

Assembly

this

now

is

As

country has been
the consequence

proceeding apace.

During the night of Oct 30 Israel committed the most heinous unprovoked
armed aggression since the conclusion of the armistice agreement. This was no
mere reprisal raid It was a premeditated, carefully prepared, armed attack whose
purpose it is to occupy part of Egyptian territory so as to provoke war in this part
of the world

During the day of Oct. 30, 1956, a note from the United Kingdom Government
was handed to the Egyptian Ambassador in London. An ultimatum was served
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upon the Egyptian Government, asking it to cease all hostilities on land, at sea
and in the air, to withdraw all Egyptian armed forces ten miles from the Suez
Canal, to accept the occupation of part of Egyptian territory by French and
armed forces, especially the towns of Ismailia, Port Said and Suez.

British

The ultimatum required an answer before 6:30 Cairo time, October 31, in the
absence of which the Governments of the United Kingdom and France would intervene to the extent which they would judge necessary
of their demands.

in order to obtain satisfaction

Since that time, Anglo-French aviation based on Cyprus against the will of the
inhabitants of that island have bombarded Egypt A number of raids took place
yesterday, especially against the city of Cairo According to information at my
disposal the three raids carried out yesterday by British and French jet bombers at
7

o'clock, 8:25

and 10.25 covered the mosque, the Almaza

Cairo airfields and a number of points near Shubra. Nine

hospital, a

human

lives

number

were

of

lost.

Throughout last night British and French bombers carried out continuous raids
all Egyptian airfields. French aviation joined with Israeli aircraft in air attacks
against Egyptian positions in the Sinai Peninsula. Today twenty-one air raids took
place over Egypt, of which nine were in Cairo and the remainder in Ismailia, Port
Said and Suez. Installations at Alexandria were destroyed and the number of
victims there is not yet known.
Moreover, the Commander-in-Chief of the French-British forces attacking Egypt
declared today in Nicosia, Cyprus and I apologize for quoting him in English
over

"the bombing will continue until Egypt sees reason. The length of the operation
depends on how quickly Egypt accepts our terms. The sooner Egypt sees reason
"
the less damage will accrue. We have considerable strength to deal blows

This cynical communique calls for no further comment.
President, Egypt has been subject to combined aggression
premeditated
by Israel, the United Kingdom and France. It is now abundantly
aggression

Mr.

war to justify
armed aggression which they have committed. The Governments of the United

clear that the aggressors agreed in advance to perpetrate this act of

the

Kingdom and France have presented motives which

I

find

it

difficult

fairly to

describe.
Sir Pierson Dixon said yesterday that he regretted that Egypt had regretted
the Anglo-French ultimatum. I am astonished to hear the representative of the

United Kingdom say that he expected for one moment that Egypt would accept
an ultimatum which asked for the landing against Egypt of Anglo-British forces
under conditions where Egypt had been subjected to aggression.
The representative of the United Kingdom said this was designed first of all
to safeguard the Suez Canal and restore peaceful conditions in the Middle East.
Now, no danger threatened the Suez Canal prior to the Franco-British intervention. According to our information the aggressors' aircraft sank an Egyptian
warship in the canal This act of war committed by Israel, France and the United
Kingdom in the region of the canal is a violation of the Charter of the United
Nations and on the other hand

it

violates the Constantinople Convention of 1888

all
principle of free passage even in time of war, which is guaranteed to
states under the provisions of Article 4 of the Constantinople Convention.
Moreover, who gave the United Kingdom and France the right to Intervene in

and the
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order to safeguard the canal? The 1888 Convention confers upon Egypt alone the
right to take measures for the defense of the canal.

Was there a decision of the United Nations, a decision of the Security Council,
which conferred upon the United Kingdom and France the right to resort to
force in order, as they allege, to safeguard the canal and insure the freedom of
passage and

Many

traffic

through the canal?

other states use the canal

No

one for a

moment thought

of using force or

joining the Franco-British forces in order to occupy the canal area.
What renders the situation even more bizarre, as stressed by the distinguished
representative of Yugoslavia, at the meeting of the Security Council held in the

afternoon of Oct. 30 of this year

and

I

quote

"is that this threat of force is

instance against the country which is the victim of aggression.
Egypt is enjoined to forswear its right of legitimate defense under Article 51 of
the charter and Egypt is asked to acquiesce to the occupation of a part of its terri-

directed in the

first

tory by two foreign powers and a time limit is set 'in the worst tradition of the
"
policy of ultimatums which we hoped was an obsolete one
Moreover, Mr. President, the representative of the United Kingdom claimed
that one of the objectives of the Franco-British intervention is to put an end as
early as possible to any warlike acts on land, at sea and in the air If this were

the genuine objective of Franco-British intervention, why is it that the representatives of these two countries exerted the veto right against two resolutions

which specifically called for a cessation of hostilities for a cease-fire?
Another point which struck my delegation was an argument by France and the
United Kingdom representatives that this was a mere temporary measure. Occupation was a mere temporary measure But history has taught us that the phrase
"temporary measure" used by their delegates used by the representatives of the
United Kingdom is far removed from the ordinary sense of these words.

The occupation of Egypt in 1882 was, according to British leaders at the time,
a mere temporary measure It happens to have lasted seventy-four years.
But the ill-faith of the aggressors needs hardly be proved further. It is obvious
m

and the United Kingdom, which are trying to
by their own means and in a unilateral manner a question which was before
the United Nations, constitutes a most flagrant violation of the United Nations
Charter which was utterly unjustified.
We thought that the United Nations Charter had put an end to the reign of
force and that the epoch of ultimatums and dictates, which brings to mind sad
memories, had come to an end when the United Nations Charter was signed in San
that the aggressive acts of France

settle

A resort to force now can only take place in accordance with the prinand provisions of the charter.
France and the United Kingdom, which violated the charter, have assumed a
heavy onus of responsibility before the world This act is fraught with incalculable
repercussions of which France and the United Kingdom will bear the consequences.
Francisco.
ciples

being invaded. Its sovereignty is being jeopardized. But one thing comis the response to this act of aggression on the
part of world public
the United States of
opinion. Two prominent members of the Security Council

Egypt

is

forts us. This

America and the Soviet Union

condemn this resort to force by France and the
United Kingdom.
President Eisenhower and the Soviet leaders clearly declared that they were
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Amongst them

Numerous

other

the head of the Yugoslav

Marshal Tito, as well as the Prime Minister of India, Mr Xehru,
would wish to quote their statements and many others bu. I leave this

state,
I

for the

distinguished representatives' of the states themselves.
Even in the United Kingdom, members of the opposition party, the Labor party,
strongly and vigorously condemn the policy of the British Government. Mr.
Gaitskell, the leader of the opposition, stated in a speech yesterday in the House

of

k

Commons, and

in the
folly,

He

I shall quote him: 'All I can
say is that in taking this decision,
view of the Opposition, the Government have committed an act of disastrous
whose tragic consequences we shall regret for years "
went on to say, "I can only say that any impartial observer must recognize

"
is a clear breach of the Charter of the United Nations
And he went on
to say that "there are millions and millions of British people
as we believe, a
majority of the nation who are deeply shocked by the aggressive policy of the

that this

Government and who still believe that it is both wise and right that we should
stand by the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the United States alliance."
The implications which are drawn from this are these that even in the United

Kingdom public opinion
present government.

is

far

from being

at one in approving the policy of the

Mr. President, as I had the honor to tell the Security Council, the Egyptian
Government, pending necessary measures by the Security Council and the General
Assembly, has no choice but to defend itself and to preserve its rights against this
armed unprovoked aggression. And we persevere in that attitude.
This act of war, committed by two members of the Security Council, constitutes
a heavy blow to the United Nations Organization, to world peace and to all of
mankind. France and the United Kingdom, in exerting their veto rights against
resolutions

moved

in the Security Council, stultified the council's action.

Under the circumstances,

the following the adoption of the Yugoslav resolution

by the Security Council and in accordance with the provisions of the resolution
uniting for peace, it is up to you gentlemen to take the necessary measures in order
to prevent and remove threats to peace and to put an end to acts of aggression
and breaches of the peace.
It is incumbent on you gentlemen

to take grave decisions fraught with heavy
consequences for the destiny of our organization and for the principles which
govern the world in which we live.
Egypt is defending herself and will continue to do so. The question is in your
hands. Condemn the aggressors, gentlemen, put an end to aggression.
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Statement by Nine Arab Leaders

November

IS,

1956

Following an invitation of His Majesty, King Hussein, King of the Hashemite
of Jordan, a meeting was held in Beirut on the 10th and llth day of

Kingdom

Rabi'al-Thann, 1376, of the Hegira [November 13 and 14, 1956], by His Majesty,
King Saud Ibn Abdel Aziz, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; His Excellency,
Abdel Fattah Mohammed el-Mughrabi, President of the Sovereignty Council in
the Sudan; His Excellency, Shukri al-Kuwatly, President of the Republic of Syria,
His Majesty, King Faisal, King of the Kingdom of Iraq, His Excellency, Camille
Chamoun, President of the Republic of the Lebanon, His Excellency, Mustafa
ben Halim, Premier of Libya on behalf of the King; His Excellency, Abdel Hamid

Ghalib, Egyptian

Ambassador

in Beirut,

on behalf of the President of the Republic

of Egypt; His Highness, Emir Saif ul-Islam Mohammed al-Badr,
the Kingdom of Yemen, on behalf of the King.

Crown Prince

of

The meeting was held to discuss the position arising from an aggression that had
been carried out by Britain, France and Israel against Egypt and the Gaza Strip
and also to reach an accord on what should be done to support Egypt in her
glorious .defense of the safety of her territories and sovereignty
The consideration of the fact that this aggression against Egypt

aggression directed against

and

efforts to safeguard joint

Arab states necessitates the unity
Arab interests.

all

is

held to be an

of sovereignty

The

participants have expressed their satisfaction with the measures taken by
the General Assembly of the United Nations by virtue of resolutions adopted by an

overwhelming majority, Nov. 2, 3 and 7, 1956
They have appreciated the effort made by the peace-loving states that contributed to the adoption of the resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities and
an immediate withdrawal of the aggressive forces from the Egyptian territories
and their return to behind the armistice lines

The

following has been unanimously agreed

1

The need

for the implementation of the previously mentioned resolution of the
United Nations should Britain and France refuse to comply with the United Nations

resolutions

and

fail

to

withdraw immediately and unconditionally from the Egyp-

tian territories

Moreover, should Israel oppose the United Nations resolutions, and fail to withdraw unconditionally her forces to behind the armistice line, and should the attitude of either Britain, France or Israel cause a conspiracy likely to lead to the
hostilities, Britain, France and Israel should be regarded as collec-

resumption of

tively responsible for collaborating to continue the aggression.
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the states represented at the conference shall act immediately
and in legal self-defense, in accordance with Article 41 of the

United Nations Charter, as well as take effective steps permissible by the utmost
capacity in compliance with their commitments under Article 2 of the Arab
collective defense agreement.

2

To

insure the separation of the Suez Canal question from the circumstances that
accompanied the attack on Egypt; to regard this question as being independent
and on its own and to promote a solution that would comply with the requisites of

Egypt's sovereignty and dignity, namely within the framework of the United
Nations, and in negotiations that shall be held with the parties concerned, away

from any display of pressure and prejudice and on the basis of the 188S Convenand the six points laid down by the United Nations on Oct. 16, 1956.

tion

3

To
tion

support the demands of the Algerian people in their struggle until the realizaof their nationalist aspirations for the attainment of independence and

sovereignty

The participants of this conference address true fraternal greetings, their appreciation and admiration to His Excellency, the President of the Republic of
Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, as well as to the Egyptian armed forces and the
people of Egypt for their patriotism and limitless self-sacrifice in the defense of

Arab nationalism, the dignity and pride

of the

Arab people.

Address to the Lok Safoha:
Jawaharlal Nehru

November

On
made

16, 1956

the 13th September 1956, the last day of the last session of the Lok Sabha, I
House about the developments relating to the Suez Canal

a statement in the

issue Previous to that, on the Sth August, I had given to the House an account
of the developments which followed the action of the Egyptian Government in
nationalizing the Suez Canal Company.

Over two months have passed

since

my

last

statement on this subject in the

Lok Sabba, and much has happened which has been reported in the public press
and must be within the knowledge of hon Members The matter was taken up by
the Security Council, and there was broad approval of certain basic principles which
should govern any agreement in regard to the Suez Canal. It was proposed that

the chief parties to the dispute, namely, Egypt, the United Kingdom and France,
should meet soon after to discuss this subject further on the basis of those
principles.

That meeting did not take

place. Instead, on the 29th October, Israel launched
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sudden and premeditated attack on Egypt and large concentrations of Israeli
made deep penetrations into Egyptian territory. The next day, the Governments of the United Kingdom and France sent an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel
to the effect that if they did not stop fighting and withdraw their forces to ten

a

troops

miles on either side of the Suez Canal, British and French forces would intervene
to stop the fighting The ultimatum expired on the morning of the 31st October
British and French forces commenced aerial bombardment of
and military objectives in Cairo and elsewhere in Egypt. This was followed
a few days later by landings of airborne troops near Port Said and heavy fighting

soon after,

and,

airfields

there.

As

the

House knows, India had viewed with grave apprehension the

policy of

U K

and French Governments after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal
Company In particular, the massing of troops and aircraft for the purpose of
military operations in Egypt appeared to us to be a reversion to past colonial
the

methods and an attempt to coerce Egypt by show of armed might. Indeed, it was
stated by responsible statesmen in the United Kingdom and France that the
regime in Egypt must be changed and, in particular, the Head of the State and
of the Government of Egypt should be removed We had hoped, however, that
after the Security Council resolution, more peaceful methods would be adopted to

The starting of military operations against Egypt by the United
Kingdom and France and, more particularly, the bombing of parts of Cairo city

solve this dispute.

and other parts of Egypt came, therefore, as a profound shock not only to people
in India but also to large numbers of people in other countries including the United
Kingdom This appeared to be a flagrant case of aggression by two strong powers
against a weaker country with the purpose of enforcing their will, even to the
extent of changing the Government of that country This led to widespread world

Anglo-French action, and as the Security Council proved
by the United Kingdom and France,
the U N General Assembly, at an emergency session, expressed its disapproval of
this action and demanded the stoppage of military operations in Egypt and the
withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel, France and the United Kingdom from
Egyptian territory. An uneasy armistice followed, and it was declared on the

reactions

against

the

ineffective because of the exercise of the veto

Kingdom, France and Israel that they would withdraw their
this was made subject to certain conditions.
These developments gave some hope that peaceful methods would henceforth be
employed and I ventured to say a few days ago that the situation had slightly
improved Today I am by no means sure that this improvement has taken place
There are numerous tendencies which may well lead, unless checked, to a rapid
deterioration of the situation and a reversion to warfare If unfortunately military

part of the United

armed

forces,

though

operations begin again, it is possible that they might extend over a
area and might even develop into a major war.

much wider

Two days ago, the Prime Ministers of Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and India
issued a joint statement which has already been placed on the table of the House
That statement gives expression to the views of these Prime Ministers to the
recent happenings in Egypt and in Hungary and points out the danger of
inherent in the present grave international situation

war

In spite of the United Nations General Assembly, sporadic fighting continued
and there has been no attempt at withdrawal of forces from Egyptian territory.
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would appear indeed that these forces have established themselves firmly on
Egyptian territory and have no present Intention of leaving it If these foreign
forces continue to remain on Egyptian territory, the situation is likely to deteriorate rapidly and bring the danger of fresh military operations nearer.
The Governments of the United Kingdom and France, though apparently accepting the U N. resolution, have laid down certain conditions which are not

It

consistent with that resolution.

The Prime Minister

of Israel has continued to

not evacuate Gaza. If the foreign forces are not wholly removed
Egyptian territory, this will amount to a clear violation of the U. X.

insist that

from

he

will

resolution.

Meanwhile, India has agreed to send a contingent of her armed forces for the
United Nations International Force and this contingent is expected to leave India
by air today This United Nations force will not be concerned with the Suez Canal
issue as such, which can only be considered separately after peace has been fully
established and

force

is

said to

foreign forces removed. The main task of the international
be to ensure that Israel remains within the demarcation lines set
all

old Armistice Agreement.
that have appeared in the newspapers have not indicated that the
have received some accounts of
fighting in and around Part Said was severe.

by the

The accounts

We

among Egyptian civilians
were very heavy, running into many thousands. Conditions in Port Said have been
stock
distressing in the extreme. We are taking immediate steps to send a large
and these show that the

this fighting

casualties, chiefly

of medicines by special aircraft to Egypt for purposes of relief.
The story of the past three and a half months, ever since the nationalisation
of the Suez Canal Company, is full of tragic drama and events have happened which
I would have thought could not possibly occur in this modern age. I find it a little
difficult to deal with this record of unabashed aggression and deception. The
one another and
explanations that have been given from time to time, contradict
which is dangerous to the freedom of Asian and African
exhibit an

approach

countries and to world peace itself It has brought misery and disaster, hatred
and ill will, with no gain whatever, and, in addition, we live now under the threat

of possible world war.
Canal ComDuring all the controversies since the nationalisation of the Suez
of propriety and forpany, Egypt has conducted herself with a large measure
bearance. Without the least justification, Egypt was attacked not only by Israel
the United Kingdom and France Whether there was any previous
but also

by

obvious
consultation between the aggressor countries, I do not know. But it is
that their plans fitted in, and the Anglo-French attack helped Israel's aggression
the victim of Israeli aggression, was attacked
it.
was itself

and

Egypt,
helped by
and France It was
immediately after by the armed forces of the United Kingdom
but also
the widespread indignation of peoples not only in Asia and Africa
only
in

Nations that put some
Europe and America and the action taken by the United
taken
this aggression. But it appears to me that the cease-fire having

check on

matters to drift. Indeed,
is a tendency to complacency and to allow
and
minimise
to
made
justify this utterly unsome
been
even
has
there
attempt
Attention has been diverted to some extent
provoked and brutal attack on Egypt

place, there

to the grave

Even

as

and distressing occurrences

we were

distressed

in

by events

Hungary.
Egypt, we viewed with grave concern

in
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in one of these
distress events in Hungary It is possible that what happened
countries produced its reactions in the other and both created a very serious international situation But it is well to remember that though both deserve serious
from the other Neither can be held to
attention, the nature of each differed

and

justify the other
are concerned with an attack

We

on freedom anywhere

in the

world

We

are

concerned also with strong nations dominating, by armed force, weaker countries
I

.

.

am

convinced that

it

is

I

may

its

it

war and violence that these problems will be
convinced that colonialism, whatever new look
old brutal self and the only remedy is for it to

not by

settled or

freedom established
put on, can revert to

am

give place to freedom

facing great danger, and

The world stands

it

may

be that the

little

wars we have

round and bigger conflicts lie ahead In particular, the ambitions of strong nations imperil weaker countries. The only hope lies in the United
Nations, representing the world community, succeeding in putting an end to the
law of force and substituting for it a more civilised method of dealing with
bomb and the Panchsheel
problems Today, the choice lies between the hydrogen

had, are only a

first

Resolutions on the Suez Crisis:

United Nations General Assembly

November, 1956

RESOLUTION 997

(ES-l)

The General Assembly,
Noting the disregard on many occasions by parties to the Israel-Arab armistice
agreements of 1949 of the terms of such agreements, and that the armed forces
of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation of the General
Armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949,
Noting that armed forces of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland are conducting military operations against Egyptian territory,
Noting that traffic through the Suez Canal is now interrupted to the serious
prejudice of

many

nations,

grave concern over these developments,
1. Urges as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the
area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of

Expressing

its

military forces and arms into the area
2. Urges the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces
behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighboring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice
;

agreements
3

;

Recommends

that

all

Member

States refrain

from introducing military goods

29
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in the area of hostilities

and in general refrain from any acts which would delay
or prevent the implementation of the
present resolution
4 Urges that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the
Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation
;

,

5

Requests the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on the compliance with the present resolution to the Security Council and to the General

Assembly, for such further action as they
with the Charter,
6.

Decides to remain

in

may deem

appropriate in accordance

emergency session pending compliance with the present

resolution.

562nd plenary meeting,
2

November 1956

RESOLUTION 998 (ES-I
The General Assembly,
Bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with
)

its

resolu-

tion 997 (ES-I; of 2 November 1956,
Requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within
forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations con-

cerned,

of

supervise

an
the

emergency international United
cessation

of hostilities

in

Nations

accordance with

Force
all

the

to

secure

and

terms of the

aforementioned resolution.
563rd plenary' meeting,
4 November 1956.

RESOLUTION 999

(ES-I)

The General Assembly,
all the parties concerned have yet agreed to
resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956,

Noting with regret that not
with the provisions of

its

comply

Noting the special priority given in that resolution to an immediate cease-fire
and, as part thereof, to the halting of the movement of military forces and arms
into the area,
"Noting further that the resolution urged the parties to the armistice agreements
to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids

promptly

across the armistice lines into neighboring territory, and to observe scrupulously
the provisions of the armistice agreements,
1
Reaffirms its resolution 997 (ES-I), and once again calls upon the parties
immediately to comply with the provisions of the said resolution
2. Authorizes the Secretary-General immediately to arrange with the parties

concerned for the implementation of the cease-fire and the halting of the moveof military forces and arms into the area, and requests him to report compliance forthwith and, in any case, not later than twelve hours from the time of

ment

adoption of the present resolution

;

Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Chief of Staff
and the members of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, to obtain
compliance of the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines;
3.
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Decides to meet again immediately on receipt of the Secretary-General's

resolution.
report referred to in paragraph 2 of the present

563rd plenary meeting,
4 November 1956.

RESOLUTION 1000

The General Assembly,
Having requested the Secretary-General,

in

(ES-Ij

its

resolution

998

(ES-I)

of

4

international United
1956, to submit to it a plan for an emergency
Nations Force, for the purposes stated,
on the plan,
Noting with satisfaction the first report of the Secretary-General

November

and having
1.

in

particularly paragraph 4 of that report,
Command for an emergency international Force

mind

Establishes a United Nations

and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms
Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956;
2. Appoints, on an emergency basis, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations
Burns, as Chief of the
Truce Supervision Organization, Major-General
to secure

of General

ELM

Command

;

3. Authorizes the Chief of the Command immediately to recruit, from the
observer corps of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, a limited
number of officers who shall be nationals of countries other than those having

in the Security Council, and further authorizes him, in
Secretary-General, to undertake the recruitment directly,
from various Member States other than the permanent members of the Security
Council, of the additional number of officers needed;

permanent membership
consultation with

the

4 Invites the Secretary-General to take such administrative measures as may
be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present
resolution.

565th plenary meeting,
5

RESOLUTION 1001
The General Assembly

November

1956.

(ES-l)

}

Recalling its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956 concerning the cease-fire,
withdrawal of troops and other matters related to the military operations in Egyptian territory, as well as its resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956 concerning
the request to the Secretary-General to submit a plan for an
tional

emergency interna-

United Nations Force,
its resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 a United
an emergency international Force, having appointed the
of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization as Chief of

Having established by
Nations

Command

Chief of Staff

for

the

Command

the

Command, and having

with authorization to him to begin the recruitment of officers for
invited the Secretary-General to take the administrative

measures necessary for the prompt execution of that resolution,
Noting with appreciation the second and final report of the Secretary-General
on the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force as requested in
General Assembly resolution 998 (ES-I), and having examined that plan,

29
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1. Expresses its
approval of the guiding principles for the organization and
functioning of the emergency international United Nations Force as expounded
in paragraphs 6 to 9 of the Secretary-General's report
2. Concurs in the definition of the functions of the Force as stated in para;

graph 12 of the Secretary-General's report;
3

Invites the Secretary-General to continue discussions with Governments of
States concerning offers of participation in the Force, toward the objec-

Member

tive of its balanced composition

;

Requests the Chief of the Command, in consultation with the SecretaryGeneral as regards size and composition, to proceed forthwith with the full organi4

zation of the Force;
5.

Approves provisionally the basic

down

rule concerning the financing of the Force

paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's report;
6. Establishes an Advisory Committee composed of one representative from
each of the following countries; Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway
and Pakistan, and requests this Committee, whose Chairman shall be the Secretarylaid

in

General, to undertake the development of those aspects of the planning for the
Force and its operation not already dealt with by the General Assembly and which

do not

fall

within the area of the direct responsibility of the Chief of the

Command;

Authorizes the Secretary-General to issue all regulations and instructions
which may be essential to the effective functioning of the Force, following consultation with the Committee aforementioned, and to take all other necessary
7.

administrative and executive action
8.

defined for

it

;

following the fulfilment of the immediate responsibilities
in operative paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the Advisory Committee

Determines

that,

shall continue to assist the Secretary-General in the responsibilities falling to

him

under the present and other relevant resolutions
9. Decides that the Advisory Committee, in the performance of its duties, shall
be empowered to request, through the usual procedures, the convening of the
General Assembly and to report to the Assembly whenever matters arise which,
;

in its opinion, are of such

urgency and importance as to require consideration by

the General Assembly itself;
10. Requests all Member States to afford assistance as necessary to the United
Nations Command in the performance of its functions, including arrangements for
passage to and from the area involved.
567th plenary meeting,

7

November

1956.

RESOLUTION 1002 (ES-l)

The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, 998 (ES-I) and 999
(ES-I) of 4 November 1956, and 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, adopted by

overwhelming majorities,
Noting in particular that the General Assembly, by its resolution 1000 (ES-I),
established a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to
secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms
of its resolution 997 (ES-I),
1. Reaffirms the above-mentioned resolutions;
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2 Calls once again upon Israel immediately to withdraw all its forces behind
the armistice lines established by the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt

and

Israel of 24

3

draw

February 1949;

Calls once again upon the United Kingdom and France immediately to withall their forces from Egyptian territory, consistently with the above-mentioned

resolutions;

4

Urges the Secretary-General to communicate the present resolution to the

parties concerned, and requests him promptly to report to the General
on the compliance with this resolution

Assembly

567th plenary meeting,
7

November

1956.

RESOLUTION 1003 (ES-l)
The General Assembly,
1. Decides to place on the provisional agenda of its eleventh
regular session, as
a matter of priority, the question on the agenda of its first emergency special
session

;

Refers to its eleventh regular session, for consideration, the records of the
meetings and the documents of its first emergency special session
3. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraph 1 above, the first
emergency special
2.

;

session

may

continue to consider the question,

regular session of the

if

necessary, prior to the eleventh

Assembly
572nd plenary meeting,
10

November 1956

SECTION

3

The Eisenhower Doctrine and

Broadcast on the Middle East

Alternatives

Crisis:

Dwight D. Eisenhower

October 31, 1956

My

fellow Americans

:

Tonight

I report to

We

realize that the full

all

as your President.
and free debate of a political campaign surrounds
issues I wish to place before you this evening have no

you

But the events and
connection whatsoever with matters of partisanship. They are concerns of every
American his present and his future.
I wish, therefore, to give you a report of essential facts so that you
whether
belonging to either one of our two great parties, or to neither may give thoughtful
and informed consideration to this swiftly changing world scene.
The changes of which I speak have come in two areas of the world Eastern
Europe and the Mideast.
In Eastern Europe there is the dawning of a new day It has not been short or
us.

easy in coming.
After World War II the Soviet Union used military force to impose on the
servants of Moscow.
nations of Eastern Europe, governments of Soviet choice
It has been consistent United States policy without regard to political party
to seek to end this situation. We have sought to fulfill the wartime pledge of the
United Nations that these countries, overrun by wartime armies, would once again

know

sovereignty and self-government
could not, of course, carry out this policy by resort to force. Such force
would have been contrary both to the best interests of the Eastern European
people and to the abiding principles of the United Nations. But we did help to

We

keep

alive the

hope of these peoples for freedom
they needed from us no education

in the worth of national indetime of the American Revolution, it was
many of them who came to our land to aid our cause.
Now, recently the pressure of the will of these peoples for national independence
has become more, and more insistent.

Beyond

this

pendence and personal

liberty. For, at the
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few days ago the people of Poland, with

to freedom,

moved

their

Alternatives

proud and deathless devotion

to secure a peaceful transition to a

new Government And

this

seems, will strive genuinely to serve the Polish people.
And more recently, all the world has been watching dramatic events in Hungary,
where this brave people, as so often in the past, have offered their very lives for

Government,

it

independence from foreign masters.
We cannot yet know if these avowed purposes

will

be truly carried out.

But two things are clear.
First, the fervor and the sacrifice of the peoples of these countries, in the name
of freedom, have themselves brought real promise that the light of liberty soon
will shine again in this darkness.

And

if

second,

intention, the

the

world

Soviet

will

Union indeed

faithfully

acts

upon

its

announced

witness the greatest forward stride toward justice, trust
nations in our generation

and understanding among
These are the facts. How has your Government responded to them?
Today, it appears, a new Hungary is rising from this struggle; a Hungrry
which we hope, from our hearts, will know full and free nationhood.

We have rejoiced in all these historic events.
Only yesterday, the Soviet Union issued an important statement on its relations
with all the countries of Eastern Europe. This statement recognized the need for
review of Soviet policies, and the amendment of these policies to meet the demands
cf the people for greater national independence and personal freedom.
The Soviet Union declared its readiness to consider the withdrawal of Soviet
advisers, who have been, as you know, the effective ruling force in Soviet-occupied
countries And also to consider withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland, Hungary
and Rumania.
The United

States has

made

clear its readiness to assist economically the

and independent governments of these countries.

new

We

have already some days
been in contact with the new Government of Poland on this matter. We
since
have also publicly declared that we do not demand of these governments the
adoption of any particular form of society as a condition upon our economic assist-

Our one concern

is that they be free
for their sake, and for freedom's sake.
with respect to the Soviet Union sought clearly to remove any
false fears that we would look upon new governments in these Eastern European

ance.

We

have also

We

We

countries as potential military allies
have no such ulterior purpose.
see
these people as friends and we wish simply that they be friends who are free.
It is not a situation that calls for extravagant fear or hysteria but it invites our

most

serious concern.

I speak, of

was, as

we

all

Middle East. This ancient crossroads of the world
know, an area long subject to colonial rule. This rule ended after

course, of the

World War II when all countries there won full independence.
Out of the Palestinian mandated territory was born the new State of
These
the ages
another

Israel.

historic changes could not,

however, instantly banish animosities born of
Israel and her Arab neighbors soon found themselves at war with one

And the Arab nations showed continuing anger toward their former rulers,
notably France and Great Britain.
The United States, through all the years since the close of World War II, has
labored tirelessly to bring peace and stability to this area.
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a basic matter of United States policy to support the
same time, to strengthen our bonds both with Israel

it

State of Israel and, at the

and with the Arab countries. But, unfortunately, through

all

these years, passion
form or another,

in the area threatened to prevail over peaceful purpose, and, in one

there has been almost continuous fighting.

This situation recently was aggravated by Egyptian policy including rearmament
We felt this to be a misguided policy on the part of

with Communist weapons.

of Egypt. The State of Israel, at the same time, felt increasing
that
safety And Great Britain and France feared more and more
Canal.
Suez
the
of
life
line
threatened
their
Egyptian policies
These matters came to a crisis on July 26 of this year when the Egyptian Government seized the Universal Suez Canal Company. For ninety years, ever since

the

Government

anxiety for

its

the inauguration of the canal, that

company has operated

the canal

largely under

British and French technical supervision.

among our allies who urged an immediate reaction to
of
force
use
insistently urged otherwise, and our wish prevailed,
by
even months
through a long succession of conferences and negotiations, for weeks
with participation by the United Nations.
there were some

Now,

We

this event

United Nations, only a short while ago, on the basis of agreed
that an acceptable accord was within our reach.
seemed
principles,
But the direct relations of Egypt with both Israel and France kept worsening
and Great Britain also determined
to a point at which first Israel, then France
of their \ital interests without
that, in their judgment, there could be no protection

And

there, in the
it

resort to force.

Upon this decision events followed swiftly.
On Sunday, the Israeli Government ordered
On Monday, their armed forces penetrated
of the Suez Canal

total mobilization.

deeply into Egypt and to the vicinity

nearly 100 miles away.

And on Tuesday the British and French Governments delivered a twelve-hour
ultimatum to Israel and Egypt, now followed up by armed attack against Egypt.
The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions.
Nor were we informed of them in advance.
of any of these nations to take such decisions and
As it is the manifest
right

likewise our right if our judgment so dictates, to dissent.
the
believe these actions to have been taken in error, for we do not accept
international
of
settlement
for
the
instrument
or
wise
a
as
of
force
use
proper

actions,

it is

We

...

disputes.

To

say

is in
this, in this particular instance,

no way

to

,

.

,

,.

minimize our mendsnip

with these nations, nor our determination to maintain those friendships.
And we are fully aware of the grave anxieties of Israel, of Britain and France.
We know that they have been subjected to grave and repeated provocations.
The present fact nonetheless seems clear. This action taken can scarcely be
which we
reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations to

have all subscribed. And beyond this we are forced to doubt that resort to force
and war will for long serve the permanent interests of the attacking nations.

Now we

must look to the future.
In the circumstances I have described, there will be no United States involvement in these present hostilities. I therefore have no plan to call the Congress in
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continue to keep in contact with Congressional
special session. Of course, we shall
leaders of both parties.
I assure you your Government will remain alert to every possibility of this
situation and keep in close contact and coordination with the legislative branch of
this

Government.

At the same time
ernment

it

is

and

to do all in its

power
measure

it

will

remain

the dedicated purpose of your
and to end the conflict.

Gov-

to localize the fighting

in this action yesterday. We went to the United
We took our first
Nations with a request that the forces of Israel return to their own line and that
hostilities in the area be brought to a close.
This proposal was not adopted because it was vetoed by Great Britain and by

France.
It is our hope and intent that this matter will be brought before the United
Nations General Assembly. There, with no veto operating, the opinion of the
world can be brought to bear in our quest for a just end to this tormenting problem.
In the past the United Nations has proved able to find a way to end bloodshed.
We believe it can and that it will do so again.
My fellow citizens, as I review the march of world events in recent years I am
ever more deeply convinced that the United Nations represents the soundest hope

for peace in the world. For this very reason I believe that the processes of the
United Nations need further to be developed and strengthened.
I speak particularly of increasing its ability to secure justice under international

law.

the recent troubles in the Middle East there have, indeed, been injustices
by all nations involved. But I do not believe that another instrument of
war is a remedy for these wrongs.
injustice
There can be no peace without law And there can be no law if we work to
invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose, and another for

In

all

suffered

our friends

The society of nations has been slow in developing means to apply this truth
But the passionate longing for peace on the part of all peoples of the earth compels
us to speed our search for new and more effective instruments of justice.
The peace we seek and need means much more than mere absence of war. It
means the acceptance of law and the fostering of justice in all the world.
To our principles guiding us in this quest we must stand fast. In so doing, we
can honor the hopes of all men for a world in which peace will truly and justly
reign.
I

thank you, and good night.
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Address to Congress:
Dwight D. Eisenhower

January

5,

1957

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker and Members of the Congress.
First may I express to you my deep appreciation of your courtesy in giving me,
at some real inconvenience to yourselves, this early opportunity of addressing you
on a matter I deem to be of grave importance to our country.
In my forthcoming State of the Union Message, I shall review the international
situation generally. There are world-wide hopes which we can reasonably entertain
and there are world-wide responsibilities which we must carry to make certain that
freedom including our own may be secure.
There is, however, a special situation in the Middle East which I feel I should,

even now, lay before this body.
Before doing so it is well to remind ourselves that our basic national objective
in international affairs remains peace
a world peace based on justice. Such a
peace must include all areas, all peoples of the world, if it is to be enduring. There
is no nation, great or small, with which we would refuse to negotiate, in mutual

good faith, with patience and in the determination to secure a better understanding
between us Out of such understandings must, and eventually will, grow confidence
and trust, indispensable ingredients to a program of peace and to plans for lifting
from us all the burdens of these expensive armaments. To promote these objectives
our Government works tirelessly, day by day, month by month, year by year. But
until a degree of success crowns our efforts that will assure to all nations peaceful
existence, we must, in the interests of peace itself, remain vigilant, alert and strong.
The Middle East has abruptly reached a new and critical stage in its long and
important history. In past decades many of the countries in that area were not fully
self-governing. Other nations exercised considerable authority in the area and the
security of the region was largely built around their power. But since the First
there has been a steady evolution toward self-government and independence. This development the United States has welcomed and has encouraged.
Our country supports without reservation the full sovereignty and independence of

World War

each and every nation of the Middle East.
Now the evolution of independence has in the main been a peaceful process.
But the area has been often troubled. Persistent cross-currents of distrust and
about a
fear, with raids back and forth across national boundaries, have brought

much of the Mideast. Just recently there have been
involving Western nations that once exercised much influence in the
area. Also the relatively large attack by Israel in October has intensified the basic
differences between that nation and its Arab neighbors. All this instability has been
high degree of instability in

hostilities

heightened and, at times, manipulated by international communism
Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East. This was true of
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the Czars

and

it

is

true of the Bolsheviks

The reasons

are not hard to find

Now

these reasons do not affect Russia's security, for no one plans to use the Middle
East as a base for aggression against Russia. Never for a moment has the United
States entertained such a thought.
The Soviet Union has nothing whatsoever to fear from the United States in

the Middle East, or anywhere else in the world, so long as

its

rulers

do not them-

selves first resort to aggression
I make solemnly and emphatically.
Now, neither does Russia's desire to dominate the Middle East
own economic interest in the area Russia does not appreciably use

That statement

spring from its
or depend upon

the Suez Canal. In 1955, Soviet traffic through the canal represented about threequarters of one per cent of the total The Soviets have no need for, and could

provide no market for, the petroleum resources which constitute the principal
Union is a substantial exporter of

natural wealth of this region. Indeed, the Soviet

petroleum products.

The reason

for Russia's

interest in

the

Middle East

is

solely that of

power

Considering her announced purpose of communizing the world, it is easy
to understand her hope of soon dominating the Middle East.
This region has always been the crossroads of the continents of the Eastern

politics

Hemisphere The Suez Canal enables the nations of Asia and Europe to carry on
the commerce that is essential if these countries are to maintain well-rounded and
prosperous economies The Middle East provides a gateway between Eurasia and
Africa.

This contains about two-thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world
it normally supplies the petroleum needs of many nations of Europe, Asia and

and

Africa.

Now

the nations of

Europe are peculiarly dependent upon

this

supply,

dependency relates to transportation as well as production. This was
vividly demonstrated since the closing of the Suez Canal and some of the pipe-lines.
Alternate ways of transportation and, indeed, alternate sources of power, can, if
necessary, be developed. But these cannot be considered as early prospects.
But these things stress the immense importance of the Middle East If the
nations of that area should lose their independence, if they were dominated by
alien forces hostile to freedom, that would be both a tragedy for the area and for
many other free nations whose economic life would be subject to near strangulation. Western Europe would be endangered just as though there had been no
Marshall Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization The free nations of Asia
and Africa, too, would be placed in serious jeopardy. And the countries of the
Middle East would lose the markets upon which their economies depend All this

and

this

would have the most adverse, if not disastrous, effect upon our own nation's economic life and political prospects.
Thus we have these simple and indisputable facts
The Middle East, which has always been coveted by Russia, would today be
.

.

.

*

prized

more than ever by

international

communism.

Soviet rulers continue to show that they do not scruple to use any means
to gain their ends.
The free nations of the Mideast need, and for the most part want, added strength

The

to assure their continued independence.

Now

our thoughts naturally turn to the United Nations as a protector of small
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nations. Its charter gives it
national peace and security

primary responsibility for the maintenance of interOur country has given the United Nations its full
support in relation to the hostilities in Hungary and in Egypt. Now the United
Nations was able to bring about a cease-fire and withdrawal of hostile forces from
Egypt because it was dealing with governments and peoples who had a decent
respect for the opinions of mankind as reflected in the United Nations General
Assembly. But in the case of Hungary, the situation was different. The Soviet
Union vetoed action by the Security Council to require the withdrawal of Soviet
armed forces from Hungary. And it has shown callous indifference to the recommendations, even the censure, of the General Assembly. The United Nations therefore can always be helpful, but it cannot be a wholly dependable protector of
freedom when the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved.

Now, under all the circumstances I have laid before you, a greater responsibility
now devolves upon the United States. We have shown, this country has shown,
so that none can doubt, our dedication to the principle that force shall not be used
internationally for any aggressive purpose and that the integrity and independence
of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate. Seldom in history has a
nation's dedication to principle been tested as severely as ours

was tested during

recent weeks.

There is general recognition in the Middle East, as elsewhere, that the United
States does not seek either political or economic domination over any other people

Our

a world environment of freedom, not servitude. On the other hand
of the nations of the Middle East are aware of the danger that
stems from international Communism and welcome closer cooperation with the
desire
if

many,

is

not

all,

United States to realize for themselves the United Nations goals of independence,
economic well-being and spiritual growth.

Now if the Middle East is to continue its geographic role of uniting rather than
separating East and West; if its vast economic resources are to serve the wellbeing of the peoples there, as well as that of others, and if its cultures and religions
and

their shrines

are to be preserved for the uplifting of the spirits of these

peoples, then the United States must make more evident its willingness to support
the independence of the freedom-loving nations of the area.

Under these circumstances I deem it necessary to seek the cooperation of the
Congress. Only with that cooperation can we give the reassurance needed to deter
aggression, to give courage and confidence to those who are dedicated to freedom
and thus prevent a chain of events which would gravely endanger

all

of the free

world.

Now

there have been several Executive declarations

followed
1950.

by

There

will within

made by

the United States

the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950,
the Presidential assurance to the King of Saudi Arabia on Oct. 31,

in relation to the

is

Middle East. There

is

the Presidential declaration of April 9, 1956, that the United States
means oppose any aggression in the area. There is our

constitutional

declaration of

Nov.

29, 1956, that a threat to the territorial integrity or political

independence of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan or Turkey would be viewed by the United
States with the utmost gravity.
Nevertheless, weaknesses in the present situation and the increased danger from
international communism convince me that basic United States policy should now
find expression in joint action

by

the Congress

and the Executive. Furthermore,
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our joint resolve should be so couched as to make it apparent that if need be our
words will be backed by action
Now it is nothing new for the President and the Congress to join to recognize
that the national integrity of other free nations is directly related to our own
security

We have joined to
We have reinforced

create and support the security system of the United Nations
the collective security system of the United Nations by a

of collective defense arrangements Today we have security treaties with
and our, peace and security are
forty-two other nations which recognize that their,
have joined to take decisive action in relation to Greece and
intertwined

series

We

Turkey and

in relation to

Taiwan

Thus, the United States through the joint action of the President and the Conwith the Senate, has manifested in many endangress, or, in the case of treaties,
gered areas

its

purpose to support free and independent governments

against external menace, notably the

we have helped
is now essential

menace of

international

and peace

communism Thereby

peace and security during a period of great danger. It
that the United States should manifest through joint action of the

to maintain

President and the Congress our determination to assist those nations of the Mideast area

which

may

desire that assistance.

.

Proposed Resolution on the Middle East:
United States

January

5,

1957

To authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with
nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.
Whereas a primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other
is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all, in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations and
Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States are
endangered as long as international Communism and the nations it controls seek

nations

;

by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other
means to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and independent; and
Whereas such danger now exists in the general area of the Middle East Therefore be

it

L

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
Congress assembled, that the President be and hereby is
authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the
general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated
SEC.

States of America in

to the

SEC

maintenance of national independence
2

The

President

is

authorized to undertake, in the general area of the
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Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of
that area desiring such assistance Furthermore, he is authorized to employ the
armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the
territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of
nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism; provided, that such employment shall be
consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter
of the United Nations and actions and recommendations of the United Nations,
and, as specified in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, measures pursuant
thereto shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at any

time such action as

it

deems necessary

in order to

maintain or restore international

peace and security.
is hereby authorized, when he determines that such use
important to the security of the United States, to use for the purposes of this
joint resolution, without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation.

SEC 3 The President

is

not to exceed $200,000,000 from any appropriations now available for carrying out
the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended This authorization
is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such
appropriations.
SEC. 4. The President shall within the
to the Congress his action hereunder.
SEC 5, This joint resolution shall

month

expire

of January of each year report

when

the President shall determine

and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East
are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United
Nations or otherwise.
that the peace

Resolution on the Middle East:
United States Senate and House of Representatives

Adopted March

5,

1957

the Middle East
Joint resolution to promote peace and stability in
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of

America in Congress assembled,
That the President be and hereby

is authorized to cooperate with and assist any
nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such
maintenance
assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the

of national independence.
SEC. 2. The President

is

authorized to undertake, in the general area of the

Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations^of
as vital
that area desiring such assistance Furthermore, the United States regards
the preservation of the independence and
national interest and world
to the

integrity of the nations of the

peace

Middle East. To

this end, if the President

determines
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the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist
any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: Provided that
such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United
States

and with the Constitution of the United

The

States.

to use during the balance of fiscal
year 1957 for economic and military assistance under this joint resolution not to
exceed $200,000,000 from any appropriation now available for carrying out the
provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, in accord with the

SEC.

3.

President

is

hereby authorized

provisions of such act. Provided, that, whenever the President determines it to be
important to the security of the United States, such use may be under the authority
of section 401 (A) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, (except that
the provisions of Section 105 (A) thereof shall not be waived) and without regard
provisions of Section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1957:
Provided further, that obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first
to

sentence of Section 2 of this joint resolution shall be paid only out of appropriaand obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes

tions for military assistance,

first section of this joint resolution shall be paid only out of appropriations
other than those for military assistance.
This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to
the use of such appropriations. None of the additional authorization contained in

of the

this section shall

be used until fifteen days after the Committee on Foreign RelaCommittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-

tions of the Senate, the
tives, the

committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Repre-

sentatives and, when military assistance is involved, the committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives have been furnished a

report showing the object of the proposed use, the country for the benefit of which
such use is intended, and the particular appropriation or appropriations for carrying out the provisions of the mutual security act of 1954, as amended, from which

the funds are proposed to be derived. Provided, that funds available under this
section during the balance of fiscal year 1957 shall, in the case of any report
submitted during the last fifteen days of the fiscal year, remain available for use

under

this section for the purposes stated in such report for a period of twenty
days following the date of submission of such report. Nothing contained in this
joint resolution shall be construed as of itself authorizing the appropriation

of additional funds for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the first
section or of the first sentence of Section 2 of this joint resolution.
SEC. 4 The President should continue to furnish facilities and military assistance, under the provisions of applicable law and established policies, to the United
Nations emergency force in the Middle East, with a view to maintaining the truce
in that region.

SEC.

5.

The President

shall within the

months

of

January and July of each year

report to the Congress his actions hereunder.
SEC. 6. This Joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine
that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East

are reasonably assured

by

international conditions created

Nations or otherwise except that it may be terminated
resolution of the two houses of Congress,

by action of the United
earlier by a concurrent
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Alternative Resolution:
J.

William Fulbright

January 11, 1957

Whereas peace with justice in the defense of human rights and fundamental
freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United
Nations and otherwise, and
Whereas peace with justice is not now assured in the Middle East,
Therefore, be it resolved That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United
States to achieve international peace and security in the Middle East, so that
armed force shall not be used except in the common interest and that the President

be advised that the sense of the Senate
process, should particularly pursue the
within the United Nations Charter:

is

that this

Government, by Constitutional

following objectives in the Middle East

1. In furtherance of the traditional policy of the United States to foster international trade and the unobstructed international movement of the world commerce,
r
negotiate arrangements w hich will assure free passage
and in peace of the Suez Canal to all nations.

on equitable terms

in

war

In furtherance of the United Nations Charter to strive for a reduction in
Arab states, assist as may be possible in the negotiation of mutually acceptment of refugees, the protection of holy places, and the
2.

tensions between Israel and the

conclusion of treaties of peace; and until these purposes are accomplished, seek
the continued intervention of the United Nations police forces between Israel and

Egypt.
3. In support of programs developed by the International Bank for Recon-

Development, and otherwise, contribute its fair share of resources,
assistance, to long-range economic development and to the
development of independent and progressive social institutions in the Middle East
struction and

including

technical

area.
4. Contribute to the maintenance of peace by reaffirming, with particular reference to the Middle East, the determination of the United States to exercise the
right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51, should any armed

attack occur affecting

its

national security.
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From Middle
Harry

East Proposal:
Tramasi

S.

January 13, 1957

We
East.

cannot hesitate, and we dare not falter in what we must do in the Middle
The peace and economy of the whole world depend upon the resources con-

centrated in that area.

So long as these resources are available

unhampered by capricious and tyrannical

barriers, the chances for

to

all

peace

nations,
will

be

good

We

must do

all

that

we can

to insure free access of this area to all nations

But

Russian intrigues and designs to move into the Middle East would deny the world
the free access it must have to survive and would inevitably lead to war Let us

make no mistake. This is what Russia is after control of these resources.
The proposals made by the President, when approved by the Congress,

will

strengthen the position of the free world But I do not think they go far enough.
I suggest that certain further steps need to be taken to undo the Russian
in the Middle East and check new penetrations there. Recurring
armed clashes and flare-ups, arising from ancient and special troubles in this area,
must be settled soon, or else Russia will continue to exploit these troubles for her

encroachments

own

expansionist purposes

These are the steps I have in mind
First. An embargo ought to be imposed on the shipment of all arms and ammunition by Russia to the Middle East It would be desirable to have an embargo
on shipments of all arms to the Middle East by all nations until tensions subside
and security pacts and disarmament agreements in the area can be worked out.
Arms and ammunition shipped into the area should go only to the emergency
.

forces of the United Nations stationed in that area

I

hear the Russians are con-

arms to Syria, and I expect they will resume shipments to
Egypt Russia must be warned that these must stop
When Russia began penetration of the Middle East by sending arms to Egypt
more than a year ago we should have warned the Kremlin that we would not
stand for this trouble-making maneuver All we had to do was to say "You can't
do that" and be ready to back it up All we would have needed to back up this
warning was to put a couple of cruisers at the end of the Black Sea Straits and a
couple of cruisers and air carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean
Our past experience as in the case of the Berlin Airlift showed that the
Russians would not dare to risk open war by shooting down our planes, once we
had made clear that we intended to maintain that airlift and that we were not
tinuing shipment of

bluffing

Second The United Nations emergency forces should be enlarged and strengthened to whatever size events may prove necessary to maintain order until the

From Middle
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Suez Canal problem has been completely resolved and a
peace treaty between
and Egypt has been concluded.
The Suez Canal is the economic jugular vein of the European economy and one
of the vital waterways of the world. A
stoppage of traffic through the canal of
only a few weeks has paralyzed the European continent and even the Middle East.
We have had to ship oil from this country to meet the emergency, although we have
been trying to build up our own dwindling oil reserves here to meet future
Israel

emergencies.
I

believe very strongly that all the vital
waterways of the world, upon which
economy of the world depend, should be freely opened to all

the peace and

commerce
At the Potsdam conference
traffic

I tried to get recognition of this

on the waterways of the world.

problem of open
urged that the Black Sea Straits, the Kiel
the Suez Canal, Gibraltar and the Panama

I

Canal, the Rhine and Danube rivers,
Canal be made free waterways for merchant shipping.
I suggest that we ought to keep on
working to relieve world tensions. And the
first practical step we can take
along that line is to achieve a permanent settle-

ment

of

the

Suez Canal, for we cannot leave
whims of any one nation.

it

to the caprices of a military

dictator or the political

And we must realize that it is naive and fantastic to hope that we can achieve
any kind of peace in the Middle East as long as there are bitterness and open
clashes between the Arabs and the Jews. The nation of Israel is here to stay.
The United States, as well as the United Nations, should do everything possible
to cool the passions of those extremists who want to destroy Israel. The boundary
between Israel and Egypt must be settled and those boundaries guaranteed.

lines

The United Nations Emergency Forces could play

a highly constructive role in

this.

Third: In our own interests and in the interest of the peace of the world we
should never again allow ourselves to become separated from our allies.
cannot

We

be part

and part appeasers.
We fought two world wars to keep Britain, France and Western civilization
from being destroyed by an ambitious Kaiser and a madman Hitler. At the end
internationalist, part isolationist, part pacifist

World War we set up a number of important barriers to see that
France and the free world were safe against the threat of international
communism. Vacillation, indecision and failure to state clearly our foreign policy
during the past few years and neglecting to keep our allies informed of our aims
of the second
Britain,

and intentions contributed

to the recent tragic events in the

Middle East and

almost brought us to a third World War.
Perhaps this is no time to remind ourselves that we must assume some responsibility for the panicky military moves of the British, French and Israelis in Egypt.

Yet we had better draw a lesson from what happened I would ask what the
American people would think we would do if the Panama Canal were seized in
violation of treaties and made subject to the will of a dictator. I know what I
would do
I feel certain that if we had kept close diplomatic contact with our allies and
maintained a frank and forthright understanding of what was involved in the
Middle East, we could well have avoided the debacle that followed, I think it is a
historic blunder to have found ourselves on the same side with expansionist and
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Communist Russia

in a

move

to

allies with whom we had
and ours are inseparable

rebuke and weaken our

two World Wars, because

to fight jointly

Alternatives

their security

administration we kept an intimate understanding with the leaders
France and Britain have, for over a century, been with us, and we
have managed to get along and cooperate on all major world problems.
It was inevitable that, at times, we would find ourselves disagreeing on certain
issues, sometimes with Britain and sometimes with France On some occasions we

During

my

of our allies

even found ourselves
free

and independent

in

sharp contention

But we never

We always got along and worked together for
We conducted our relations in a free and candid
each other what

would

failed to treat

them as

allies

we intended

to do,

our mutual security and peace

We never failed to
and we always did exactly what we said
manner.

tell

we

do.

As President of the world's leading power, I thought it not only essential but
proper to keep the doors of the White House open to all our allies at all times
with equal treatment for all As President, I welcomed the visits of all heads of
Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers.
Potsdam Conference I informed Stalin that if any further
joint conferences of heads were to be held, they would have to take place in
Washington, since President Roosevelt and I had already come to meet them in
Europe Now that we have a promise of a new foreign policy, I hope that all the
Allied leaders will soon again be invited to come to Washington and that invitations for such visits will not be limited to a few men we favor or court,
As we back the President in his announced program for the Middle East, let us
also make sure that we restore the strength, dignity and prestige of our allies,
without whom we cannot be certain of the maintenance of peace for all the
state, as well as

At the end

of the

people of the world.

Alternative Resolution:

Michael Mansfield

January 29, 1957

Whereas the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of the
nations of the Middle East is vital to the interests of the United States;
Whereas the welfare

of the United States

and other nations

is

related to the

prevention of further hostilities in the region of the Middle East, and the resumption of passage of ships of all nations through the Suez Canal
;

Whereas the present truce maintained by the United Nations in the Middle
East may prove temporary if there is no lasting settlement of the Suez dispute
and the Arab-Israeli conflict and if economic instability in the region persists,
Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States are
endangered as long as international communism and the nations it controls seek
by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other

From
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means

to attempt to bring under their domination
peoples now free and independent; and
Whereas such danger now exists in the general area of the Middle East'
Therefore be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled
1. That the United States
regards as vital to the national interest and world
peace the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of the nations
of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof,
the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of
nations

requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country conby international communism- Provided, that such employment shall be
consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of

trolled

the United Nations
2. Notwithstanding any limitations in existing law, the President may use appropriations made pursuant to the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, to
furnish facilities and military assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may

deem
3.

appropriate, to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East;
call upon the United Nations General Assembly to

The President should

establish at once a Special Commission on Arms Traffic in the Middle East with a
view to recommending measures for regulating the flow of military materiel into

that region
4.

The

;

President should

recommend

to the Congress

an economic program of

amount and

duration, which in his judgment will facilitate a settlement of the Suez dispute and the Arab-Israeli conflict and otherwise promote
stability in the Middle East and the peaceful progress of the nations of that
specific nature,

region.

From

a Statement of Turkey's Middle East
Fuat Koprulu

April

The
the

5,

Policies:

1956

"recent events" in the Middle East to which you allude can neither weaken
its development, for the clear-cut aim of this Pact

Baghdad Pact nor prevent

is to create an effective system of defense in the Middle East area in conformity
with Art. 51 of the United Nations Charter against those who nurture aggressive

designs.

Penetration by the Soviets into the Middle East and their attempts to create
confusion there dates from long before the Baghdad Pact. If Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Syria oppose the Pact and have started to move towards the Soviets, we are
of the opinion that this indicates that the big and common danger is being inadvertently neglected due to certain considerations of prestige and petty rivalry.
I am of the opinion that the day will come when the emotional and impulsive
state of affairs in the

Middle East

will

be replaced by reason and moderation, and

182

that

regional disputes
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can be resolved, so that the Baghdad Pact

may become

identified with every state in the area.
I do not believe that there is any

need to orient the Baghdad Pact in a new

direction in the face of the political and economic penetration of the Middle East
by the Soviets. The direction of the Pact is manifest, and it behooves us only to

work in that direction.
With respect to the suggested need

for increased cooperation in the field of
already embodied in the Baghdad Pact itself. On the
other hand, efforts in this respect cannot be taken as involving any neglect or
reduction of political and military endeavors.

economy,

this necessity

is

Should the United States of America also adhere to the Baghdad Pact

in the

near future, and remember that this Pact is in complete conformity with the principles of American foreign policy, such a move would undoubtedly constitute an

important event from the viewpoint of the growth of the Pact.
It would be appropriate to make a distinction between Turkey's efforts on
behalf of the Baghdad Pact on the one hand and Turkish-Israeli relations on the
.

.

.

other. As already clarified on different occasions, since the beginning of the
Palestine problem the Turkish Government has acted within the framework of
the United Nations and in loyalty to the decisions adopted by that body. Not for

the sake of peace in the Middle East alone but also for world peace and tranquility
Turkey hopes that an equitable solution will be found with the least
possible delay to this dispute which is still creating tension and in respect to

as a whole,

which

it

ticular

is

hard

to say that

have made

it

it

may

not lead to war Recent developments in par-

clear for all to see that the flames of this dispute are

fanned

by those who nurture hidden aspirations regarding the Middle East Turkey
has not abandoned the hope that this dispute may yet be resolved in a conciliatory
manner and within the framework of the United Nations.
solely

.

.

.

Statement on Egypt's Middle East Policy:

Gamal Abdul Nasser

November

21,

1956

The policy of Egypt is a policy of national independence
value this independence more than life itself. I will not

Egypt and Egyptians
become the stooge or
Egypt is determined to have

or pawn or hireling of anybody. Just as
independence so also Egypt is determined to have and maintain ideological
independence from all foreign ideologies such as Marxism, Fascism, Racism,
satellite

political

Colonialism, Imperialism and Atheism, all of which incidentally are European in
The revolutionary government of Egypt is dedicated to the universal ideals

origin.

of justice between men and justice between
nations, the equality of all men and
nations before the world and individual and personal freedom, and to achieve
these ideals the new Egypt will work in accordance with her own
special circumstance, in accordance with her own religious teachings and cultural heritage. Dediall
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cated to

is profoundly aware of the necessity of the
^rational independence, Egypt
cooperation of nations Situated where it is in one of the historic crossroads of
the world Egypt could not lack this awareness
Egypt desires to cooperate an
honorable cooperation with other countries.
Concretely and specially Egypt stands
for international law. I pledge myself to the strict observance of all the interna-

tional law which now exists. More than that I desire the
expansion of international
law to meet the needs of the complex modern world.
Egypt like all other nations
has a special fellow feeling for those nations which share its cultural traditions
and for those excolonial nations which are in a similar phase of transition to inde-

pendent democracy and economic progress. But the idea of trying to create an
Arab empire or of attempting to dominate such an empire is repugnant to Egypt
and to me. Just as European nations work toward European union and just as the
twenty-one sovereign nations of North and South America have developed a Pan
American Union so the Arab countries work toward an ideal of fruitful cooperation. But each Arab nation cherishes its integrity just as
Egypt does. The concept
of Arab imperialism is foreign fiction or foreign propaganda based on ignorance

The primary and basic objective of the revolutionary government of
the radical improvement of the economic and social conditions of the
Egyptian people as a free and independent nation. It is to this purpose that I
desire to concentrate the energies of my government. But that cannot be the case
or worse.

Egypt

is

until certain highly inflammable problems are solved. I call upon all the governments of the world and upon every man and woman of good will to join in serious
efforts to achieve just and honorable solutions of these problems.

From Address
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... I should like to tell the General Assembly quite frankly what is the philosophy
which underlies our present approach to this problem or the withdrawal of Israel
forces in accordance with our undertaking of S November. (The General Assembly
will recall that in response to the resolution of 2 November and the subsequent
resolutions the

ber as follows-

Government of Israel notified the Secretary-General on 8 NovemThe Government of Israel will willingly withdraw its forces
kt

.

.

from Egypt immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with
the United Nations in connection with the emergency international force ") Many
representatives have spoken as if, in their view, the only important consideration
is when we withdraw. Of far greater moment is the question. How do we withdraw? What situation will the withdrawal create? What comes in its place? Will
the withdrawal become an integral stage in the promotion of peaceful conditions?
Or will it pave the way to a return to the previous state of siege and of anarchy?
This is perhaps the most fateful practical question which the United Nations now
faces in the conduct of

its

work.

The Eisenhower Doctrine and
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Alternatives

There are two possible approaches to this problem of withdrawal. One is a
will instantaneously reject,
system, which I am certain the General Assembly
under which we would carry out the withdrawal without any coordination with the
movements of the United Nations Force, without any care for the future and
without any guarantee of Egypt's future conduct toward Israel Sinai would then
become again a base for Nasser to renew against Israel the deadly menace which
I have but briefly described. Once again the peaceful desert would become a
source of blood and of peril.

Let me again say that an Egyptian military base in the Sinai Peninsula cannot
Israel Armor
possibly have any other purpose except to sustain an assault against
and weapons would again pour into the peninsula in preparation for the next
round. Egypt and Israel would again face each other near Gaza, which Egypt seized
by aggression eight years ago. From that position the jedayeen commando squads
would again roam through the countryside, which has known a blessed tranquillity
in the past few weeks. The illicit blockade would again be established on the Gulf
of Aqaba, for the first time an international waterway open today to the ships of
all nations without distinction of flag, and thereby another grotesque situation
would have been brought about. The United Nations would have been active in
restoring to a state of blockade what had hitherto been an open waterway. Egypt
has blocked one waterway, the Suez Canal, contrary to the 1888 Convention
this system, which I propose that the General Assembly reject, of a
and unplanned withdrawal, the United Nations would find itself inadvertently responsible for bringing Egypt back to block the other waterway, so that
the protection of blockade would become an international objective. Thus, belligerency will be restored, acts of war by sea or land will again arise until they provoke
the inevitable explosion and who knows how far or how much any such explosion
will be localized. This is a startling prospect, but it is exactly what will happen

Under

reckless

the method of effecting and implementing the withdrawal of troops is not
approached with minimum care and precision. This return to the status quo of
belligerency is precisely what Nasser wants. It is what some delegations quite
inadvertently may be proposing when they urge that the withdrawal take place in
if

disregard of what will ensue and in detachment from the plans now under way for
defining the tasks of the United Nations Emergency Force now entering the Canal
area. This question of a return to the status quo of insecurity was frankly discussed in the General Assembly during the first debates on the establishment of

the

United Nations Force

On

that occasion,

invited our attention to that problem.

What
we to

then, six

shed,

strife,

He

said

too,

the

Canadian representative

:

months from now? Are we

to go through

all this

again? Are

return to the status quo? Such a return would not be to a position of
security, or even to a tolerable position, but would be a return to terror, blood-

explosion.

.

incidents,
.

charges and counter- charges, and ultimately another

,

These, too, are instructive words, except that one might have a reservation
six months in an atmosphere of renewed belliger-

whether peace could endure for
ency.
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in order to avoid such a blind
procession

that the General

Assembly devised machinery
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back to disaster and belligerency
form of the United Nations

in the

Emergency Force.
I

have then portrayed one method of

within

it

effecting a withdrawal

which would contain

the seeds of a future conflict.

But there is another system of withdrawal fully consistent with the resolutions
of the General Assembly, but also with the
purpose and objectives of the United
Nations and its Charter. Let me again stress that the Government of Israel will
carry out the undertaking for the withdrawal of
in its

communication of

8

or permissible that Sinai
assaults?

its troops from Egypt as defined
November. We shall do this. But is it essential or wise
must again become remilitarized as a base for future

Are there no other alternatives whereby the very emptiness of that
may become a bridge of peace between two countries? There are

historic desert

ways of reconciling
danger. I will not

obligation to withdraw with the avoidance of this
detailed proposals at this forum, but we have constructive

Israel's

make

proposals which would

fulfill

and the avoidance of the
larly,

is

it

essential

emanating from the re-creation of

this base. Simi-

or wise or permissible that maritime belligerency shall be

restored in the Gulf of
belligerency

both of these objectives, the principle of withdrawal

perils

Aqaba

in

defiance of United Nations decisions against

and of the international law governing narrow waterways? What

shall

we have achieved if we leave behind a position at the entrance to the Gulf
Aqaba in which acts of maritime war can be achieved, evoking in the course

of
of

time a natural response and re-creating that vicious circle of violence from which
it is our passionate desire to break loose?

There are ways of reconciling the resolutions of 2, 5 and 7
creation of such conditions as will preclude that danger, and

November with the
we shall make pro-

posals accordingly in the proper contexts.
There are solutions for Gaza other than the renewal of this Egyptian salient in

a position which would

There

is

make

Egyptian-Israel peace impossible.
Canal This is not affected one

the problem of the Suez

way

or the

other by Israel's policy on the withdrawal of troops from Egypt, but we have a
special interest and a special experience. Under the 1888 Convention this waterway

was to be opened to the ships of all nations in time of peace and in time of war.
Article 4 of the Convention emphasizes that the obligation to keep the Canal open
even in time of war rests upon Egypt even when Egypt is a belligerent, and therefore, the present situation in which the Canal
convention.

is

blocked

is

a violation of that

But even before that violation there was another long-established violation
through the discriminatory closing of the Canal to Israel's ships and cargoes. The
Canal is now closed to all nations. May we not hope that when it is opened it shall
be opened to all nations without distinction of flag in conformity to the Constantinople Convention and the resolutions of the Security Council?
This, then, is the summary of our position We are still convinced of the necessity, the justice, the rectitude of what we had to do for Israel's defense against
an open threat to destroy it. This salutary resistance may be written in history as
a triumphant assertion that small democracies have a right to live and not only

large dictatorships supported

by

larger Powers,
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We
it

shall carry out our 8 November undertaking, but there
out which might lead to war There is a way of carrying

is
it

Alternatives

a way of carrying
out which gives a

We

choose, urge and advocate the latter course. These problems
seriously and constructively and rapidly discussed.
invite the United Nations authorities concerned with the implementation of

chance of peace

must be

We

these resolutions to consider with us the proposals which we have conceived and
might continue to present for carrying out the agreed principle of withdrawal from

Egypt

in a

manner conducive to peaceful conditions in the area to be affected by
meantime we would urge the necessity of avoiding any

the withdrawal. In the

increase of tension, including such increase of tension as arises from false reports
I will again repeat the denial which I gave from this rostrum yesterday of

mischievous reports asserting an imminent danger to Syria from troop concentrations in Israel. There is no foundation whatever for those reports which have
unfortunately been transmitted not only by Syria but by other representatives
have invited United Nations observers to study the scene on the IsraelSyrian frontier. Their report, which entirely disputes the Syrian contention, has

here.

We

now been made

available

and

it

is

the hope of

General will find means of making

my

known

it

to

delegation that the SecretaryMembers of the General

all

Assembly.

A final consideration brings us back to the crux of our problem, whether the
implementation of the General Assembly's resolution is to be succeeded by a state
of war. This belligerency, this state of war, is the great paradox of this discussion
A nation claims and exercises a state of war against its neighbor and then complains about the absence of peace Egypt behaves to Israel as though there is war.
behave towards Egypt as though there is peace. Egypt comes
United Nations and says, "I seek your protection; I am
only working for Israel's destruction; I am at war with Israel; I wish to send
people to Israel to kill and to plunder; I will seize Israel's ships in international

Israel

is

called

upon

to

in full belligerency to the

waterways;

I

will

build

up armaments

for Israel's destruction;

alliances to bring about Israel's downfall

while I do

all

I ask the

I

will

concert

United Nations to protect

me

of this."

The complete

incongruity of belligerency in the system of the Charter

is

the

shocking and tragic spectacle that we have seen.
In conclusion we seek the understanding and counsel of the General Assembly
on the need for carrying out our 8 November undertaking in conditions which will

prevent a recurrence of the conflict.
of our heart because we know what
our

War

of Independence, the

We

call for this

here at stake

is

hundreds

prudence out of the depths
The thousands who fell in

fields by Nasser and
push disaster away a few weeks
speak out of the deep pathos of a people

slain in

homes and

his fellow potentates, the lives lost in the effort to

ago

these are

all

vividly before us.

We

which more than any other has faced the prospect of physical extinction in its
journey across history and which during eight years of its statehood has unreasonably been called upon to live under the dark and dreadful shadow of physical
destruction. It is then in the name of that sentiment that we say: Let Sinai become
a place of peace and not a base of war. Let the closed waterway of Suez be

opened Let the open waterway

means of avoiding
is

fatal for peace.

at the

Gulf of Aqaba not be closed Let us find
and Israel forces which

that explosive proximity of Egyptian
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The danger and opportunity walk here hand

in

hand

It is within our capacity

in a matter of days so to arrange affairs that the recent struggle
last

page

might be the

in the chapter of Egyptian-Israel conflict.

Joint Declaration on Middle East Policy:

USSR

and Communist China

January

8,

1957

In the course of an all-around exchange of opinion, both sides have recorded
and major
complete unanimity of views on the present day international situation
international problems. Following the Geneva conference of 1954, the four-headsof-Government conference of 1955 and the Bandung Conference of Asian and
African countries, an obvious tendency toward a detente appeared In the international situation, and ideas of peaceful coexistence between states with different

systems began to prevail in the minds of the people,
a result of the armed attack of the imperialist aggressive forces against Egypt
and their subversive activities in Hungary, the tendency of easing the international
forces.
situation has run up against the obstacles and destructive resistance of these
With the support of the Socialist states and the other peaceable states and
nations of the world, the peoples of Egypt and Hungary have achieved victory^in
their heroic and resolute struggle. The conspiracies of the imperialist aggressive
The imperialists, however, cannot reconcile
circles have suffered utter defeat
social

As

themselves to this and continue their aggressive subversive activity.
is proceeding
facts indicate that the development of international events
the world must be constantly
of
All
the
roads
tortuous
peoples
peace-loving
along
the
on the alert and prepared to wage a consistent and prolonged struggle against

The

mechinations of the aggressive imperialist forces.

and war preparation
emphasize that, unlike the policy of aggression
of the United
the
headed
groups
monopoly
the
by
camp
imperialist
pursued by
a policy of
are
following
steadfastly
States, the countries of the Socialist camp

Both

sides

upholding and safeguarding world peace.

and

Asia
At the same time, there are many nationally independent states in
abide by the policy
which
as
firmly
India,
a
such
and
power
great
Africa,
primarily
of peace and neutrality.
that also come
There are not a few states in Europe and other areas of the world
for
such a policy.
a
to
show
tendency
out for peace and neutrality, or are beginning
are growing with every day
war
to
and
opposed
forces
Public
championing peace

on

all

continents.

from the
Contradictions and disagreements in the camp of imperialism arising
are
influence
of
growing
and
markets
spheres
struggle for raw material sources,

more deep and acute with every
With the exception of the
peoples of

all

day.

a few imperialist states the
aggressive forces in
war
the world yearn for peace and come out against

The Eisenhower Doctrine and
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Alternatives

The united forces of peace in the Socialist states, the nationally independent
and other peaceable countries and nations are far superior to the forces of aggressive imperialist blocs

If all the peaceable forces in the international arena unite,

join efforts in a resolute struggle,
will definitely

any

intrigues of the aggressive imperialist quarters

be frustrated

Both sides note that after Britain, France and Israel had suffered defeat in their
aggression against Egypt, American imperialism is trying to make use of the
Britain and France
situation so as to take the place of the colonialist powers
in the Near and Middle East, to suppress the movement for national independence
and enslave the peoples of these countries, and is also striving to step up the
policy of aggression and war preparations in this area.
This is precisely the essence of the so-called Eisenhower doctrine This colonialpolicy of the United States in the Near and Middle East creates fresh tensions
arena of hostilities caused by the aggression against Egypt.

ist

in this area, recently the

the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China
policy of the United States and are ready to continue
rendering the necessary support of the peoples of the Near and Middle East so as
to prevent aggression and interference in the affairs of the countries in this area.

The Governments of
resolutely condemn this

With a view

completely eliminating the consequences of imperialist aggresGovernments hold that it is necessary to satisfy the Egyptian
Government's lawful demand for complete compensation by Britain, France and
to

sion in Egypt, both
Israel of the

damage caused by

their aggressive actions

Both Governments resolutely come out against any imperialist machinations
aimed at placing the Suez Canal under "international control" and are for the
settlement of the question of free passage of shipping through the Suez Canal by

way
for

of negotiations between the states concerned on the basis of complete respect

Egyptian sovereignty.

The Governments

of the Soviet Union and China wholeheartedly support the
and nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America in their striving to fight
against colonialism, to uphold and consolidate their national independence, sovereignty and freedom, to achieve industrial progress and economic independence.
In the struggle against war, against colonialism and in defense of world peace,
the Socialist states and the nationally independent countries can effect all-round
countries

cooperation in conformity with the five principles of peaceful coexistence
The facts show that this sincere cooperation has already played an important
part in present-day international affairs Friendly cooperation of the Socialist

have won their national independence accords both their
and the interests of world peace.

states with countries that

mutual national

interests

Both Government delegations note
movement and perpetrating aggression

that in suppressing the national liberation
against the nations that have won their na-

independence, the aggressive imperialist alignments do not give up their
attempts to conduct subversive activity against the Socialist states
u
Of late, the aggressive imperialist alignments are intensifying the cold war"

tional

.

and conducting subversive activities against the Soviet Union, against communism
and the cause of peace
It is necessary to be vigilant in the face of these schemes. The Soviet Union
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and China are united with all the
mutual assistance commitments.

Any

Socialist states

189

by

their fraternal friendship

and

provocative actions of the aggressive imperialist forces aimed at underSocialist states will meet with the most resolute rebuff

mining the

Soviet Proposals for the Middle East:
a note handed to U.S. Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen

From

February 13, 1957

As a result of the efforts of the peace-loving peoples, supported by the United
Nations, the aggressive actions against Egypt were liquidated, and favorable conditions arose and real possibilities emerged for insuring peace and also for the
Near and Middle East
war in this region provided prerequisites for
the strengthening of national independence, sovereignty and economic development
not only in Egypt but in all the countries of the Near and Middle East, and also
opened the way for the broad cooperation of the countries of this region with all
countries on the principles of equality in relations between states as formulated in
solution of international problems in the

The

liquidation of the hot-bed of

the decisions of the

Bandung conference [of Asian-African nations in 1955],
The peace-loving peoples justly expected that henceforth peace in the Near and

Middle East could be preserved and strengthened, and that an end would be put
to the policy of foreign interference in the internal affairs of this region, that the
sovereignty and independence of the countries of the Near and Middle East would
be sincerely respected, and that the countries of this region, and in particular the
victim of aggression Egypt will be given selfless economic aid.
However, the period of amelioration of the tense situation in this region was
regrettably short, and the hopes of the peoples were not justified. As a result of
the unilateral steps taken by certain powers, the situation in the Near and Middle
East has recently become very much more acute. This is mainly caused by the fact
that it is still intended to use
without the consent of the United Nations and in
a unilateral manner the armed forces of one of the great powers in the Near and

Middle East, at the discretion of that power, in order to interfere

in the internal

affairs of this region.

There
the

is

also the proposition for providing economic aid for the countries of
East, along with the imposition upon them of conditions by

Near and Middle

which these countries are to renounce any ties with certain countries which are
members of the United Nations that is, to accept political conditions for such
aid that are incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of these countries and
with the high principles of the United Nations.
One cannot fail to be aware that the carrying out of such a policy, outside the
framework of the United Nations, would lead to a new and dangerous worsening
of the situation in the region, which has so recently been the theatre of military
action resulting from the aggression against Egypt, and would represent a threat
to the cause of peace throughout the world.

The Eisenhower Doctrine and

190

Alternatives

is nothing but a continuation of a policy of isolated,
as NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, and the
blocs
such
military
aggressive
barriers between states.
setting up of artificial economic and political
At the basis of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union lies the principle of the

The aforementioned plan

differences in their social or state
peaceful coexistence of states, irrespective of
its friendly relations with the Arab
in
known
fact
a
It
is
that,
establishing
system.
deterioration in the relations
countries, the Soviet Union not only did not seek any

of those countries with other great powers, but on the contrary upheld the need
for broad international cooperation, and the need to insure stable peace and the
creation of an atmosphere of trust in the area of the

Near and Middle East.

Soviet Union does not possess, and does not wish to possess, military bases
or any kind of concessions in countries of the Near and Middle East for the purpose of making profits, nor does it seek to obtain any kind of privileges in that

The

area, because all that

is

The Soviet Union is
the Near and Middle

incompatible with the principles of Soviet foreign policy
be peace in the area of

vitally interested that there should

East, situated in direct proximity to its borders It is
sincerely interested in the consolidation of the national independence of the countries of that

area and in their economic prosperity.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government the preservation of peace in the Near
and Middle East is a necessary condition not only for the development of the
countries of the Near and Middle East, but, as recent events have shown for
of many other countries. The need to
Near and Middle East demands a broad
economic and cultural ties between all countries, and

the economic prosperity
strengthen peace and security in the

safeguarding

development of political,
joint action by the great powers primarily responsible for peace, this being particularly in accord with the United Nations Charter.
The Soviet Government considers that, by joint efforts on the part of the great
powers, the U S S R the U S.A Britain and France, the permanent United Nations
,

,

Security Council members, it would be possible to secure lasting and stable peace
in that area if all the afore-mentioned great powers built their relations with
countries of the

Near and Middle East on the

basis of the general principle of a
for their national

policy of noninterference in their internal affairs and respect

independence and sovereignty
Proceeding from the above-mentioned, the Soviet Government addresses to the
governments of the USA, Britain and France the proposal to work out and to
proclaim basic principles in matters of peace and security in the Near and Middle

East and of noninterference into the internal affairs of the countries of this region.
These principles could be made the foundations of a joint declaration, the
adoption of which would exclude the possibility of any dangerous, unilateral action
by this or that great power in regard to the countries of Near and Middle East,

and would help to strengthen peace and security in this most important region, to
develop national economy and to consolidate the independence of these countries.
It is self-evident it would be open to any state interested in peace and security,
which desires to build its relations with the countries of the Near and Middle East
on the basis of the mentioned principles, to subscribe to this declaration
Proposals regarding the obligations of the member-powers under the declaration
could at once be conveyed to the governments and peoples of the Near and Middle
East countries.
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The Foreign Ministry appends the basic stipulations of the draft declaration
by the four powers the U.S.S.R the U.S A Britain and France as proposed
by the U.S S.R. Government, and would be grateful to the United States Embassy
for information regarding the acceptability to the United States Government of
,

,

the draft of the basic principles expounded in the declaration regarding peace and
security in the Near and Middle East and non-interference into the internal affairs
of the countries of this region.
The Soviet Government would have no objection to the Governments of the
United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union coming out with separate
declarations (of similar context) regarding their relations with the countries of the
East, based on the principles expounded in the attached draft.

Near and Middle

Draft of the basic principles of declarations by the Governments of the
U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Britain and France regarding the question of peace and
security in the Near and Middle East and non-interference in the internal
affairs of the countries of this region

U.S.S.R., the U.S.A the United Kingdom and the French Republic, guided by lofty
peace-loving aims and the principles of the United Nations as expressed in its
Charter, declare their agreement that at the basis of their policy in respect of the
,

Near and Middle East lies the desire to establish peace and
Near and Middle East and throughout the world; acknowledge and
respect the lofty principles of relations between states formulated at the Bandung
conference of Asian and African countries; strive to create favorable conditions
countries

of the

security in the

for the strengthening of the national independence and national sovereignty of the
countries of the Near and Middle East; express a sincere desire to contribute

by common efforts, to the economic development of the countries
of this area, and are in this proceeding from the fact that the natural wealth of
the underdeveloped countries is the inalienable national property of the peoples of
these countries, which have the full right to dispose of and use it in the interests
disinterestedly,

of the development of their national economy and progress.
The Governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.S A., Britain and France, desire to

contribute to the all-round development of economic, business and cultural relations of the countries of the Near and Middle East with all countries, on the basis
of equality and mutual advantage; are of the opinion that wide economic and trade
relations for the countries of this area accord not only with the interests of these
countries but also with the securing of the economic prosperity for other countries
of the world, and recognize the need for a peaceful settlement of all outstanding
international problems

and questions

relating to the

Near and Middle East by

way of negotiations
Aware of the importance

of the responsibility they bear for the maintenance of
the
of the U.S S
peace and security throughout the world, the Governments
in their policy in respect
U.S.A., Britain and France pledge themselves to follow,

R

Near and Middle East, the principles stated below
The presentation of peace in the Near and Middle East by settling questions
issue exclusively by peaceful means, on the basis of the method of negotiations.
Near and
2. Noninterference in the internal affairs of the countries of the

of the
1.

at

,

Middle East. Respect for the sovereignty and independence

of these countries
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3. Refusal to undertake
any attempts to draw these countries into military
alignments with the participation of the great powers.
4. The liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign
troops from

the territory of countries of the

Near and Middle

East.

Joint refusal to supply arms to countries of the Near and Middle East.
Assistance in the economic development of countries of the Near and Middle

5.

6.

East, without putting forward any political, military or other conditions incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of these countries.
The Governments of the US.SR., the U.S.A the United Kingdom and the
,

French Republic express the hope that other states as well will, in their relations
with countries of the Near and Middle East, adhere to the same principles.

From Address
Guy Mollet

to National Press Club:

February 27, 1957

... Of course, the President [Eisenhower] and I have broached the subject of
the Middle East. Without concealing our disagreements of the
we
past

months,
have recorded that our respective positions have always been clear-cut so that our
mutual confidence has remained unchanged. We have one common
purpose, which
is the restoration of a lasting
peace in the Middle East, a peace based on justice
and international law.

The worst
tion as

it

possible formula would be to return purely and simply to the situaexisted prior to the so-called Israeli aggression. This would even consti-

tute a crime against peace. All of us have had the
weakness, for eight years, to
allow disturbances to develop and to
accept an undeclared war, as the United
Nations' resolutions were repeatedly flaunted. Our peoples would not allow us to
repeat the same tragic error.

We

must strike at the very factors of this state of tension, at all the factors.
piecemeal or temporary solution in the Middle East will always be a bad solution. Some of the factors of the
present situation are geographic, others are purely

A

political.

The

first

of these "geographic" factors concerns the frontier of Israel

fact the very existence of the State of Israel.
circled as

Let us not forget that

and

in

Israel, en-

by ill-intentioned neighbors and subjected to repeated aggressions
by Egypt, was forced to resort to its elementary right of selfdefense. I refuse to brand this State as an
aggressor.
Israel was born under the
auspices of the United Nations. It is entitled to have
it

is

chiefly instigated

the question of
teed.

its

frontiers definitely settled

At the same time as

this

and

its

territorial integrity

guaran-

problem of the Arab refugees
in Gaza, until
yesterday a base for attacks against Israel, must also be settled.
The second of these factors is the Gulf of Aqaba. Bordered
by four States, the
Gulf of Aqaba is an international
waterway. To guarantee free
problem

is

settled, the

passage through
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the Straits of Tiran, and thus to prevent the choking of Israel,

implementing international law.
The third factor is the Suez Canal

Egypt without any military
months with respect to the

The

is

deliberate sabotage of the Canal

justification, as well as the blackmail of the past

clearing up of a channel, are proof that
the signature of the Egyptian Government.

little trust in

nothing but

we can

by
two

place

The Suez
free, in

Canal, an international waterway, like the Gulf of Aqaba. must be kept
accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, from political inter-

ference on the part of any country and,
The economic life of Europe and of

all, on the part of Egypt.
countries of Southeast Asia cannot

of

first

many

possibly depend on the goodwill of an Egyptian dictator.
The elimination of these three factors of tension may be obtained through the
must not
customary international procedures. Some have already been started.

We

relax our efforts before a general settlement has been reached.

The problems which
I shall rate first the

I

have called

Pan-Arab

3

'

are even

''political

more

serious.

Egypt and Soviet

activities of

Among

them,

infiltration in the

Middle East.

A

year ago, when the French Government was denouncing the Pan- Arab ambi-

A

tions of Colonel Nasser, the response it met with was at times rather skeptical
definite scheme had, however, been outlined in "The Philosophy of the Revolu-

tion."

In

this book,

Nasser has proclaimed

his will to unify the

Arab world from the

1

Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf around a "hero," himself, and to use for this

aim against the West the instrument of blackmail which the geographic position
of his country has put into his hands, the Suez Canal and the oil of the Middle
East. Subsequent events have proved that these were not empty threats.
Denouncing Pan-Arabism does not mean attacking the Arab world and even
less so the

Moslem community.

Isn't France, in

any

case, a

Moslem power 5 Pan-

Arabism is not the expression of the feelings of a people. Like Pan-Germanism and
Pan-Slavism which other dictators have made famous, it is a myth, in the name
of which the independence of peoples is being threatened.
It would be the worst possible mistake to answer this

Arab propaganda spread-

ing from Cairo and Damascus with concessions or counter-propaganda. The free
nations must make a stand; they must show the rest of the world that provocations
never pay and that one cannot compromise when the respect of international
obligations

is

at stake.

Such a task

will require time,

much

firmness and a large

dose of confidence.
the more necessary as Pan-Arabism is the best tool of
Following Lenin's advice, the leaders of Soviet Russia bring
aid to all movements of extreme nationalism. Cairo and Damascus, fountainUnion.
springs of Pan-Arabisrn, are also the strongest bridgeheads of the Soviet
The French Government has acknowledged the extreme importance of President
on the Middle East. The United States has acted with
Eisenhower's

Yet such
Communist

effort

is

all

infiltration.

message

know that Soviet Russia
leadership. Is has served well the cause of peace and we
is not indifferent to warnings such as the one she has just received.
in dealing in greater details with these
I do not want to abuse

your patience
they deserve a more thorough analysis Their settlement
and long-range policy. This, I indirequires that the free world engage in a joint
cated to the President of the United States.

problems, however

much

.

.

.
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Statement by Four Arab Leaders:
Cairo Radio Broadcast

From

February 27, 1957

A meeting

was held between the 25th of the month of Rajab, 1376, corresponding
25th of February, 1957, and 27th of the month of Rajab, 1376, correspondSaud Ibn Ebdum Aziz
ing to the 27th of February, 1957, between His majesty King
al Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, His Majesty King Hussein I, King
to the

of the

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; His Excellency Shukri al-Kuwatly, President
Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the

of the Republic of Syria; His Excellency
Republic of Egypt, and their statesmen.

This was the fourth in a series of meetings that they hold from time to time in
order to study the international situation and to discuss problems affecting the Arab
nations, the course of their life, progress, and very existence
The participants [in the conference] were informed of the laudable efforts made

by His Majesty King Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz

in the course of his visit to the

United

States of America, the elucidations made by His Majesty to statesmen [in the
United States] on the Arab points of view with regard to Middle East problems

and the subjects of the discussions.
His Majesty also gave an account of explanations given by him to President
Eisenhower with particular reference to Arab rights and problems, including the
recent aggression against Egypt and its results, as well as Egypt's rights to sovereignty over the Suez Canal, and the seriousness of Israel's noncompliance with the
United Nations resolutions that stipulate an unconditional withdrawal from the

Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba beyond the armistice
gaming any advantages as a result of the triple aggression.

lines

without Israel's

The conferees affirm their anxiousness to play their part in the international
sphere and to contribute to the creation of international relations on a basis conducive to peace, justice and well-being and respect for their sovereignty and
interests.

Their strength having grown through the unity of their people, their faith in the
safety of their aims having grown, the Arab countries meeting at the conference
reaffirm their earlier declared determination to protect the Arab nation from the

harm of

the "cold

war" and

neutrality thus preserving

They

its

its real

dispute and to abide by the policy of positive
national interests.

also affirm the fact that the defense of the

from the Arab nation

Arab world should emanate
and outside the scope of

in the light of its real security

foreign pacts.

The participants note that, despite the United Nations Resolution and in defiance of unanimous world public opinion of the necessity of Israel's withdrawal
beyond the armistice

lines, the triple

aggression against Egypt

still

exists in all its
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and aspects since Israel has not complied with the United Nations
on unconditional withdrawal.

resolu-

effects

tions

The participants [in the conference] hold, moreover, that peace and security in
the Middle East is in jeopardy while the population of Gaza continues to suffer
acute oppression and maltreatment at the hand of Israel.
Therefore, the conferees have decided:
1. To work for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel beyond the
armistice lines.
2.

To uphold

3.

The

1

in full the rights of the Palestine Arabs
over the territories and territorial waters

necessity on the part of the aggressive states to compensate Egypt for

damages and

To

and the Arabs sovereignty
all

losses caused through their aggression

made with the view to reducing Egypt's sovereignty
Suez Canal as the Suez Canal is an integral part of Egypt, her
sovereignty over the canal is absolute, and the freedom of navigation in the canal
is
regulated in accordance with the provisions of the 18SS Constantinople
Convention.
5. To
condemn British aggression against the territories of Yemen and to
4

and

reject all attempts

rights over the

solidarity with Yemen in stemming this aggression
support absolutely the rights of the Arabs of Algeria to freedom and
independence and the courageous struggle against imperialist force

assume an attitude of
6.

To

The conferees hold

that their liberal policy, emanating from their faith in the
of their nation to a free and independent life and rooted in their Arab
patriotism which has proved to the world its real existence, increases their solidarity

right

in order to attain the

Arab

nation's aspirations of freedom, unity and progress.

SECTION

4

The Continuing Struggle

Proclamation of the United Arab Republic

February

1,

1958

On February 1, 1958, in a historic session held at Kubbah Palace in Cairo, His
Excellency President Shukry El-Kuwatly of Syria, and President Gamal AbdelNasser of Egypt, met the representatives of the Republics of Syria and Egypt,
El-Sayed, Sabry El-Assaly, El-Sayed Abdel-Latif El-Baghdady, El-Sayed Khaled
El-Azm,

Anwar

El-Sayed

Zakana Mohieddin,

El-Sayed

Hamed El-Khoga, El-Sayed
Maamoun El-Kozbary, El-

El-Sadat, El-Sayed Fakher El Kayyaly, El-Sayed

Sayed Hussein El-Shaffei, El-Sayed Assaad Haroun, General Abdel-Hakim Amer,
El-Sayed Salaheddin El-Bittar, El-Sayed Kamaleddin Hussein, El-Sayed Khalil
El-Kallas, El-Sayed Noureddine Tarraf, El-Sayed Saleh Akeel, El-Sayed Fathy
Radwan, General Afif El-Bizry, El-Sayed Mahmoud Fawzy, El-Sayed Kamal Ramzi
Stino, El-Sayed Aly Sabri, El-Sayed Abdel-Rahman El-Azm and El-Sayed Mah-

mound

Riad.

The purpose

meeting was to discuss the final measures to be taken for
Arab peoples' will, and the execution of what the constitutions
of both republics stipulate, namely that the people of each of them form a part of
the Arab Nation They, therefore, discussed the decisions unanimously approved by
the National Assembly of Egypt and the Syrian House of Representatives that
unity should be established between the two countries as a preliminary step towards
the realisation of complete Arab unity. They also discussed the clear signs manifest
in the past few years, that Arab nationalism was the inspiring spirit that dominated
the history of Arabs in all their different countries, their common present and
of this

the realization of the

the hoped-for future of every Arab.
They came to the conclusion that this unity which is the fruit of Arab nationalism is the Arabs' path to sovereignty and freedom, that it is one of humanity's

gateways to peace and co-operation, and that it is therefore their duty to take
this unity with persistence and determination staunch and unwavering, out of the
circle of wishes and aspirations to where it can be converted into a reality. They
came out of this with the conviction that the elements conducive to the success of
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the union of the two republics were abundant,
particularly recently after their
which had brought them even closer to one another made the
struggle
meaning of nationalism considerably clearer, stressed the fact that it \\as a move-

joint

ment

for liberation

and rehabilitation and that

it

was a

faith in peace

and co-opera-

tion

For all this, the participants declare their total agreement, complete faith and
deeply rooted confidence in the necessity of uniting Egypt and Syria into one state
to be named "The United Arab Republic."
They have likewise decided to declare their unanimous agreement on the adoption
of a presidential democratic system of government for the Arab Republic The
executive authority shall be vested in the head of the state assisted by the ministers
appointed by him and responsible to him.
The legislative authority shall be vested in one legislative house The new republic shall have one flag, one army, one people who shall remain joined in a unity

where

all will

share equal rights and duties, where

their country with heart

and

soul,

and compete

all \\ill call

for the protection of

in the consolidation of its integrity

and the insurance of its unvulnerability.
His Excellency President Shukry El-Kuwatly and President Gamal Abdel-Nasser
will each deliver a statement to the people in the Syrian and the Egyptian Parliaments respectively on Wednesday, February 5, 1958 in which they \\ill announce
the decisions reached in this meeting and explain the principles of the unity on
which this rising young republic shall stand
The peoples of Egypt and Syria shall be called upon to participate in a general
plebiscite on the principles of this unity and the choice of the head of the state
within thirty days.

In proclaiming these decisions, the participants feel great pride and overwhelming
joy in having assisted in taking this positive step on the road to Arab unity and
a unity which had been for many an epoch and many a generation the
solidarity
Arab's much cherished hope and greatly coveted objective In deciding on the unity
of both nations, the participants declare that their unity aims at the unification of
all the Arab peoples and affirm that the door is open for participation to any
Arab state desirous of joining them in a union or federation for the purpose
of protecting the

Arab peoples from harm and

and safeguarding

its

May God

evil,

protect this step

we have taken and

vigilant care and benevolence so that the
of unity may live in dignity and peace.

His ever

strengthening Arab sovereignty,

existence.

those which are to follow with

Arab people under the banner
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The Arab Federation:
Joint Communique of Iraq and Jordan
February

14,

1958

WHEREAS

the great Arab Revolt, led by His late Majesty Al-Hussein Ibn All,
heralding the birth of a new dawn for the Arab Nation, and reflected by sacrifice for
the liberation of the Greater Arab Motherland and the unification of its peoples and
lands with the aim of regaining the station of the Arabs among the nations of
and contributing to the advancement of civilization; and

its

the world

WHEREAS

derived its inspiration from the will of the
freedom and unity on the basis of their glorious history and their
faith in themselves and the immortal message of their Nationalism, and
WHEREAS the message of the Arab Revolt whose author gave his life in its
cause descended to sons and grandsons, inherited by generation after generation
as the torch that guides the Nation of the Arabs in its march towards the achieve-

Arabs

that blessed Revolt

to achieve

ment

of its cherished aims of comprehensive unity and full freedom and sovereignty
and for the recovery of its glory, the preservation of its sacred inheritance and the
realization of its aspirations for an auspicious future under this blessed unity
therefore, the two Hashemite States have resolved to form a Federation
between them based on these high aims, and in fulfillment of this object and their
National aims agreement has been reached on what follows
1. An Arab Federation is formed between the Kingdom of
Iraq and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to be known as the Arab Federation and to take effect as
from Friday, 24 Rajab 1377 A H corresponding to 14th February 1958 A D

NOW

:

This Federation shall be open to the other Arab States
to

who may wish

to adhere

it.

Each of the two

States shall preserve its independent, international identity
sovereignty over its territories and retain its present regime of government.
3 International treaties, pacts and agreements entered into by either of the two
States before the formation of the Federation shall continue to be observed by the
2.

and

its

State that concluded

them but

shall not bind the other State

As

for international

pacts and agreements that may be concluded after the establishment of
the Federation and which shall come within the terms of the Federation, these
treaties,

shall

4

come under the competence and authority of the Federal Government.
As from the date of the official proclamation of the establishment of the

Federation, measures for the complete unification of the following matters shall be
executed by the two States of the Federation
.

(c)

The unification of Foreign Policy and Diplomatic representation
The unification of the Armies of Jordan and Iraq (the Arab Army)
The removal of Customs barriers between the two States and unification

(d)

The

(a)

(b)

of their

Customs laws

unification of educational

programmes
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5. The two parties agree to take the
necessary steps as quickly as possible to
unify currency and co-ordinate economic and financial policies between the two

States.

When

6

necessity or the interests of the Federation require the unification of
in Article 4, the necessary steps shall be taken in accord-

any matter not mentioned

ance with the Constitution of the Federation to bring such matters within the
competence and authority of the Federal Govenment.
7. The flag of the Arab Revolt shall be the
flag of the Federation and of the

two

States.

(a) Federal matters shall be dealt with by the Federal
of a Legislative Chamber and Executive Authority
8.

(b)

The members

of the Legislative

ments of Iraq and Jordan

Chamber

shall

from among
numbers

respectively,

Government

consisting

be elected by the Parlia-

their

own members,

the

two

States to be equally represented in
(c) The members of the Executive Authority shall be appointed in accordance
with the Provisions of the Federal Constitution to assume responsibility for the

matters which come within the competence of the Federal Government.
9. The King of Iraq shall be the Head of the Federal Government and in the
event of his absence for any reason, the King of Jordan shall be head Each of the

two Kings shall retain his Constitutional powers in his own Kingdom. In the event
of any other State adhering to the Federation, the question of Head of the Federation shall be reconsidered as circumstances may require.
10 The seat of the Federal Government shall alternate between Baghdad and
Amman and for a period of six months in each
11. (a) The Federal Government shall draw up a Constitution for the Federation in accordance with the bases set out in this Agreement and the Constitution
of each of the two States shall be modified to the extent and limits required by the
provisions of the Federal Constitution.
(b) The necessary steps and measures shall be taken to establish the Federal
Government and draw up the Federal Constitution \\ithin a period not exceeding
three months within the date of the signature of this Agreement.

This Agreement shall be ratified according to the Constitutional procedures obDone at Basman Palace, Amman, This Friday 24 Rajab

served in the two States.
1377,

A

H. corresponding

to 14th February 1958 A.

D.

Statement on Sending Troops to Lebanon:
Dwight D. Eisenhower

July 15, 1958

Yesterday morning I received from President Chamoun of Lebanon an urgent
plea that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon to help maintain
security and to evidence the concern of the United States for the integrity and
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independence of Lebanon. President Chamoun's appeal was made with the concurrence of all of the members of the Lebanese Cabinet.
President Chamoun made clear that he considered an immediate United States
response imperative if Lebanon's independence, already menaced from without,
were to be preserved in the face of the grave developments which occurred yester-

day
of

in

its

Baghdad whereby the
members martyred.

lawful Government was violently overthrown and

many

In response to this appeal from the Government of Lebanon, the United States
has dispatched a contingent of United States forces to Lebanon to protect American
lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese Government in defense
of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity. These forces have not been sent as any act
They will demonstrate the concern of the United States for the inde-

of war.

pendence and integrity of Lebanon, which we deem vital to the national interest
and world peace. Our concern will also be shown by economic assistance. We shall
act in accordance with these legitimate concerns.

The United States, this morning, will report its action to an emergency meeting
of the United Nations Security Council. As the United Nations Charter recognizes,
an inherent right of collective self-defense. In conformity with the spirit
is reporting the measures taken by it to the
Security Council of the United Nations, making clear that these measures will be
terminated as soon as the Security Council has itself taken the measures necessary
there

is

of the Charter, the United States

and security.
States believes that the United Nations can and should take measures

to maintain international peace

The United

which are adequate to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. It is
apparent, however, that in the face of the tragic and shocking events that are
occurring near by, more will be required than the team of United Nations observers
now in Lebanon. Therefore, the United States will support in the United Nations
measures which seem to be adequate to meet the new situation and which will
enable the United States forces promptly to be withdrawn
Lebanon is a small peace-loving state with which the United States has traditionally had the most friendly relations. There are in Lebanon about 2,500 Americans
and we cannot, consistently with our historic relations and with the principles of
the United Nations, stand idly by when Lebanon appeals itself for evidence of our
concern and when Lebanon may not be able to preserve internal order and to

defend

itself against indirect aggression.

Address to Congress:
Dwight D. Eisenhower

July 15, 1958

On

July 14, 1958, I received an urgent request from the President of the ReLebanon that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon Presi-

public of

dent

Chamoun

stated that, without an immediate showing of United States support,
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to survive.

with the concurrence of

all

the

This request by President
of the Lebanese

members

Cabinet. I have replied that we would do this and a contingent of United States
Marines has now arrived in Lebanon This initial dispatch of troops \vill be augmented as required. United States forces will be withdrawn as rapidly as circumstances permit.

Simultaneously, I requested that an urgent meeting of the United Nations
Security Council be held on July 15, 1958. At that meeting, the permanent representative of the United States reported to the Council the action which this
government has taken. He also expressed the hope that the United Nations could

soon take further effective measures to meet more fully the situation in Lebanon.
will continue to support the United Nations to this end.
United States forces are being sent to Lebanon to protect American lives and

We

Government of Lebanon in the preservation of
and independence, which have been deemed vital to
United States national interests and world peace
About two months ago a violent insurrection broke out in Lebanon, particularly
along the border with Syria, which with Egypt forms the United Arab Republic
This revolt was encouraged and strongly backed by the official Cairo, Damascus
and Soviet radios, which broadcast to Lebanon in the Arabic language The insurrection was furthered by sizable amounts of arms, ammunition and money and by
personnel infiltrated from Syria to fight against the lawful authorities The avowed
purpose of these activities was to overthrow the legally constituted Government of
Lebanon and to install by violence a Government which would subordinate the
independence of Lebanon to the policies of the United Arab Republic.
Lebanon referred this situation to the United Nations Security Council. In view
of the international implications of what was occurring in Lebanon, the Security
Council on June 11, 1958, decided to send observers into Lebanon for the purpose
of insuring that further outside assistance to the insurrection would cease. The

by

their presence

Lebanon's

to

assist the

territorial integrity

Secretary General of the United Nations subsequently undertook a mission to the
area to reinforce the work of the observer.
It was our belief that the efforts of the Secretary General and of the United
Nations observers were helpful in reducing further aid in terms of personal and
military equipment from across the frontiers of Lebanon. There was a basis for
hope that the situation might be moving toward a peaceful solution, consonant with
the continuing integrity of Lebanon, and that the aspect of indirect aggression from
7

without was being brought under control.
The situation was radically changed, however, on July 14 when there was a
violent outbreak in Baghdad, in nearby Iraq Elements in Iraq strongly sympathetic to the United Arab Republic seem to have murdered or driven from office
individuals comprising the lawful government of that country. We do not yet know

what extent they have succeeded We do have reliable information that
important Iraqui leaders have been murdered.
We share with the Government of Lebanon the view that these events in Iraq
demonstrate a ruthlessness of aggresive purpose which tiny Lebanon can not combat

in detail to

without further evidence of support from other friendly nations.
After the most detailed consideration, I have concluded that, given the developments in Iraq, the measures thus far taken by the United Nations Security Council
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are not sufficient to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. I have
considered, furthermore, the question of our responsibility to protect and safe-

guard American citizens in Lebanon, of whom there are about 2,500. Pending the
taking of adequate measures by the United Nations, the United States will be
acting pursuant to what the United Nations Charter recognizes is an inherent
the right of all nations to work together and to seek help when necessary to
preserve their independence. I repeat that we wish to withdraw our forces as soon
as the United Nations has taken further effective steps designed to safeguard

right

Lebanese independence.

which have been occurring in Lebanon represent infrom without, and that such aggression endangers the independence
and integrity of Lebanon.
It is recognized that the step now being taken may have serious consequences. I
It is clear that the events

direct aggression

have, however, come to the considered and sober conclusion that despite the risk
involved, this action is required to support the principles of justice and international
law upon which peace and a stable international order depend.

Our Government has acted in response to an appeal for help from a small and
peaceful nation which has long had ties of closet friendship with the United States.
Readiness to help a friend in need is an admirable characteristic of the American
people, and I am, in this message, informing the Congress of the reasons why I
believe that the United States could not in honor stand idly by in this hour of

Lebanon's grave

peril

As we

act at the request of a friendly

government

to help

it

independence and to preserve law and order which will protect
American lives, we are acting to reaffirm and strengthen principles upon which the
safety and security of the United States depend.
to preserve

its

Arab Resolution:
United Nations General Assembly

August

20,

Compromise

1958

resolution drafted

by delegates of ten Arab

states.

The General Assembly,
Having considered the item "Question discussed

at the 838th

meeting of the

Security Council" on 7 Aug., 1958,
Noting the Charter aim that states should "practice tolerance and live together
in peace with one another as good neighbors,"

Noting that the Arab states have agreed in the pact of the League of Arab States
and numerous ties which link the Arab states, and
to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and
to strengthen the close relations

sovereignty of these states, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of
the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future

all

and the

realization of their aspirations

and hopes

Desiring to relieve international tension,

;
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A
Welcomes

the renewed assurances given by the Arab states to observe the
provisions of Article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab States that "each member shall respect the systems of government established in the other member states
1.

and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states," and that "each shall pledge
to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government/'
2. Calls upon all member states to act
strictly in accordance with the principles
of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, of nonaggression, of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and of equal

and mutual

benefit,

and

to insure that their conduct

by word and deed conforms

to

these principles;

B
Requests the Secretary General to make forthwith, in consultation with the governments concerned and in accordance with the United Nations Charter, and having
in mind Section A of this resolution, such practical arrangements as would adequately
help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon
and Jordon in the present circumstances, and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries;

C
Invites the Secretary General to continue his studies now under way and in this
context to consult as appropriate with the Arab countries of the Near East with a

view to possible assistance regarding an Arab development
further economic growth in these countries;

institution designed to

D
Requests member states to cooperate fully in carrying out this resolution;
2. Invites the Secretary General to report hereunder, as appropriate, the first
such report to be made not later than 30 September, 1958
1.
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